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Social cognitive abilities are needed to process and understand social information 
in order to respond appropriately in everyday social interactions. While there are a 
number of tests that have been developed to measure social cognition in the 
literature, many have important limitations such as only assessing one ability, 
performance being predicted by measures of intelligence and exhibiting low 
ecological validity. To address some of these limitations, I developed a new test 
called the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT). The ESCoT is an animated test 
that assesses four domains of social cognition: cognitive Theory of Mind (ToM) 
(What is X thinking?); affective ToM (How does X feel at the end of the 
animation?); interpersonal understanding of social norms (Did X behave as other 
people should behave?); and intrapersonal understanding of social norms (Would 
you have acted the same as X in the animation?). The aims of this thesis were to 
examine the validity of the ESCoT as a test of social cognition and to further 
investigate social cognitive processes in healthy and neurological populations.  
The ESCoT was firstly administered to a healthy population of older, middle-aged 
and younger adults to examine the effects of ageing on social abilities. This study 
found that the ESCoT was sensitive to age; poorer performances on cognitive and 
affective ToM and also interpersonal but not intrapersonal understanding of social 
norms were predicted by older age. Furthermore unlike traditional tests used in the 
study, performance was not predicted by measures of intelligence. Instead, the sex 
of participants and autistic-like traits, in addition to age were found to be 
important for performance.  
The ESCoT was then validated in a sample of adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD), and performance was compared to performance on established social 
cognition tests. Convergent validity was demonstrated in the study and the ESCoT 
xvii 
 
was sensitive to social cognitive difficulties found in ASD. This study also showed 
that the ESCoT was more effective than existing tests at differentiating ASD adults 
and neurotypical controls.  
The interplay of social anxiety and empathy on ESCoT performance in addition to 
further exploring sex and autistic-like traits were then examined in a younger 
adult population. Social anxiety and empathy were not significant predictors of 
performance on the ESCoT. Similar to the results of the ageing study, this study 
found that women were better than men on affective ToM. However, unlike the 
ageing study, better cognitive ToM performance was predicted by older age. Better 
performance on interpersonal understanding of social norms and ESCoT total 
scores were predicted by more years of education. 
The subsequent chapter then examined the clinical efficacy of the ESCoT in a 
patient population (Alzheimer's disease, behavioural-variant Frontotemporal 
dementia and amnestic mild cognitive impairment). Here performance on the 
ESCoT was compared between the patients and neurotypical controls. It was found 
that patients performed poorer than neurotypical controls on ESCoT total scores, 
affective ToM, inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms.  
The final chapter returned to healthy ageing to more closely investigate the 
consequences of healthy ageing on social cognitive processes, by examining the 
positivity bias (preference for positive over negative stimuli) found in older adults 
using an attention paradigm. There was no evidence of the positivity bias in older, 
middle-aged and younger adults in regards to reaction time or accuracy. However, 
older and middle-aged adults differed in accuracy across stimuli type compared to 
younger adults.   
xviii 
 
This thesis offers novel insights into the social cognitive abilities of various 
populations. The ESCoT presents a new, informative and validated test of social 
cognition for researchers and clinicians to use, which has many advantages over 
established tests of social cognition.   
The following chapters are under review for journal publication: 
Chapter 3: Baksh, R.A., Abrahams, S., Auyeung, B., & MacPherson, S.E. (under 
review). The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT): Examining the effects of age 
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review). Social cognition in adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders: Validation of 












Lay summary  
For us to interact with others, we rely on specific abilities to deal with social 
interactions. While there are many existing tests of our social abilities, some of 
these have disadvantages such as uncertainty in what they are assessing. 
Consequently, this limits their usefulness. This thesis aimed to develop a new test 
called the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) to improve the way we measure 
social abilities. The ESCoT measures our ability to deduce what someone might be 
thinking and feeling in a particular situation. It also measures our understanding 
of how others should behave and how we should behave in public.  
Through a series of studies the ESCoT was shown to be useful at identifying the 
changes that occur to our social abilities as we age. It was found to be helpful at 
identifying the social difficulties adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder experience 
better than traditional tests of social abilities. Furthermore, it showed that men and 
women differ in how well they can tell how someone else is feeling, and that our 
ability to identify how someone is thinking improves with age in young adults. The 
ESCoT was then used with patients with dementia to examine if it could be used in 
clinical settings. The results from this study showed that it is able to detect 
difficulties that dementia patients might experience in their social abilities. The 
final chapter looked at the way in which we handle emotional information as we 
age, but this study did not find support for improvements in dealing with 
emotional information with increasing age.  
The present series of studies provides support for the ESCoT as a useful test that can 
be used to measure our social abilities in different groups of people, clinical and 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Social cognitive abilities underlie our ability to process social information. This 
chapter gives an overview of two of the social cognitive abilities individuals use in 
social interactions (Theory of Mind and understanding of social norms), the tests of 
social cognition available for researchers to investigate social abilities and the 
















1. Introduction   
1.1. What is social cognition?  
The survival of an animal is dependent on social functioning; the ability to 
effectively interact with others in social situations (Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
Compared to other animal species, the social interactions in which humans engage 
are extremely complex (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 
2004). To process these complex interactions, humans have developed abilities to 
effectively interpret the social information within an interaction (Van Overwalle, 
2009). These are our social cognitive abilities.  
Social cognition has been studied from different theoretical and methodological 
perspectives, most notably in social psychology and social neuroscience (Amodio & 
Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle, 2009). Social psychologists have examined how an 
individual interacts with their constantly changing social world (Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996), neuroscientists have examined the neural networks underlying 
social cognitive abilities (Sebastian et al., 2011) while neuropsychologists have 
studied patients to understand how difficulties in social cognition affect social 
functioning and interpersonal relationships (Henry, Phillips, & Von Hippel, 2014). 
These differing perspectives have converged in the domain of social cognitive 
neuroscience (Amodio & Frith, 2006).  
While there are many varying definitions of social cognition, for this thesis social 
cognition was defined as the higher-order cognitive processes that allow 
individuals to interpret the behaviours of others (Adolphs, 2009). These abilities 
allow us to process and understand social information in order to respond 
appropriately in everyday interactions (Van Overwalle, 2009). Social cognition 
includes abilities such as theory of mind (ToM; i.e., the ability to recognise other 
people’s mental states to understand and predict their behaviour), emotion 
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recognition, empathy, moral judgments and the understanding of social norms 
(Baez, García, & Ibanez, 2016; Baez et al., 2013; Baez et al., 2012; Frith, 2008; 
Henry, Cowan, Lee, & Sachdev, 2015; Love, Ruff, & Geldmacher, 2015). The 
processing of social information has been shown to occur without conscious 
awareness (Adolphs, 2009; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Fiske & Taylor, 2013) and 
making social cognitive inferences is crucial for successful social interactions 
(Dziobek et al., 2006). This thesis will focus on ToM and understanding of social 
norms since these two social cognitive abilities are not typically explicitly 
examined together and it will draw from literature examining social cognitive 
abilities in healthy ageing adults and clinical populations, specifically adults with 
Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) and patients with dementia.  
1.2. Neuropsychology of social cognition 
Our understanding of social cognition has been informed by neuroimaging 
(Martory et al., 2015). As a consequence of such investigations, it has been shown 
that the processing of social stimuli typically engages certain brain regions 
specialized for social information (Adolphs, 2009; Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012; 
Poletti, Enrici, & Adenzato, 2012; Van Overwalle, 2009). In an early study by 
Brothers (1990), it was proposed that the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex, and 
the temporal poles are the regions activated during social interactions. As Figure 1 
shows, understanding of social cognition has significantly progressed since the 
early nineties, and it is now evident that social cognitive abilities consist of a 
complex and interconnected neural system involving the temporoparietal junction; 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC); superior temporal sulcus/gyrus, fusiform face 




1.2.1. Figure 1. The main structure and regions involved in social cognition in 
adults 
 








1.3. ToM abilities  
The notion of a ‘theory of mind’ was first introduced by Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) and popularised by Simon Baron Cohen in his work on children with ASD 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Since this seminal work showing that 
children with ASD perform poorer on ToM tasks compared to neurotypical 
controls (NC) or children with Down’s syndrome, research on ToM has received an 
immense amount of attention. Consequently, until recently ToM was often used 
interchangeably with the term social cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006; Hutchins, 
Prelock, & Bonazinga, 2012; Hutchins et al., 2016). However, ToM is not the only 
ability that falls under this heading (Baez et al., 2013; Baez et al., 2012).  ToM 
should be considered as one of several processes that form our social cognitive 
abilities.   
Recent research from imaging and behavioural studies which used patients with 
lesions and clinical populations have shown a further breakdown of social 
cognitive abilities, such that ToM should not be considered a one-dimensional 
concept (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Aharon-
Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory, Tibi-
Elhanany, & Aharon-Peretz, 2006; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, Goldsher, & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2005), with processes differing based on whether they refer to 
cognitive or affective judgements (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). Cognitive ToM is 
defined as the ability to make inferences about the intentions and beliefs of another 
individual. Affective ToM refers to the ability to make inferences about what 
another individual is feeling (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2011; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2010). Numerous studies have investigated the role that various brain 
regions have in processing cognitive versus affective ToM by examining their 
activation in response to cognitive ToM tests such as perspective taking (Hynes, 
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Baird, & Grafton, 2006) and affective ToM tests like the Faux Pas test (Stone, 
Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998).  
On tests of cognitive and affective ToM, the performance of patients with localized 
lesions in the ventromedial regions was compared to patients with dorsolateral 
lesions, mixed prefrontal lesions, and posterior lesions and with NC. It was found 
that while NC performed better on affective ToM compared to cognitive ToM, 
patients exhibited a different patterns of findings. Affective ToM was impaired by 
ventromedial damage, while cognitive ToM was mostly impaired by extensive 
prefrontal damage (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). These results were 
replicated using other tests of cognitive and affective ToM (false beliefs, false 
attribution, irony and lies) in a second lesion study. Again, patients with lesions 
localised to the ventromedial regions were significantly impaired on tests of 
affective ToM compared to cognitive ToM (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006). Moreover, 
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005) showed that lesions to the ventromedial but not 
dorsolateral PFC results in significant impairments to affective ToM but not 
cognitive ToM. In another study, performance of criminal offenders with 
psychopathic tendencies were compared to participants with localized lesions in 
the orbitofrontal or dorsolateral cortex, participants with non-frontal lesions, and 
NC. Individuals with psychopathy and those with orbitofrontal cortex lesions were 
impaired on the affective ToM inferences but not on cognitive ToM (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2010). Moreover, individuals with schizophrenia have been found to 
be more impaired on affective ToM than cognitive ToM compared to NC (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2007). Finally, using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in NC 
adults, Kalbe et al. (2010) found that stimulation over the dorsolateral PFC results 
in a selective effect on cognitive but not affective ToM. These findings suggest that 
cognitive and affective ToM abilities are partly dissociable (Shamay-Tsoory & 
Aharon-Peretz, 2007).  
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As Figure 2 shows, while both cognitive and affective ToM inferences involve the 
precuneus, temporo parietal junctions and posterior superior temporal sulci, 
cognitive ToM recruits the dorsolateral PFC while affective ToM inferences involves 
the ventromedial PFC (Hynes et al., 2006; Kalbe et al., 2010; Kipps & Hodges, 
2006; Sebastian et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005; Sommer et al., 2007; Stone et al., 1998; Stuss, Gallup 
Jr, & Alexander, 2001). 
1.3.1. Figure 2. Model of the shared but distinct neural systems for cognitive and 
affective ToM 
Adapted from Poletti et al. (2012), Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005, 2006) and 
Sebastian et al. (2012).  
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1.4. Understanding of social norms  
One important aspect of social cognition that has not typically been assessed is the 
ability to understand social norms from interpersonal and intrapersonal 
perspectives. Interpersonal understanding of social norms is defined as the 
understanding of how another person should behave in a particular situation. 
Intrapersonal understanding of social norms is related to how you, yourself would 
behave in a social interaction.   
While these abilities are rarely examined, they are particularly important because 
committing a social norm violation can be detrimental to existing relationships or 
opportunities to form new social relationships. Intrapersonal understanding of 
social norms has been explored in studies of dementia and adults with ASD. These 
studies have found that this social cognitive ability is impaired in behavioural-
variant Frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD, see Chapter 6, section 6.1.1 for further 
review) (Carr et al., 2015) but is intact in adults with ASD (Baez et al., 2012, see 
Chapter 4, section 4.1 for further review). Interpersonal understanding of social 
norms has been examined in an ageing population. Halberstadt, Ruffman, Murray, 
Taumoepeau and Ryan (2011) found that older adults were poorer at 
discriminating between socially appropriate and inappropriate behaviours from 
short videos of social interactions compared to younger adults. Suggesting that 
with advancing age, our ability to understand how others should behave in social 
interactions is affected (see Chapter 3, section 3.1 for further review).  
There is some neuroimaging data to suggest differential activation between other 
(interpersonal) –and–self (intrapersonal) inferences. These have been observed in 
the medial PFC and the ventromedial PFC which appear to be biased towards self-
references, while the dorsomedial PFC is activated for other–inferences 
(D'Argembeau et al., 2007; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). Moreover, using 
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functional neuroimaging of NC adults, interpersonal understanding of social 
norms judgments has been shown to involve similar brain regions as cognitive and 
affective ToM including the medial frontal, temporal, lateral orbitofrontal and 
medial PFC (Berthoz, Armony, Blair, & Dolan, 2002). The orbitofrontal cortex has 
been found to be associated with antisocial behaviour in individuals with 
Borderline Personality Disorder, who exhibit impairments in both inter-and 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms (Blair, 2004).  
1.5. Social cognition in clinical populations  
Social cognition impairments are found in a number of clinical disorders including 
schizophrenia (Green, Horan, & Lee, 2015), social anxiety disorder (Hezel & 
McNally, 2014), depression (Wolkenstein, Schönenberg, Schirm, & Hautzinger, 
2011), ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001), Williams 
syndrome (Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2008), bvFTD (Henry et al., 2014), 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) (Poletti et al., 2012), Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (van 
der Hulst, Bak, & Abrahams, 2014) and traumatic brain injury (McDonald, 
Flanagan, Martin, & Saunders, 2004). These impairments are a major problem 
underlying difficulties in interpersonal relationships in several psychiatric 
populations (Patin & Hurlemann, 2015) and deficits in social functioning is a key 
diagnostic criterion for several clinical disorders (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012) such 
as ASD and bvFTD (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Additionally, the new 
DSM-5 has introduced social cognition as one of the six core functional 
components that can be affected by a clinical disorder (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; Happé & Conway, 2016). Deficits in core social abilities like 
ToM can be more incapacitating than traditionally assessed cognitive deficits 
(Henry et al., 2015) and impairments in social cognitive abilities are thought to be 
responsible for dysfunctional social interactions and social interaction difficulties 
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seen in clinical populations (Bora, Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015; Hutchins et al., 
2016).  
Social cognitive abilities are important for facilitating societal integration and 
social support (Cohen, 2004; Silk, Alberts, & Altmann, 2003) and socially 
proficient individuals are more likely to be healthier and live longer (Cohen, 2004; 
Silk et al., 2003). ASD is the prototypical disorder to exemplify the importance of 
social cognitive abilities for effective social functioning (see Chapter 4, section 4.1 
for further review). As a consequence of these difficulties in their social abilities, 
ASD adults experience social isolation (Orsmond, Krauss, & Seltzer, 2004; 
Orsmond, Shattuck, Cooper, Sterzing, & Anderson, 2013), superficial and less 
supportive friendships (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2003; Orsmond et al., 2013) 
and have difficulties maintaining meaningful relationships (Palmen, Didden, & 
Lang, 2012). These social difficulties occur despite adults with ASD having a desire 
for intimacy and social connectedness (Müller, Schuler, & Yates, 2008). Results 
from research involving individuals with ASD have suggested that social cognitive 
impairments are not the result of general cognitive dysfunction, as individuals with 
ASD perform well on controls tests, but are impaired on tests of ToM (Baron-
Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). In patients with dementia, Henry 
et al. (2014) found that patients with AD and bvFTD show impairments on ToM 
tests; bvFTD patients have significant and substantial difficulties in social abilities 
compared to AD patients (see Chapter 6, section 6.1.1 for further review). The 
findings above demonstrate that many different clinical groups exhibit social 




1.6. Social cognition in healthy populations  
In healthy populations, previous research has also shown that ToM plays a key role 
in communicating effectively during conversations (Krych-Appelbaum et al., 
2007). People with better ToM abilities are more competent at social interactions. 
Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, and Malone (2010) found that adults with 
higher ToM scores perform better on group tasks such as those that involve 
resolving conflicts of points of view and brainstorming. Poor social skills present a 
major stumbling block for successful social integration (McDonald, Flanagan, 
Rollins, & Kinch, 2003). Without accurate social cognition individuals may 
respond to others in a manner that is ineffective, poorly timed, or frankly 
inappropriate (McDonald, 2012). Moreover, in NC adults social cognition abilities 
have been found to be important predictors of social competency (Henry et al., 
2015), as they impact upon an individual’s daily functioning, well-being and 
family quality of life (Love et al., 2015). Impairments are found as a consequence 
of healthy ageing (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013) with researchers 
showing that increasing age has a negative effect on an individual’s cognitive ToM 
(Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bottiroli, Cavallini, Ceccato, Vecchi, & Lecce, 2016; Castelli 
et al., 2010; Duval, Piolino, Bejanin, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2011; Fischer, 
O’Rourke, & Thornton, 2016; German & Hehman, 2006; Moran, Jolly, & Mitchell, 
2012; Saltzman, Strauss, Hunter, & Archibald, 2000) and affective ToM  (Bailey & 
Henry, 2008; Bailey, Henry, & Von Hippel, 2008; Fischer et al., 2016; Pardini & 
Nichelli, 2009) (see Chapter 3, section 3.1 for further review). However, using 
different paradigms to measure the processing of emotional information, other 
researchers have suggested that older adults show a positivity bias in how they 
attend to positive and negative information, compared to younger adults (Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003). These results show that this is one aspect of processing 
emotional information that does not seem to show the same results as affective 
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ToM (see Chapter 7, section 7.1.2 for further review). Investigations into other NC 
populations have also shown that subclinical presentations of autistic-like traits 
(the Broader Autism Phenotype, BAP), empathy and social anxiety all impact on an 
individual’s performance on tests of social cognition (Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Hezel 
& McNally, 2014; Wainer, Ingersoll, & Hopwood, 2011). Moreover, sex 
differences have also been found on our social abilities, specifically relating to 
affective ToM (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015). The impact of these traits on social 
cognition performance is reviewed in greater detail in Chapter 5 while the BAP 
and social cognition is discussed below.  
1.7. The Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP) 
There has been an increase in the prevalence of ASD diagnoses over recent years, 
due to increased awareness and improvement in assessment tools (Matson & 
Kozlowski, 2011; Williams, Mellis, & Peat, 2005). Moreover, genetic studies have 
shown that up to 56% of UK cases are genetically heritable (Colvert et al., 2015). 
Consequently, research into the genetic heritability of ASD has shifted to a 
dimensional approach to investigate the presence of autistic traits in first-degree 
relatives of individuals with ASD. Following a spectrum model of ASD, these studies 
have reported subclinical traits of ASD in these family members (Constantino et al., 
2006; Grove, Baillie, Allison, Baron-Cohen, & Hoekstra, 2013; Piven, Palmer, 
Jacobi, Childress, & Arndt, 1997; Sucksmith, Allison, Baron-Cohen, Chakrabarti, & 
Hoekstra, 2013; Sucksmith, Roth, & Hoekstra, 2011).  
The presentation of similar but less severe autistic-like traits is referred to as the 
Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP) (Bolton et al., 1994). More precisely, the BAP 
describes a group of subclinical social skills, communication traits and unusual 
personality features that are frequently found in the relatives of individuals with 
autism and which are believed to be milder manifestations of traits characteristic of 
13 
 
clinically diagnosed ASD (Constantino et al., 2006; Rutter, 2000). There is 
evidence to suggest that subclinical autistic-like traits are not restricted to family 
members of individuals with ASD. Studies examining the BAP in neurotypical 
populations have found the presence of autistic-like traits in individuals with no 
known relatives with ASD (Constantino & Todd, 2003; Hoekstra, Bartels, Verweij, 
& Boomsma, 2007; Hurst, Mitchell, Kimbrel, Kwapil, & Nelson-Gray, 2007; Jobe & 
White, 2007; Stewart & Austin, 2009; Wainer et al., 2011). This suggests that 
subclinical autistic-like traits are a set of continuous and quantitative traits that are 
measurable in neurotypical individuals and distributed in the general population 
(Constantino et al., 2006; Constantino & Todd, 2005).  
1.8. The BAP and social cognition  
Individuals in the neurotypical population who exhibit more autistic-like traits 
report experiencing more social difficulties (Wainer et al., 2011). A number of 
studies have examined the relationship between the BAP and social cognition, but 
results have been variable. Parents of individuals with ASD have been shown to 
display difficulties in inferring affective states relative to age- and IQ-matched 
controls (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997). Moreover, Losh and Piven (2007) and  
Losh et al. (2009) found that individuals who exhibited more autistic-like traits 
performed poorer than those with fewer traits on tests of affective ToM. However, 
other studies have found no relationship between autistic-like traits and affective 
ToM (Kunihira, Senju, Dairoku, Wakabayashi, & Hasegawa, 2006). In terms of 
cognitive ToM, Sasson, Nowlin, and Pinkham (2013) found no significant 
relationship between cognitive ToM and BAP traits using the Broad Autism 




1.9. Tests used to measure social cognition  
Tests that specifically assess social cognition are important because standard 
neuropsychological tests do not assess social abilities (Dodich et al., 2015; 
McDonald, 2012). Moreover social cognition tests are more sensitive than 
traditional neuropsychological tests of cognition at differentiating 
neurodegenerative diseases such as AD and bvFTD (Bora et al., 2015; Gregory et 
al., 2002). To measure social cognition, many researchers have developed various 
tests. Table 1 below gives a summary of the tests that have been designed to 
measure ToM and social norm understanding.  
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1.9.1. Table 1. A summary of tests used to assess ToM and understanding social norms  





Brief description of 
test 
Advantages  Disadvantages  
Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes (RME) 
Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, 




images of the eye 
region of faces.  
Most common test 
of social cognition. 
Quick and easy; 
pencil and paper 
test.  




images resulting in 
some not being very 
clear.  Descriptor 
emotions are an 
interpretation from 
the authors and are 
advanced verbal 






aspects to some 
stimuli.  
Awareness of Social 
Inference Test 
(TASIT) 




and social inference  
Dynamic excerpts 




Multiple versions to 










test with an 
administration time 





Affective ToM Series of television 




















waiting to take part 




Use of hidden 
filming limits the 
range of mental 
states to be inferred. 
No clear distinction 
between cognitive 
and affective ToM. 
Faux Pas Task  Stone et al. (1998) Affective ToM, 
Empathic 
understanding 
Verbal, series of 
short written 
stories. Can be read 
to subject or they 










stating what they 
are. Limited 




e.g. Sally–Anne test 
Wimmer and 
Perner (1983) and 
various authors  
Cognitive ToM Written stories or 
storyboards of first 
and second order-
(mistaken) beliefs 
between characters.   
Extensive research 
use. Short and easy 
to administer.  
Ceiling effects. 
Limited ecological 
validity with real 
world interactions. 






Snowden et al. 
(2003) 
Affective ToM (and 
Cognitive ToM in 
some versions) 
Static, force choice 
self versus other 




Brief and easy to 
administer.  
Some ceiling effects. 
Limited ecological 
validity.  
Movie for the 
Assessment of Social 
Cognition (MASC) 




Short film of four 
characters getting 
together for a 




Dubbed in English 
and limited 
validation of its use 




choice answers.  
Reading the Mind 
in Films (RMF) 
Golan, Baron-
Cohen, Hill, and 
Golan (2006) 
Affective ToM Dynamic, short 
excerpts from 
feature films.  
More ecologically 
valid than tests 
using static stimuli. 
Relatively short to 











Rankin (2008) Intrapersonal 
understanding of 
social norms 
List of everyday 
social behaviours 
that individuals 
might engage in.  







clinical populations.  



















Static stimuli limits 
ecological validity.  
Strange Stories Test Happé (1994) Cognitive and 
affective ToM 




stories. Easy to 
administer.  
No clear distinction 
between cognitive 
and affective ToM. 
Associated with 
verbal 










of established tests 
of social cognition.  
Variety of ToM 
tests. Clinical cut-




A combination of 
previous tests such 
as the RME and 
Faux Pas, therefore 




scoring methods are 
simple to use.   
duration (40–60 
minutes).  
Strange Stories Film 
Test 














affective ToM.  
Interactions lack 
context.  




1.9.2. Current tests of ToM and social norms understanding  
Within the field of social cognition, there are many tests that attempt to examine 
our social abilities, some experimental and other clinical tests. Table 1 gives a 
summary of the more popular tests that researchers have used to measure ToM and 
social norm understanding. False-belief tests were the first tests that researchers 
used to assess ToM and were the first to show that particular sample populations 
exhibit difficulties on social inferences. First-order false belief tests involve 
attributions about another individual’s (mistaken) belief about an event. Second-
order false-belief tests require the individual to attribute the false belief of one 
person based on the thoughts of another (Poletti et al., 2012; Premack & Woodruff, 
1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).  
Tests like the Faux Pas and RME have been extremely significant in developing our 
understanding of the abilities that we use to process complex social information. 
The Faux Pas test (Stone et al., 1998) consists of stories of an interaction in which a 
character unintentionally said something that was socially inappropriate and could 
potentially insult or hurt the feelings of the other character in the story. While the 
RME (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) consists of 36 photographs of 
the ocular region of different human faces, and requires participants to make a 
force-choice response from four adjectives which best described what the 
individual in the image was thinking or feeling. Indeed, the RME is one of the most 
commonly used tests of social cognition in the literature (Henry et al., 2015) with 
adults with ASD (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) and dementia 
patients (Gregory et al., 2002) both experiencing difficulties in inferring what 
another individual is thinking or feeling. 
To improve ecological validity of tests, newer tests like the TASIT, MASC, RMF and 
Strange Stories Films test have been developed. The TASIT, MASC and Strange 
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Stories Films test all use excerpts of real-life actors engaging in various interactions 
(Dziobek et al., 2006; McDonald et al., 2003; Murray et al., 2017), while the RMF 
uses interactions from feature films (Golan et al., 2006). These tests are important 
because they have provided researchers with the capability to study social 
cognition using measures that more closely reflect how we use our social cognitive 
abilities in everyday interactions. The TASIT is predictive of real world functioning 
in clinical populations (McDonald et al., 2004). The Strange Stories Films test has 
recently been shown to have higher diagnostic accuracy compared to traditional 
tests like the RME in adults with ASD (Murray et al., 2017). Moreover, an 
advantage of both the TASIT and the GeSoCS are that they have been clinically 
validated. The TASIT has been validated in patients with Traumatic Brain Injury 
(McDonald et al., 2004), while the GeSoCS has been used in patients with stroke, 
epilepsy, trauma, tumour and dementia (Martory et al., 2015). This is extremely 
beneficial as they can be used in clinical settings to inform clinicians of social 
cognition deficits patients may be experiencing.   
1.9.3. Limitations of current tests of social cognition  
There are many important limitations to the current, existing tests of social 
cognition (see Table 1). One limitation of early false-belief tests is that they were 
designed for children and children as young as 6 or 7 years old can pass false-
belief tests (Roeyers & Demurie, 2010). In addition, research has found that adults 
with ASD can perform as well as NC on these tests (Happé, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-
Cohen, 1999; White, Hill, Happé, & Frith, 2009) but still show marked problems in 
social interactions in everyday life (Dziobek et al., 2006; Palmen et al., 2012). This 
suggests that these tests may not be very sensitive in detecting social cognitive 
impairments in ASD adults.   
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Another limitation of many traditional tests of social cognition is that each is 
designed to assess a specific ability and they do not assess cognitive and affective 
ToM within the same test (Henry et al., 2013). This is an issue because it is difficult 
to compare cognitive and affective ToM if different tests are used. In the same 
study of AD, cognitive ToM was measured using first-order false belief, while 
affective ToM was measured using the RME (Cuerva et al., 2001).  
This problem also exists in ageing research, for example Fischer et al. (2016) used 
the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994) to assess cognitive ToM while the RME 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) was used to assess affective ToM. 
Moreover, previous researchers have used visual-static stimuli such as Tom’s taste 
test to assess affective ToM (Duval et al., 2011) and the RME (Pardini & Nichelli, 
2009). While others have used verbal vignettes (Phillips et al., 2011) and visual-
dynamic false belief story tests (Bailey & Henry, 2008) to measure our cognitive 
ToM abilities. The disadvantage of using different paradigms is that they use 
different stimuli, and may differ in level of difficulty. Researchers have suggested 
that stimuli type has an effect on performance (Henry et al., 2013) while tests that 
are unmatched in difficulty make direct comparisons problematic.  
Some researchers have attempted to consider cognitive and affective ToM 
separately, but using existing tests. Bottiroli et al. (2016) attempted to measure 
cognitive and affective ToM using the Faux Pas test by reinterpreting the questions 
of the test into tapping specifically cognitive and affective ToM. They demonstrated 
that compared to younger adults, older adults performed poorer on cognitive ToM, 
but showed intact affective ToM abilities. Yet, some authors have argued that the 
Faux Pas imposes demands on both cognitive and affective ToM indiscriminately 
(Henry et al., 2013). This test was designed before researchers explicitly regarded 
ToM as a multidimensional process and so there is no clear distinction between 
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cognitive and affective ToM. Moreover, it could be argued that the Faux Pas is a 
measure of affective ToM, as well as social norm understanding, since it primarily 
requires the participant to understand that a protagonist’s feelings have been hurt 
by a social norm violation.  
Another limitation of current tests of social cognition is their associations with 
intelligence, as performance on some social cognition tests are positively 
influenced by measures of intelligence (specifically verbal comprehension and 
perceptual reasoning) (Baker, Peterson, Pulos, & Kirkland, 2014; Charlton, Barrick, 
Markus, & Morris, 2009; Maylor, Moulson, Muncer, & Taylor, 2002; Sullivan & 
Ruffman, 2004). Consequently, Charlton et al. (2009) have argued that age-
related difficulties in ToM are not independent of intelligence. They found that the 
association between age and ToM abilities as measured by the Strange Stories test 
was fully mediated by perceptual reasoning and partially mediated by verbal 
comprehension. Further studies have found correlations between ToM and verbal 
abilities (Maylor et al., 2002) and have shown that perceptual reasoning 
performance accounts for age-related differences, again on the Strange Stories test 
(Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). These findings suggest that some tests may not be 
simply assessing our social cognitive abilities and this has important implications 
for interpretations of age-related differences in performance. Additionally, in 
research on adults with ASD, results have shown that verbal comprehension 
significantly influences performance on the RME (Baker et al., 2014), Strange 
Stories test (Kaland et al., 2002) and RMF (Golan et al., 2006), whereas perceptual 
reasoning also influences performance on the RME (Baker et al., 2014). On the 
TASIT, the authors report that up to 24% of variance in performance on social 
inferences scores was associated with verbal comprehension (McDonald et al., 
2003). Such findings limit the interpretations from these tests and it would be 
beneficial for tests to assess social cognition independently of intelligence. 
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A recurrent drawback of many tests including the RME, RMF and Awkward 
Moments Test is the stimuli. These tests use stimuli that were created not for the 
purpose of assessment, for example advertisements, and then repurposed for a test 
of social cognition. The primary benefit of this approach is time the researchers 
save by not having to create the stimuli themselves. While this is undoubtedly a 
time effective approach, the stimuli are not designed to represent a specific 
inference about how the character is feeling or thinking. Tests like the RME, RMF 
and Awkward Moments Test also do not account for the large individual variability 
that accompanies an individual’s interpretation of what another individual may be 
feeling or thinking. Moreover, RME and RMF are multiple-choice format tests and 
this limits their ability to measure everyday social abilities because we are not 
normally faced with social situations that give us an explicit choice of potential 
answers. Moreover, there is only a single correct answer on these tests, but 
inferring what another individual is feeling can have multiple interpretations.   
Tests like the Faux Pas and Strange Stories test also lack ecological validity. They 
require participants to read factual or fictional information regarding multiple 
characters and process mental state information. However because of this 
methodology of using written stories, they do not capture specific abilities used in 
everyday social interactions (Frith, 2004; Klin, 2000; Lugnegård, Hallerbäck, 
Hjärthag, & Gillberg, 2013). Older adults are often impaired on these types of tests 
compared to their younger counterparts (Henry et al., 2013). However, due to the 
nature of the tests, poor performance could be a secondary consequence of broader 
cognitive difficulties (Eddy, Beck, Mitchell, Praamstra, & Pall, 2013). Additionally, 
false-belief tests lack ecological validity because in the real world we are not 
typically presented with situations similar to those in classic false-belief stories (e.g. 
B’s belief about A’s beliefs about the location of an object). There are other key 
limitations relating to ecological validity of established tests, for example the MASC 
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is dubbed in English and important information about the interactions between the 
characters could be lost in translation. Moreover, the Awkward Moments Test uses 
television adverts of exaggerated interactions lowering the ecological validity of the 
test. The Empathic Accuracy Paradigm uses scenes from hidden filming that limits 
the range of mental states to be inferred. 
Similarly, social interactions also occur within a context, and this context is key for 
processing social information and responding appropriately within the interaction 
(Chung, Mathews, & Barch, 2010; Love et al., 2015; Vermeulen, 2015). For 
example, when examining social cognition in ASD, some authors suggest utilizing 
context-sensitive tests involving real-world scenarios (Baez & Ibanez, 2014). 
Adults with ASD can pass forced-choice social cognition tests (Baez et al., 2012; 
Izuma, Matsumoto, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2011; Klin, 2000; Schilbach, Eickhoff, 
Cieslik, Kuzmanovic, & Vogeley, 2012), but have difficulties on tests which require 
spontaneous attributions of mental states (Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009). 
Unfortunately, the influence of context on social interactions is generally ignored 
in social cognition research (Bar, 2004; Maren, Phan, & Liberzon, 2013; Melloni, 
Lopez, & Ibanez, 2014). Specifically, tests like the TASIT and RMF lack contextual 
information. The TASIT uses excerpts from short interactions; consequently it lacks 
important information about the interaction. However, this missing information 
may be essential to the way in which the interaction is interpreted..  
As social abilities are so vital for social interactions (Henry et al., 2015; Love et al., 
2015), researchers have attempted to develop tests of social cognition for use in 
clinical settings (Martory et al., 2015; McDonald et al., 2003). However, as Table 1 
shows, the tests that have been validated for clinical use are not appropriate for 
clinical environments (Dodich et al., 2015). For example, the TASIT is a long test 
with an administration time of 60-75 minutes, while the GeSoCS can take up to 60 
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minutes to complete. Since typical neuropsychological assessments are subject to 
time constraints, these two tests would be too lengthy for clinicians to use. There 
are other limitations of social cognition tests which restrict their usefulness in 
clinical settings. For example, popular tests like the RME (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) lack validity as they do not correlate with other 
tests of social cognition in ASD (Spek, Scholte, & Van Berckelaer-Onnes, 2010) and 
have shown mixed results in terms of impaired performance of ASD compared to 
controls (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Couture et al., 2010; 
Roeyers et al., 2001). A concise, informative and validated test of social cognition 
for clinicians to use would be exceptionally beneficial in clinical settings.  
It is evident that many existing tests assess only one social ability. However, social 
cognition consists of several different abilities that are simultaneously required 
during social interactions. To get a more realistic and comprehensive 
understanding of people’s abilities, we need assessments that examine several 
aspects of social cognition. There are no tests which are currently available in the 
literature that allow clinicians and researchers to examine different aspects of 
social cognition such as cognitive and affective ToM, as well as the understanding 
of social norms within the same test. These are important abilities that would 
advance our understanding of our social cognitive abilities.  
There are many important consequences to the limitations we have discussed. For 
example in the healthy ageing literature, there are inconsistencies in terms of what 
effects ageing has on our social cognitive abilities and this could be related to the 
way in which researchers assess ToM (Henry et al., 2013). These contradictions 
have resulted in an unclear picture of what happens to our social skills as we age. 
Traditional tests such as verbal text based tests can often overestimate social 
cognitive abilities. For instance, ASD individuals can pass the Strange Stories test 
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but still exhibit difficulties in real-world social interactions (Scheeren, de Rosnay, 
Koot, & Begeer, 2013). The abstract nature of these tests limits their ecological 
validity because the relationship to real-world functioning is unclear (Mathersul, 
McDonald, & Rushby, 2013). Without suitable tests of social cognition, we are 
unable to accurately assess our social abilities.   
1.10. Interim summary  
To summarise, social cognition is concerned with the processes which we use to 
process social information and respond accurately in interpersonal interactions 
(Baez et al., 2016; Frith, 2008; Henry et al., 2015; Love et al., 2015). Two 
important social cognitive abilities have been discussed; the frequently researched 
ToM ability and understanding of social norms which is not commonly examined. 
The literature has shown that many clinical groups demonstrate social cognitive 
impairments. Equally, there are many tests which have been developed by previous 
researchers to examine our social abilities. While these tests have been beneficial to 
our understanding of social cognition, many of them are not without their 
disadvantages. These limitations provide opportunities to develop improved tests of 
social cognition.    
1.11. Objectives and overall scope  
More ecologically valid and informative tests that assess different social cognitive 
abilities in the same test are clearly needed, not only in research, but in clinical 
settings (Henry et al., 2015). Therefore, a new test called the Edinburgh Social 
Cognition Test (ESCoT) was developed based on previous work (Baksh, 2013). The 
ESCoT is an animated test that assesses four domains of social cognition. These are 
cognitive ToM (What is X thinking?), affective ToM (How does X feel at the end of 
the animation?), interpersonal understanding of social norms (Did X behave as 
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other people should behave?) and intrapersonal understanding of social norms 
(Would you have acted the same as X in the animation?).  
The aims of this thesis are to examine the validity of the ESCoT as a test of social 
cognition and to further investigate social cognitive processes in healthy and 
neurological populations. Firstly, Chapter 2 discusses the development of the ESCoT 
based on previous work. Chapter 3 (under review, PLoS ONE) then utilizes the 
ESCoT as a test of social cognition to examine the effects of healthy ageing on social 
cognitive abilities. Chapter 4 (under review, Autism Research) examines the 
validity of the ESCoT as a test of social cognition by comparing performance on the 
ESCoT with established tests of social cognition in ASD adults. Then the utility of 
the ESCoT as a research tool is examined by investigating the effects of sex, 
personality traits and self-reported levels of empathy on social cognition in 
younger adults in Chapter 5. Next, Chapter 6 investigates the use of the ESCoT as a 
clinical tool in dementia patients. Chapter 7 further explores the consequences of 
healthy ageing on social cognitive processes, by examining the positivity bias 
(preference for positive over negative stimuli) found in older adults using an 
attention paradigm. Finally, in Chapter 8 a summary of the results and a general 








Chapter 2: Development of the Edinburgh Social Cognition 
Test (ESCoT) 
This chapter describes the development of the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test 
(ESCoT).  During my MSc project supervised by Professor Abrahams and Dr 
MacPherson, I examined age effects on a test of social cognition called the Social 
Scenarios Test (SST), which was the precursor to the ESCoT. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the limitations of the SST and the stimuli development, scoring, and the 














2.1. Introduction  
The ESCoT was developed from a former test called the Social Scenarios Test (SST). 
The SST was developed by Professor Abrahams and Dr MacPherson and used in my 
MSc in Human Cognitive Neuropsychology dissertation project to examine the 
effects of healthy ageing on social cognition (Baksh, 2013). 
2.1.1. Social Scenarios Test: Precursor of the ESCoT 
The SST was a static visual task that assessed ToM, emotional understanding and 
social norms. It consisted of 10 partially coloured storyboards showing different 
social interactions. Each storyboard consisted of 4 individual panels portraying a 
specific social interaction. Five of the interactions depicted ‘everyday’ interactions 
while the remaining 5 showed social interactions wherein one character 
committed a social norm violation. To focus participants’ attention to the social 
situation, the key characters engaged in the interaction were depicted in colour 
while the remaining characters/background were in black and white. 
Each storyboard was shown to the participant and 5 questions were asked about 
each social interaction: a general comprehension question (Can you tell me what's 
happening in this story, starting with the first picture and finishing with the last 
picture?), a ToM question (What did the X think that X wanted?), an emotional 
understanding question (How did X feel at the end of the story?), a social norm 
question (Did X in the animation behave as other people should behave?) and a 
self-reference question (Would you have acted the same as X in the story?). The 
ToM, emotional understanding and social norm questions were all scored while the 
self-reference question was not. Figure 3 below gives an example of the stimuli, 




2.1.1.1. Figure 3. Storyboard and scoring scheme from the SST: 















The primary aim of this project was to examine the effects of ageing on social 
cognition. There was no statistically significant difference between younger and 
older adults on the subtests. However, there was a significant difference in SST total 
scores between younger and older adults.  
2.1.1.2. Figure 4. Performance of younger and older adults on each subtest (out of 
20) of the SST (taken from Baksh, 2013) 
Error bars = Standard error  
2.1.2. Limitations of the SST  
From Figure 4, it is evident that the main limitation of the SST as a test of social 
cognition was that the younger adults found the test too easy. This is based on the 
near ceiling performance of this group on the ToM and emotional understanding 
subtests. This would severely limit the application of the SST as a research and 
clinical test, due to limited variability in responses. Moreover, the ceiling effect 
made interpretation of the null age-related findings difficult since ceiling effects 




















Subtests of the SST
Younger Adults Older Adults
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have been present (Cramer & Howitt, 2004). Another limitation of the SST was that 
the self-reference question was not scored. This was an unexploited opportunity to 
explore intrapersonal understanding of social norms, an area that is extremely 
understudied in social cognition research. Moreover, the SST used static stimuli, 
but static tests are not very ecologically valid. There is recent evidence to suggest 
that video tests increase ecological validity, and as a consequence are more 
effective than other types of tests at differentiating between ASD and NC adults 
(Murray et al., 2017). Therefore, the SST might be improved if the static 
storyboards were turned into animations to increase the test’s ecological validity. 
This modification could potentially increase the application of the SST as a test of 
social cognition. 
To address the limitations highlighted in this earlier work, the first phase of my 
PhD was to redesign the SST. Firstly, the static storyboards became animations with 
summary storyboards at the end of each animation. New guidelines for scoring 
each question were created and a new guideline to score the self-reference 
question was introduced.  
2.1.3. Development of the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT)  
The animations for the ESCoT were based on the scenarios from the SST. One 
animation was taken out because there was ambiguity in regards to the nature of 
the interaction. These animations were each approximately 30 seconds long and 
were developed by a graphic designer. Attention was given to each animation to 
ensure that they contained the relevant information from the original stories (see 
Appendix 1.1 for each storyboard). In regards to administration of the ESCoT, 
participants watched the animation and they were asked questions relating to what 
they had observed while a static storyboard summary remained onscreen.  
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The structure of the scoring scheme was based on the SST; participants were asked 
a general comprehension question to describe what occurred in the interaction, 
this was done to ensure participants understood each animation (again, this was 
not scored). They were then asked 4 questions aimed at assessing different social 
cognitive abilities. Firstly, the names of the questions were changed to more 
accurately exemplify the specific social cognitive ability they were intended to 
measure. 
Following Simone Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues’ model of ToM (Shamay-Tsoory 
& Aharon-Peretz, 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005), the ToM question of the 
SST was renamed cognitive ToM and the emotional understanding question was 
renamed affective ToM. The questions for both ToM abilities were kept the same. 
Moreover, social norm understanding was subdivided into self- versus other-
inferences. The social norms question was renamed interpersonal understanding of 
social norms (inferences about how another individual should behave) and the 
self-reference question was renamed intrapersonal understanding of social norms 
(inferences about how the participant themselves would have behaved compared 
to the character in the animation). Finally, to differentiate this new test from the 
SST, I changed the name of the test to the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT).  
Secondly, in an attempt to increase the variability in responses, the total points that 
could be awarded for each question was increased from 0 – 2 points to 0 – 3 points 
for each of the subtests (see Appendix 1.2 for full scoring scheme). Each response 
was scored based on the quality of the answer, with maximum points awarded for 
responses that successfully extracted and integrated the relevant information from 
the interaction and articulated this response in a contextually specific manner. 
Importantly, response length was not related to quality; participants could score 
37 
 
maximum points with a minimal response that provided the appropriate 
information. For the scoring of the intrapersonal understanding of social norms 
subtest, responses that considered the social nuances of the interaction were scored 
more highly than responses that highlighted personal attributes of the participant. 
Participants could score a maximum of 30 points for each subtest and a maximum 
score of 120 points on the overall test (see Figure 5 below for an example of this 
scoring scheme). To examine the validity of the ESCoT, 2 pilot studies were 















2.1.3.1. Figure 5. The scoring scheme of the ESCoT (scenario 1, see Appendix 1.2 
for full scoring scheme) 
 
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the man think that the elderly woman wanted?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain that in a little 
bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the elderly woman 
needs help with a specific activity and a 
contextual reason why she needs assistance. For 
example help with her shopping because she 
looks like she is unable to pick it up herself/she 





An answer that recognises that the elderly woman 
needs help with a specific activity. For example, 
help with her shopping/her shopping to be 
picked. No more than two points can be gained if 
the consequences of her age or situation is not 
explained  (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the elderly woman 
needs help. For example his assistance/help 
(prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the elderly 
woman needs help. For example him to avoid 
stepping on her shopping OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How did the elderly woman feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain that in a little 
bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative 
emotion with a contextual reason. For example 
angry/disappointed/sad/frustrated because the 
man walked straight pass her without offering to 
help pick up her spilled shopping when it is 




An answer that gives a specific negative 




An answer that provides a generic negative 
emotion. For example not happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For 
example tired/unconcerned OR provides a 
positive emotion for example, happy OR don’t 
know 
0 





Question 3: Interpersonal understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other 
people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain that in a little 
bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man acted in a 
socially unacceptable way and a contextual reason 
why she needed help. For example, no - should 
have helped the elderly woman pick up her 
shopping as she obviously needed help/is frail/is 




An answer that recognises that the man acted in a 
socially unacceptable manner. For example no - 
should have helped her (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the man 
acted in a socially unacceptable manner but 
provides a reasonable justification. For example 
yes - may have been in a rush and couldn't 
help/he didn't do anything wrong/he avoided her 
shopping as she requested/might not have noticed 
her pointing 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
 
Question 4: Intrapersonal understanding of social norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
man in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 














2.2. The ESCoT: Pilot 1 
 2.2.1. Methods 
2.2.1.1. Participants 
With the new dynamic animations, summary storyboards and new scoring 
guidelines, the ESCoT was piloted on 10 younger adults (8 females, M age = 25.60 
years, SD = 3.24, range = 22–32). Participants were recruited using online 
advertisement. Informed consent was obtained from all individuals and the study 
was approved by the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences 
(Psychology) Ethics committee.  
2.2.1.2. Materials and Procedure  
Participants completed the ESCoT in a quiet room. Here they watched each 
animation and answered questions relating to what they saw. The ESCoT consisted 
of 10 dynamic, cartoon-style animations depicting social interactions. Five 
interactions involved a social norm violation and 5 portrayed everyday interactions 
that did not involve social norm violations. Participants answered 5 questions 
following each animation (see Appendix 1.2 for the full scoring scheme) and could 
score a maximum of 120 points (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3 for a more detailed 
description of the ESCoT).  
2.2.1.3. Analysis  
Participants’ performance was graphically represented using histograms. Secondly, 
a content analysis was done by first transcribing the responses of participants for 
each scenario and then the frequency of particular ways of answering the 
questions were investigated (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
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2.2.2. Results   
2.2.2.1. Figure 6. Performance of participants (n = 10) on the ESCoT  
 
Error bars = Standard error 
As Figure 6 shows, there were still issues with the scoring scheme of the ESCoT. For 
example, there was larger variation in performance for cognitive ToM compared to 
the other subtests. Additionally, there was near-ceiling performance on affective 
ToM, with little variation in scores.  
To understand these issues in greater detail and to investigate reasons behind the 
different kinds of responses to the questions, a content analysis was performed on 
the responses of the 10 participants.  
2.2.2.2. Content analysis of Pilot 1: Cognitive ToM 
Firstly, the analysis focused on the cognitive ToM subtest to understand why there 
























Subtests of the ESCoT
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comparison to the other subtests. The most evident observation from the data was 
that participants had difficulties with the second-order nature of the question: 
‘what did X think that X wanted?’ Specifically, responses were often vague and 
unclear in regards to which perspective participants were referring. The examples 
and Figure 7 below illustrates this.  
Scenario 1 & 7 – Examples of responses in which the perspective was ambiguous:  
Scenario 1 
 
Question: What did the man think that the elderly woman wanted? 
First response: A hand to pick up her groceries.  
Following prompt: I don’t know really. Just a hand to get them back up. 








Question: What did the women think that the man wanted?  
First response: Wanted them to be quiet (in relation to Scenario 7).  
Following prompt: Because they were talking in the cinema and he couldn’t 
hear, so he was like shh… 
As the examples above demonstrate, it was unclear whether the response that the 
participants gave were a first order (they thought that…) or second order ToM 
(they thought that he thought…) answer. Interestingly, in Scenario 1, 70% of 
participants gave a vague answer in terms of perspective where it was unclear 
which character’s perspective the participant was referring to. The type of error 
dropped to 50% in Scenario 2. For some participants, they frequently gave answers 
in which the perspective was vague. For example, participant no. 4 gave vague 
answers in 100% of their responses and participant no. 7 did the same in 90% of 
their responses. Moreover, frequency of vague answers in terms of perspective 
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decreased substantially after the first two scenarios and participants gave second-
orders more frequently.   
2.2.2.2.1. Figure 7. Percentage of times participants gave ambiguously vague 
answers in relation to perspective-taking   
 
Figure 7 illustrates, that participants often gave responses in which it was unclear 
which character in the interaction they were referring to. They frequently gave at 
least one answer in which the perspective was ambiguous. Eighty per cent of 
participants did not answer the cognitive ToM question correctly. 
To further understand the difficulties with the cognitive ToM question, the 






























Number of vague answers
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2.2.2.2.2. Figure 8. Number of first-order answers to the cognitive ToM question 
The results in Figure 8 are based on participants’ full response to the questions 
(their initial responses and the follow-up prompt, ‘Can you explain that in more 
detail?’) It is evident that 100% of participants answered the cognitive ToM 
question from the wrong perspective at least once. Participants gave an average of 
2.5 out of 10 first-order ToM answers when asked the second-order cognitive ToM 
question.  
Another important trend that emerged from the data was that participants 
frequently gave a response in which the perspective was vague but would then 
follow this up with a first-order rather than the correct second-order explanation. 











































Scenario 1 – Example of ambiguously vague perspective taking with first order 
responses:  
Question: What did the man think that the elderly woman wanted? 
First response: To pick up her stuff and help her… 
Following prompt: She thought he should pick up her shopping. Help her 
take them home. 
Scenario 10 – Example of participants switching from a second-order response to a 
first order response:  
 
Question: What did the woman think that the couple wanted?  
First response: The woman thought that the couple wanted a memory and a 
photo to be taken of them. 
Following prompt: The couple wanted her to help them and provide a, do 
them a favour. 
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All participants made these errors at least once. They either gave a vague response 
which turned out to be a first-order answer or gave a second-order response that 
became a first-order answer following prompting.  
Finally, the occurrence of social and non-social answers was examined. Social 
answers were defined as responses that mentioned both of the characters in the 
interaction and non-social answers as those that only mentioned one of the 
characters in the interaction.  
2.2.2.2.3. Figure 9. Number of non-social answers to cognitive ToM questions 
 
As Figure 9 shows, out of the 10 occasions, 70% of participants gave at least one 
non-social response. This suggests that participants sometimes failed to incorporate 
both characters in the interaction in their answers to the cognitive ToM question.  
2.2.2.3. Interim summary  
As the results above have shown, there are several factors that may have 




































providing responses from an unclear perspective, producing first-order answers to 
the second-order ToM question, difficulties maintaining a second-order 
perspective and, on occasion, providing non-social answers.  
2.2.2.4. Content analysis of Pilot 1 data: Affective ToM 
As previously mentioned, the performance on the affective ToM subtest was near 
ceiling, indicating that participants found this subtest relatively easy. To 
understand the kind of responses participants gave, their answers were 
dichotomised into two groups: responses that exhibited a lower order emotional 
understanding and those that demonstrated a higher order emotional 
understanding. This was carried out because all types of contextual emotions were 
regarded as correct answers and there was no differentiation between the types of 
emotions described.  
A response was categorised as a lower order emotional response if they included 
happiness, sadness, disgusted, fear, surprised and angry. This was based on the  
facial expression work by Paul Ekman (Ekman, 1973; Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 
1969). Responses such as fine, ok, upset and not happy were included as lower 
order emotional responses as they are contextually vague and are ambiguous.  
A higher order emotional response was defined as a complex, contextually specific 
emotions. For example, disappointed, rude, abandoned, vulnerable, helpless, 
unlucky, disrespected, irritated, “pissed off” are all complex and contextually 






2.2.2.4.1. Figure 10. The number of lower and higher order emotional responses of 
participants  
 
As Figure 10 illustrates, most participants gave a mixture of responses containing 
lower and higher order emotions, with the exception of participant no. 9 who gave 
higher order emotional responses for all 10 scenarios.   
2.2.2.5. Redesigned scoring scheme for the ESCoT 
Based on the results above, the scoring scheme was redesigned for the cognitive 
and affective ToM subtest. This was also the case for the interpersonal 
understanding of social norms scoring scheme based on the results from the 
cognitive ToM question analysis, to incorporate the social and non-social 





























Below is the new scoring scheme with examples from scenario 1.  
1. Cognitive ToM: What is the elderly lady thinking? 
This question was changed to a first-order ToM question, as the content analysis 
showed that participants were finding the second-order nature of the question 
difficult. Moreover, it was altered for consistency across the test items since the 
other 3 subtest questions were all first-order.   
A social and non-social aspect was added to the responses to differentiate a 1-point 
and 2-point answer. To achieve 3 points on this question, participants were now 
required to include both characters in the interaction and provide a contextual 
reason for the inference about what the character is thinking. Social and non-
social answers were added to examine participants’ inclusion of all characters in 
the interaction into their responses.  
Finally, to clearly differentiate cognitive and affective ToM, any cognitive ToM 
responses that included an affective state limited the maximum mark to 2 points, 









2.2.2.5.1. Figure 11. New cognitive ToM scoring instructions: What is the elderly 
lady thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / 
Can you explain that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the elderly 
lady required assistance, and provides a 
contextual reason of why she needed assistance. 
For example, she is thinking she wants him/the 
young man to help her pick up the 
shopping/she wants his help because her bag 
has split/she has a stick so she cannot do it 





A social answer that recognises that the elderly 
lady required assistance. No more than 2 points 
can be gained if a contextual reason is not 
given. For example, she is thinking she wants 
him/the young man to help her pick up the 
shopping/she wants his help (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the 
elderly lady required assistance. No more than 
1 point can be gained if there is no mention of 
the other person from the interaction in the 
response, even with a contextual reason. For 
example, she wants assistance/she is thinking 
she wants help/help to pick up her shopping 
(prompt) 
1 
    









2. Affective ToM: How does the elderly lady feel at the end of the animation?  
Based on the content analysis, I separated responses into lower and higher order 
emotional answers. To achieve more than 1 point, participants were now required 
to give a contextual reason for the specific emotion.  
2.2.2.5.2. Figure 12. New affective ToM scoring instructions  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / 
Can you explain that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order 
emotional understanding, with a contextual 
reason. For example, she feels 
abandoned/vulnerable/helpless because the 
man just ignored her and she is going to have to 
pick up her shopping on her own, which will 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order 
emotional understanding, with a contextual 
reason. For example, she feels angry/she is 
upset/not happy because the man just ignored 
her and she is going to have to pick up her 
shopping on her own, which will be difficult as 
she has mobility issues (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order 
emotional understanding. For example, she feels 
angry/she is upset/not happy (prompt) 
1 
    








3. Interpersonal understanding of social norms: Did the man in the animation 
behave as other people should behave? 
In line with the cognitive ToM question, I added a social and non-social aspect to 
the interpersonal understanding of social norms. To differentiate a 2- and 3-point 
answer, participants were now required to provide a contextual reason to achieve 
3 points.  
2.2.2.5.3. Figure 13. New interpersonal understanding of social norms scoring 
instructions  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / 
Can you explain that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding 
of the relevant social norm highlighting that the 
man acted in a socially unacceptable manner, 
and provides a contextual explanation of why 
she needed help. For example, no - he should 
have helped her/the elderly woman pick up her 
shopping because she obviously needed help/is 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding 
of the relevant social norm highlighting that the 
man acted in a socially unacceptable manner. 
No more than 2 points can be gained if a 
contextual explanation is not given. For 
example, no - he should have helped her/the 
elderly woman pick up her shopping (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an 
understanding of the relevant social norm 
highlighting that the man acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. For example, no - he 
should have helped/picked up the shopping 
(prompt) OR yes – he may have been in a rush 
and could not help/he did not do anything 
wrong/he avoided her shopping as she 
requested/might not have noticed her pointing 
1 
    




4. Intrapersonal understanding of social norms: Would you have acted the same as 
the man in the animation?  
As highlighted by Figure 6, participants’ performance did not indicate that this 
question required modification.  
2.2.2.5.4. Figure 14. New intrapersonal understanding of social norms scoring 
instructions  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 











(1)     
5. Additional changes made to the scoring scheme based on the content analysis  
The cognitive and affective ToM questions were counter-balanced in terms of 
administration order and I introduced a practice scenario so participants were 
familiar with the nature of the questions, and to clarify any questions they might 
have about the test (see Appendix 1.3 for this new animation). Finally, participants 
could now score a maximum of 30 on each subtest with a maximum score of 120.    
2.3. The ESCoT: Pilot 2 
2.3.1. Methods  
2.3.1.1. Participants  
To evaluate this new scoring scheme, a short pilot on 5 participants was 




2.3.1.2. Materials and Procedure  
Similar to Pilot 1, participants completed the ESCoT in a quiet room and answered 
each question after watching the animation. In this pilot, their answers were 
scored using the new scoring scheme detailed above (see Appendix 1.4 for the full 
scoring scheme).  
2.3.1.3. Analysis  
Participants’ performance was graphically represented using a histogram. 
Secondly, a shorter content analysis was performed on one participant who 
exhibited poorer performance on the ESCoT compared to the other participants.  
2.3.2. Results  
2.3.2.1. Figure 15. Individual performance of participants with the new scoring 
scheme (each subtest is scored out of 30) 
 
1 2 3 4 5
Cognitive ToM 9 27 23 22 21
Affective ToM 21 25 22 23 23
Interpersonal understanding
social norms
13 26 21 22 25
Intrapersonal understanding
social norms



























As Figure 15 demonstrates, performance was more consistent across the subtests 
with the new scoring scheme, with the exception of participant no. 1. Mean 
performance on each of the subtests (without participant no. 1) was cognitive ToM 
= 23.25, affective ToM = 23.25, interpersonal understanding of social norms = 
23.50 and intrapersonal understanding of social norms = 27.  
2.3.2.2. Case study of participant no. 1: Pilot 2 
To understand the atypical performance of participant no. 1, a short content 
analysis was performed on their performance to illustrate some of the errors noted 
in their answers.  
Participant no. 1 was a neurotypical 28-year-old male student who was studying 
for his MSc in Philosophy. Noteworthy, he took 52 minutes to complete the ESCoT 
which is substantially longer than the 20 – 25 minutes of the other participants.  
Typical errors of Participant no. 1:  
1. He gave an emotional response for cognitive ToM questions, but he showed an 









Scenario 4:  
 
E: What is the woman with the child thinking?  
S: You know it’s a playground and like that so it’s unhygienic, so it has 
bacteria and if kids play in this area, it makes it dangerous for them. So she 
might be really annoyed because voluntarily or not this guy is putting her 
kids health at risk so she might be, you know quite annoyed, I would 
understand it.   
E: Can you explain that in a little bit more detail? 
S: Well, I would not say that she would be angry, just for the sake. If it’s a 
playground or any area that kids play, especially, then it would be a hazard 
or dangerous. There could of course be a different objection. You know, it’s 
not right to just, this guy could not just care about the consequences. The 
others should care and take care of the problem.   
E: How does the woman with the child feel at the end of the animation? 
S: Annoyed.  
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E: Can you explain that in a little bit more detail? 
S: To put myself in her situation, what would I. Yeah annoyed, feeling a bit 
like why her reasonable request was ignored by this guy.  
2. Some vague emotional responses, but an advanced understanding of social rules. 
For example:  
E: How does the woman feel at the end of the animation? (Disobey parking 
regulations) 
S: Again, I don’t really know. But I could presume she’s a bit like oh well, I 
did what I could.  
E: Can you explain that in a little bit more detail? 
S: Difficult to say, I think this, generally speaking, in the scheme of things; 
she has other stuff to do that just…I don’t know. And at the end of the day, 
it’s a no parking zone. You can’t really complain because it’s quite visible.  
As the example responses above demonstrated, participant no. 1 showed specific 
difficulties in responding to the subtest questions of the ESCoT. Such difficulties are 
common in conditions like ASD, in which individuals have difficulties inferring 
what another individual is thinking but have a good understanding of social norms 
(Zalla, Sav, Stopin, Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009).  
While he was recruited as a neurotypical participant, it was possible he had a 
diagnosis of a clinical or developmental disorder that was not disclosed and could 
have affected his performance on the ESCoT. Moreover, he could have exhibited 
subclinical traits of a clinical disorder that too could have affected his 
performance. Unfortunately, background information such as diagnosis of clinical 
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disorders was not collected, nor was subclinical presentations of developmental 
disorders such as ASD assessed. Consequently, given this participant’s responses to 
the subtests of the ESCoT, he was excluded.  
2.4. Overall summary and conclusions 
The principles of the SST as a test of social cognition were good, but the SST 
suffered from important limitations. The ESCoT was developed to address these 
limitations and produce a test that was more ecologically valid, to assess different 
domains of social cognition within a single test. Results from the pilot data suggest 
that the ESCoT is an improvement from the SST and the next stage would be to 






















Chapter 3: The Effect of Age, the Broader Autism Phenotype 
and Intelligence on Performance of the ESCoT 
To explore the validity of the ESCoT as a test of social cognition, I first examined 
the effects of healthy ageing on our social abilities. Moreover, in the forthcoming 
chapter I examined the psychometric properties of the ESCoT by investigating the 
effect of the Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP) and intelligence on performance of 
this new test of social cognition.  
Data in this chapter were collected by myself.  
1This chapter has been submitted in its complete form as a journal paper and is 
currently under review for publication in PLoS One. 
Baksh, R.A., Abrahams, S., Auyeung, B., & MacPherson, S.E. (under review). The 
Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT): Examining the effects of age on a new 





                                                          
1 The section numbering has been changed to fit in with the thesis structure although the format is 
consistent with the journal 
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3.1. Introduction  
The study of social cognition is concerned with the higher-order cognitive 
processes that allow individuals to interpret the behaviours of others (Adolphs, 
2009). These abilities allow us to process and understand social information in 
order to respond appropriately in everyday interactions (Baez et al., 2016; Frith, 
2008; Henry et al., 2015; Love et al., 2015). Social cognition includes abilities such 
as theory of mind (ToM; i.e., the ability to recognise other people’s mental states to 
understand and predict their behaviour), emotion recognition, empathy, moral 
judgments and the understanding of social norms (Baez et al., 2013; Baez et al., 
2012).  
Healthy aging is associated with reliable improvement in emotional well-being 
(Scheibe & Carstensen, 2010) and social functioning (Luong, Charles, & 
Fingerman, 2010). Although social network size decreases with age, older adults’ 
social interactions with individuals who remain within their social networks are 
rated as being more satisfying (English & Carstensen, 2014). Life experience is 
thought to influence how people process and respond to social information (e.g., 
(Blanchard-Fields, 2007)). For example, older adults are thought to be more 
receptive to emotional cues when making social judgements compared to younger 
adults (see (Hess, 2005)). Yet, some studies examining individuals’ ability to 
understand and evaluate relevant social information have reported poorer 
performance in healthy older adults compared to younger adults (Henry et al., 
2013; Kemp, Després, Sellal, & Dufour, 2012). 
One of the most extensively studied aspects of social cognition in healthy aging is 
ToM (Kemp et al., 2012). More recently, it has been argued that ToM is not a one-
dimensional concept, but processes differ based on whether they refer to cognitive 
or affective judgements (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). Cognitive ToM is defined as 
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the ability to make inferences about the thoughts, intentions and beliefs of another 
individual. Affective ToM refers to the ability to make inferences about what 
another individual is feeling (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2011; Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2010). Age-related differences have been found where older adults 
perform more poorly compared to their younger counterparts on tests such as 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 
2001), Faux Pas stories (Stone et al., 1998) and Happé’s Strange Stories, among 
others (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey et al., 2008; Bottiroli et al., 2016; Duval et al., 
2011; Happé, Winner, & Brownell, 1998; Maylor et al., 2002; McKinnon & 
Moscovitch, 2007; Moran et al., 2012; Rakoczy, Harder‐Kasten, & Sturm, 2012; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). Yet, other studies have found age-related 
improvements in favour of older adults such as Happé et al. (1998) or equivalent 
performance between younger and older adults (Castelli et al., 2010; Keightley, 
Winocur, Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006; Li et al., 2013; MacPherson, 
Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007; Phillips, MacLean, & 
Allen, 2002; Wang & Su, 2006). Potentially, age-related differences may be related 
to one aspect of ToM but not the other, for example cognitive ToM but not affective 
ToM. However, research into possible dissociations between cognitive and affective 
ToM has yielded mixed findings. In perspective taking tests that assess cognitive 
ToM, older adults perform more poorly than younger adults (Bailey & Henry, 
2008; Bottiroli et al., 2016; Castelli et al., 2010; Duval et al., 2011; Fischer et al., 
2016; German & Hehman, 2006; Moran et al., 2012; Saltzman et al., 2000). 
Nonetheless, other authors have failed to find age-related differences in cognitive 
ToM (Castelli et al., 2010; Keightley et al., 2006). Affective ToM has been 
examined using tests such as the RME (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 
2001) where individuals are required to make inferences from the eye region of 
photographs. Older adults have been found to perform significantly more poorly 
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than younger adults (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bailey et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2016; 
Pardini & Nichelli, 2009; Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007). Video based ToM tests 
have also shown that older adults perform significantly more poorly than younger 
adults (Slessor et al., 2007; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). However, Castelli et al. 
(2010) and Li et al. (2013) have both reported comparable performance between 
younger and older adults on the RME. Moreover, story-based affective ToM tests 
such as the Faux Pas test (Stone et al., 1998) have less consistently reported age-
related differences with some studies reporting poorer performance with age 
(Wang & Su, 2006) but others not reporting age-related differences (MacPherson 
et al., 2002). Overall, it is unclear how social cognitive abilities, specifically 
cognitive and affective ToM abilities are affected by aging when the performance 
of older adults is compared to younger adults. A possible reason for the 
inconsistencies in the literature could be related to the way in which researchers 
assess ToM (Henry et al., 2013).  
The aging literature has tended to assess the influence of age on the distinct 
components of ToM using different tests (e.g., Fischer et al., 2016) and these 
paradigms vary in both their stimuli type and level of difficulty. For example, 
affective ToM has been examined using tests involving visual-static stimuli such as 
Tom’s taste test (Duval et al., 2011) and the RME (Pardini & Nichelli, 2009). In 
contrast, cognitive ToM has been examined using verbal vignettes (Phillips et al., 
2011) and visual-dynamic false belief story tests (Bailey & Henry, 2008). Existing 
tests of social cognition have been criticised as they require participants to read 
factual or fictional information regarding multiple characters and process mental 
state information. Poor performance could be a secondary consequence of broader 
cognitive difficulties (Eddy et al., 2013). Moreover, few aging studies have 
compared affective and cognitive ToM within the same test, making it difficult to 
contrast the influence of age on tests that are not directly comparable. Recently, 
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Bottiroli et al. (2016) attempted to measure cognitive and affective ToM using the 
Faux Pas test. They demonstrated that compared to younger adults, older adults 
performed poorer on cognitive ToM, but showed intact affective ToM abilities. Yet, 
some authors have argued that the Faux Pas imposes demands on both cognitive 
and affective ToM (Henry et al., 2013). This test was designed before researchers 
explicitly regarded ToM as a multidimensional process and so there is no clear 
distinction between cognitive and affective ToM. Moreover, we would argue that 
the Faux Pas is a measure of affective ToM, as well as social norm understanding, 
since it primarily requires the participant to understand that a protagonist’s 
feelings have been hurt by a social norm violation.  
One important aspect of social cognition which has not typically been assessed in 
the aging literature is the ability to understand social norms from interpersonal 
and intrapersonal perspectives. While intrapersonal understanding of social norms 
has been explored in studies of dementia (Carr et al., 2015), adults with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders (ASD) (Baez et al., 2012) and patients with schizophrenia and 
bipolar disorder (Baez et al., 2013), few studies have examined this ability in 
healthy aging. In one of the only studies exploring interpersonal understanding of 
social norms in healthy aging, Halberstadt, Ruffman, Murray, Taumoepeau and 
Ryan (2011) found that older adults were poorer at discriminating between 
socially appropriate and inappropriate behaviours from short videos of social 
interactions compared to younger adults.  
Performance on social cognition tests have been shown to be influenced by 
variables such as personality traits and measures of intelligence (e.g., verbal 
comprehension and perceptual reasoning). Charlton et al. (2009) have argued that 
age-related difficulties in ToM are not independent of measures of intelligence. 
They found that the association between age and ToM abilities as measured by 
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Happé’s Strange Stories test was fully mediated by perceptual reasoning and 
partially mediated by verbal comprehension. Further studies have found 
correlations between ToM and verbal abilities (Maylor et al., 2002) and have 
shown that perceptual reasoning performance accounts for age-related 
differences, again on Happé’s Strange Stories test (Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004). 
These findings suggest that some tests may not be simply assessing our social 
cognitive abilities and this has important implications for interpretations of age-
related differences in performance. 
A hallmark characteristic of ASD is pronounced impairments in social cognition 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Moreover, research has shown that 
difficulties in social cognition are responsible for social functioning impairment in 
ASD (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002), suggesting that social 
cognitive abilities are important contributions to the quality of an individual’s 
social interactions. This finding is relevant for the present study since 
characteristics typically found in adults with ASD are continuously distributed 
within the general population (Sasson et al., 2013; Wainer, Block, Donnellan, & 
Ingersoll, 2013; Wainer et al., 2011). Indeed, subclinical autistic-like traits 
referred to as the Broad Autism Phenotype (BAP) (Piven et al., 1997) within the 
general population are related to reductions in social cognitive ability (Sasson et 
al., 2013). Individuals who exhibit more BAP traits report experiencing more 
social and interpersonal problems (Losh & Piven, 2007; Wainer et al., 2011). 
Additionally, recent evidence suggests that BAP traits in older adults are associated 
with lower levels of social support, and increased self-reported levels of depression 
and anxiety (Wallace, Budgett, & Charlton, 2016). Given the findings discussed 
above, it would be of interest to examine the relationship between the ESCoT, 
measures of intelligence and the BAP, and compare these to the findings of 
established tests.  
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To our knowledge, no tests are currently available in the literature that allow 
clinicians and researchers to examine different aspects of social cognition such as 
cognitive and affective ToM and understanding of social norms within the same 
test. Yet, some authors have argued that reliable assessments of a given construct 
should have multiple measures and these should differ in modality (Devine & 
Hughes, 2013). This could possibly be the reason for contradictory findings in the 
aging literature (Henry et al., 2013). Moreover, while tests like the Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al., 2006), the Awareness of 
Social Inference Test (TASIT) (McDonald et al., 2003), the Awkward Moments Test 
(Heavey et al., 2000) and the Empathic Accuracy Paradigm (Roeyers et al., 2001) 
already exist and are all useful indices of social cognitive functioning, they are not 
without their limitations. For instance, the TASIT (McDonald et al., 2003) uses 
excerpts from short interactions so lacks important contextual information, the 
MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) is dubbed in English, the Awkward Moments Test 
(Heavey et al., 2000) uses television adverts of exaggerated interactions and the 
Empathic Accuracy Paradigm (Roeyers et al., 2001) uses scenes from hidden 
filming which limits the range of mental states to be inferred. 
We attempted to address these issues using a novel test of social cognition called 
the Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT). We devised the ESCoT to explicitly 
measure both cognitive and affective ToM in the same test. The ESCoT also 
provides a much-needed measure of interpersonal and intrapersonal social norm 
understanding. Few tests measure more than one social cognitive ability in a single 
test, but the ESCoT provides four distinct and potentially informative insights into 
social cognitive abilities.  
The aims of this study were to investigate the relationship between the ESCoT and 
a) age, b) measures of intelligence and c) the BAP in comparison to established 
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tests. Additionally, we sought to examine convergent validity between the ESCoT 
and other measures of social cognition. By closely examining different social 
cognitive abilities in a systemic manner using the ESCoT, this study sought to shed 
new light on the consequences of aging on social cognitive abilities in younger, 
middle-aged and older adults. 
3.2. Methods  
3.2.1. Participants  
A total of 91 healthy participants were recruited for this study: 30 aged between 
18 and 35 years (15 male, 15 female), 30 aged between 45 and 60 years (15 male, 
15 female) and 31 aged between 65 and 85 years (14 male, 17 female). The 
participants’ demographic information is reported in Table 2. None of the 
participants had any self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders 
based on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) exclusion criteria 
(Wechsler, 1997). Participants were recruited from online advertisement, through 
a Psychology Department volunteer panel, and were reimbursed for their time. The 
study was approved by the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language 
Sciences (Psychology) Ethics committee at the University of Edinburgh. 
3.2.2. Measures  
3.2.2.1. Assessment of Intelligence 
The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II) 
(Wechsler, 2011b) was administered as a measure of verbal comprehension and 
perceptual reasoning. Participants completed four subtests: Vocabulary; 
Similarities; Block Design; and Matrix Reasoning. Scores from each of the four 
subtests were converted to age-adjusted standardised scores. The Vocabulary and 
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Similarities subsets provided a Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) and Block 
Design and Matrix Reasoning provide a Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI) 
(McCrimmon & Smith, 2013; Wechsler, 2011b).  
3.2.2.2. Measures of the Broader Autism Phenotype (BAP) 
The Autism Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & 
Clubley, 2001) was administered to assess traits related to the autism spectrum. 
 The Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) was 
administered to measure the ability to identify and understand the thoughts and 
feelings of others and to respond to these with appropriate emotions.  
The Systemizing Quotient (SQ) (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, & 
Wheelwright, 2003) assessed the drive to analyse or construct systems such as 
mechanical systems. All questionnaires were self-report and participants 
completed them electronically.  
For the AQ (maximum score = 50), the higher the score, the more autistic-like 
characteristics the individual possessed. For the EQ (maximum score = 80), higher 
scores suggested higher levels of empathy. For the SQ (maximum score = 150), 
higher scores suggested stronger interest systems, for example the drive to 
construct systems or to understand the underlying rules that govern a system.  
3.2.2.3. Measures of Social Cognition  
The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT). The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test 
(ESCoT) measured four social cognitive abilities: cognitive ToM; affective ToM; 




The ESCoT consisted of 11 dynamic, cartoon-style social interactions (each 
approximately 30 seconds long): 1 practice interaction, 5 interactions involved a 
social norm violation and 5 portrayed everyday interactions that did not involve 
social norm violations. Each animation had a different context and specific 
questions relating to that context. The animation was presented in the middle of a 
computer screen and at the end of each animation, a static storyboard depicting a 
summarised version of the interaction was presented (see Figure 16). The 
storyboard remained on the screen for the duration of the trial.  
Figure 16. Example interaction from the ESCoT 
 
General comprehension question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, 
starting with the first picture and finishing with the last picture? 
Cognitive ToM: What is the elderly lady thinking? 
Affective ToM: How does the elderly lady feel at the end of the animation? 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation 
behave as other people should behave? 
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Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Would you have acted the same as 
the man in the animation? 
Participants were asked to describe what had occurred in the interaction. Then 
participants were asked one question to assess each of the four subtests of social 
cognition (see Figure 16). To allow participants to give their optimal interpretation 
of each interaction and capture the quality of their response, they were prompted 
if they gave a limited response or their response lacked important information 
from the interaction. They were prompted with the question, ‘Can you tell me more 
about what you mean by that?’ or ‘Can you explain that in a little bit more detail?’. 
Each participant was prompted only once for each question.  
Each response was scored based on the quality of the answer with maximum points 
awarded for responses that successfully extracted and integrated the relevant 
information from the interaction and articulated this response in a contextually 
specific manner. Importantly, response length was not related to quality; 
participants could score maximum points with a minimal response. For scoring of 
the intrapersonal understanding of social norms subtest, responses that considered 
the social nuances of the interaction were scored more highly than responses that 
highlighted personal attributes of the participant. Each question was awarded a 
maximum of 3 points, resulting in a score of 12 points for each social interaction. 
The total maximum score for the test was 120 points.  
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 
2001). The RME was administered to assess affective ToM. Participants were 
presented with photographs of the ocular region of different human faces and 
were required to make a force-choice response from four adjectives (one target 
and three foils) which best described what the individual was thinking or feeling. 
Prior to performing the test, participants were provided with a glossary of the 
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adjectives to clarify what each word meant, if they are unsure or unfamiliar with 
the word. Reponses were recorded verbally and 1 point was awarded for each 
correct answer, giving a total score of 36.  
Reading the Mind in Films (RMF) (Golan et al., 2006). The RMF was administered 
to assess affective ToM. Participants viewed short scenes from feature films and 
were instructed to make a forced-choice response from four adjectives (one target 
and three foils) that best described what the protagonist was thinking or feeling at 
the end of the scene. Similar to the RME, participants were provided with a 
glossary of the adjectives for clarification and responded verbally. A correct 
response was awarded 1 point, giving a total score of 22. 
Judgement of Preference (JoP) (Girardi, MacPherson, & Abrahams, 2011). The JoP 
assessed a participant’s ability to make affective ToM judgements of a character 
while inhibiting their own preferences. This version consisted of a pre-
experimental condition and two experimental conditions, each comprising of 
twelve trials each. In the pre-experimental condition, participants were instructed 
to choose the item that they liked the most out of 4 items. Following this, 
participants were presented with a small circular face in the middle of a computer 
screen with 4 objects in the four corners. In the affective condition, participants 
were told to choose the item the face in the middle of the screen liked. In the 
physical condition, participants were asked to identify the item that the face was 
looking at. Participants touched the item in the correct position on the screen of a 
touch-screen computer. Each participant was instructed to respond as quickly but 
as accurately as possible. The affective and physical conditions were 
counterbalanced. A correct response was given 1 point with a maximum score of 
12 per condition. 
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Social Norms Questionnaire (SNQ) (Rankin, 2008). The SNQ examined 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms. It was originally developed to screen 
patients for potential behaviour changes and is administered to examine how well 
participants understand the social standards that govern their behaviour in 
mainstream culture. Participants were given a list of behaviours (e.g., tell a 
stranger you don’t like their hairstyle?) and asked to indicate whether or not each 
of the behaviours was socially acceptable to perform in the presence of a stranger 
or acquaintance, not a close friend or family member. A total score (maximum 
score = 22) was calculated, with higher scores reflecting better performance.  
3.2.3. Procedure 
Participants completed all six tasks in a single session, which took approximately 
two hours to complete. The order of the tasks was kept the same for each 
participant.  
3.2.4. Statistical Analyses 
The effects of age, intelligence (verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning) 
and the BAP (AQ, EQ and SQ) on the ESCoT and established tests of social cognition 
were investigated using hierarchical multiple regression analysis. In the first stage, 
the background predictors (age, gender, years of education, measures of IQ) which 
showed a correlation with the outcome variables (subtests of the ESCoT, ESCoT 
total scores and established social cognition tests) at a pre-specified significance 
level of p < 0.20 was entered into the analysis (Altman, 1991) using the enter 
method. While some researchers have suggested that all relevant variables should 
be included in the regression model regardless of their significance, this approach 
can result in numerically unstable estimates and large standard errors (Bursac, 
Gauss, Williams, & Hosmer, 2008). We chose a significance level of p < 0.20 over 
73 
 
more traditional levels such as p < 0.05 because p < 0.05 can fail in identifying 
variables known to be important, and simulation studies have shown that a cut-off 
of p < 0.20 yields better outcomes than a cut-off of p < 0.05 (Bursac et al., 2008; 
Lee, 2014). The scores of VCI and PRI were entered into the first stage 
independently along with the other background predictor variables in separate 
regression models. In the second stage, AQ, EQ and SQ scores were entered using 
the stepwise method (entry criterion p < 0.05, removal criterion p > 0.10) to 
examine their effect on performance. Furthermore, adjusted scores based on the 
regression analyses were calculated.  These age adjustments were calculated using 
the unstandardized β coefficients from the regression analysis and the mean age of 
the sample, the calculations for these can be found in the supplementary materials 
(Appendix 1.5). To investigate the relationship between the ESCoT and standard 
tests of social cognition, correlational analyses were conducted to validate the 
ESCoT against established tests. 
3.3. Results  
Table 3 demonstrates the preliminary correlational analyses between cognitive 
ToM, affective ToM, inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms with 
VCI scores, PRI scores, age, years of education and gender. Variables with 
correlations that were significant at the p < 0.20 level were included in the 
regression analysis. Tables 4 shows a summary of the regression analyses for the 




3.3.1. Table 2. Summary of demographic information  
Age group  
 Younger adults  
(n = 30) 
Middle-aged adults  
(n = 30) 
Older adults  
(n = 31) 
Sig* ηp² (d) 
Age (SD) 26.20 (5.21) 50.60 (5.77) 72.45 (6.05) - - 
Males:Females 15:15 15:15 14:17 0.409 - 
Years of full-time 
education 
17.03 (2.82) 15.53 (2.86) 14.58 (2.88) O < Y 0.12 (0.74) 
Y = Younger adults; M = Middle-aged adults, O = Older adults. *Analyses were conducted using one-way ANOVAs, post hoc testing 
were conducted using Gabriel’s procedure for multiple comparisons. All p<.05. 
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3.3.2. Table 3. Correlational analysis between the background predictors and measures of the ESCoT 
Outcome variable Age Years of  
education 
Gender VCI PRI 
Cognitive ToM –0.32* 0.18* 0.01 0.12 0.04 
Affective ToM –0.17* 0.09 0.23* 0.15* 0.18* 
Interpersonal understanding of social norms –0.38* 0.12 0.06 –0.08 –0.09 
Intrapersonal understanding of social norms –0.16* –0.09 –0.13 –0.09 –0.11 
*p < 0.20. Predictor variables which correlated with the outcome variable at the p < 0.20 level met criteria for inclusion in the 
regression model. Predictor variables with correlations p > 0.20 did not meet criteria for inclusion in the regression model. Results of 
the regression analyses that included the correlated variables can be seen in Table 3. VCI = Verbal Comprehension Index; PRI = 






3.3.3. Table 4. Regression analyses for the subtests of the ESCoT with VCI and PRI scores 
 
 
Model 1 summary Significant predictors 
in Model 1 
Excluded 
predictors in 
Model 2  
F–change & ΔR² Significant predictors 
in Model 2 
Cognitive ToM R = 0.33, R2 = 0.11, 
F(2, 87) = 5.28, p = 
0.007 
Age (p  = 0.006) AQ, EQ & SQ – – 




R = 0.38, R2 = 0.14, 
F(1, 88) = 14.43, p = 
0.000267 
Age (p = 0.000267) EQ & SQ F–change = 10.55, p 
= 0.002, ΔR² = 0.09 
Age (p = 0.000069) 
& AQ (p = 0.002) 




R = 0.16, R2 = 0.03, 
F(1, 88) = 2.28, p = 
0.134 
– EQ & SQ F–change = 7.27, p 
= 0.008, ΔR² = 0.08 
AQ (p = 0.008) 
      
VCI 
Affective ToM 
R = 0.35, R2 = 0.13, 
F(3, 80) = 3.80, p = 
0.013 
Age (p  = 0.014) & 
Gender (p = 0.048) 
AQ, EQ & SQ – – 





R = 0.35, R2 = 0.12, 
F(3, 80) = 3.61, p = 
0.017 
Age (p = 0.026) & 
Gender (p = 0.037) 
AQ, EQ & SQ – – 
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ESCoT total scores and IQ scores. The ESCoT total scores correlated with age (r= –
0.42, p < 0.001). Years of education (r = 0.13, p = 0.229), gender (males = 1, 
females = 2, r = 0.09, p = 0.397), VCI scores (r = 0.11, p = 0.300) and PRI scores 
(r = 0.09, p = 0.391) did not correlate with ESCoT total scores at p < 0.20. 
Therefore, these variables did not meet criteria for inclusion in the model.   
In the first regression model (R = 0.42, R2 = 0.18, F(1, 88) = 19.28, p < 0.001), 
age was a significant predictor of ESCoT performance (p < 0.001). The inclusion of 
AQ, EQ and SQ scores produced a significant F-change (F-change = 5.44, p = 
0.022, ΔR² = 0.05). In the final model, only age (p < 0.001) and AQ scores (p = 
0.022) were significant predictors of ESCoT performance, with older age and 
higher AQ scores predicting poorer performance on the ESCoT. EQ and SQ scores 
were excluded as predictors from the final regression model. 
RME and IQ scores. For the RME scores, VCI scores (r = 0.28, p = 0.009) met 
criteria for inclusion in the first stage of the analysis. Age (r = –0.10, p = 0.331), 
years of education (r = –0.07, p = 0.531), gender (r = –0.06, p = 0.554) and PRI 
scores (r = 0.14, p = 0.202) were not included.  
In this regression model, (R = 0.24, R2 = 0.06, F(1, 82) = 5.16, p = 0.026), VCI 
scores (p = 0.026) predicted performance on the RME. Higher VCI scores 
predicted better RME performance. AQ, EQ and SQ scores were not retained in the 
final model.     
RMF and IQ scores. Gender (r = 0.22, p = 0.033), VCI scores (r = 0.38, p = 
0.000363) and PRI scores (r = 0.27, p = 0.014) met the criteria for inclusion in 
the regression models. Age (r = 0.02, p = 0.858) and years of education (r = –
0.03, p = 0.802) did not correlate with RMF scores at p < 0.20.  
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In this regression model (R = 0.43, R2 = 0.19, F(2, 80) = 9.28, p < 0.001), VCI 
scores (p < 0.001) and gender (p = 0.041) were significant predictors of RMF 
performance. Female participants and those with higher VCI scores performed 
better on the RMF. No variables were entered into the model in the second stage as 
they did not meet criteria for inclusion.  
In a regression model with PRI scores (R = 0.35, R2 = 0.12, F(2, 80) = 5.60, p = 
0.005), both gender (p = 0.030) and PRI scores (p = 0.013) were predictors of 
RMF scores. Female participants and participants with higher PRI scores were 
associated with better performance on the RMF. AQ, EQ and SQ scores were not 
retained in the final model.     
SNQ and IQ scores. Age (r = 0.14, p = 0.18) and VCI scores (r = 0.23, p = 0.04) 
met criteria for inclusion. Gender (r = 0.07, p = 0.523), years of education (r = –
0.12, p = 0.261) and PRI scores (r = 0.06, p = 0.602) did not meet criteria for 
inclusion in the regressions. However, all regression analyses were not significant 
(all p > 0.10). 
 JoP and IQ scores. Age (r = 0.05, p = 0.638), years of education (r = –0.05, p = 
0.628) gender (r = –0.13, p = 0.234), VCI scores (r= –0.06, p = 0.613) and PRI 
scores (r = –0.09, p = 0.421) did not meet criteria for inclusion in the regression 
models. Moreover, all regression analyses for the JoP were not significant (all p > 
0.10). 
3.3.4. Age adjusted scores  
Cognitive ToM. The regression analysis demonstrated a negative association with 
age; as age increased, performance on cognitive ToM decreased. Rather than 
producing separate normative data for each age group, we suggest that raw 
cognitive ToM scores should be adjusted for age accordingly: 18–22 years old= –1 
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point, 23–77 years old= no change in raw score and 78 years and older= +1 
point.  
Affective ToM. The regression analysis revealed that age negatively predicted 
performance on affective ToM. As participants’ ages increased, performance on 
affective ToM decreased. Therefore, raw affective ToM scores should be adjusted 
for age:  18–26 years old= –1 point, 27–73 years old= no change in raw score and 
74 years and older= +1 point.  
Gender predicted performance on affective ToM with being female predicting 
better performance better than being male. However, the difference between the 
male and female groups was only 0.36 standard deviations (less than 1 point on 
the ESCoT). Therefore, it is not necessary to adjust the raw affective ToM scores for 
gender.  
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms. Since the regression analysis 
revealed that age predicted performance on interpersonal understanding of social 
norms, raw scores should be adjusted as follows: 18–19 years old= –2 points, 20–
34 years old= –1 point, 35–65 years old=no change, 66–80 years old= +1 point 
and 81 years and older= +2 points.   
3.3.5. Correlations between the ESCoT and established tests  
Correlational analyses with the Holm correction for multiple comparisons showed 
that the ESCoT significantly correlated with the RME (r = 0.33, p = 0.002) and 
showed a trend towards significance with the SNQ (r = 0.19, p = 0.074). The RME 
correlated with the RMF (r = 0.38, p < 0.001) and SNQ (r = 0.34, p = 0.002). The 
RMF also showed a trend towards significance with the SNQ (r = 0.19, p = 0.077). 
None of the tests significantly correlated with the JoP (all p > 0.10).  
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3.3.6. ESCoT inter-rater reliability and internal consistency 
To establish the reliability of the scoring, we calculated inter-rater reliability for 
the ESCoT using intraclass correlation (ICCs). A second independent rater scored a 
sample of 5 participants from each age group. The consistency (ICCs) for the 15 
ratings was 0.90, indicating high inter-rater reliability.  
We assessed internal consistency for the ESCoT by calculating Guttman's Lambda 4 
reliability coefficient. This method has been shown to be a better measure of 
internal consistency than Cronbach’s alpha (Sijtsma, 2009). Guttman's Lambda 4 
reliability coefficient for the ESCoT was 0.70 which is acceptable (Nunnally, 
1978).  
3.4. Discussion  
The current study presented a new within subjects’ measure of social cognition 
that assesses cognitive and affective ToM, as well as intra- and interpersonal social 
norm understanding, within the same test. We examined the effects of age, 
measures of intelligence and the BAP on the ESCoT and established tests of social 
cognition. Additionally, we investigated the relationship between the ESCoT and 
established measures of social cognition. Total ESCoT scores were predicted by the 
age of participants and their AQ scores, here increasing age and AQ scores resulted 
in poorer performance. Investigation of the subcomponents of the ESCoT revealed 
that performance on cognitive ToM was significantly predicted by age, with 
increasing age resulting in decreased performance on cognitive ToM. Affective 
ToM was also predicted by age but also gender; in this instance, better 
performance was associated with being younger and female. Moreover, 
performance on interpersonal understanding of social norms was predicted by age 
and AQ scores – increasing age and AQ scores were predictive of poorer 
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performance. On the subtest of intrapersonal understanding of social norms, 
higher AQ scores predicted poorer performance.  
Notably, the ESCoT total score and sub-test measures were not associated with the 
two measures of intelligence; verbal comprehension (VCI) and perceptual 
reasoning (PRI). This contrasts with performance on some of the more standard 
tests of social cognition. In the present study, we found that participants with 
higher verbal comprehension scores performed better on the RME, while RMF 
performance was significantly predicted by measures of verbal comprehension, 
perceptual reasoning and gender. Here, female participants and those with higher 
verbal comprehension and perceptual reasoning scores performed better on this 
measure of affective ToM. The correlation analysis demonstrated that ESCoT total 
scores significantly correlated with the RME and showed a trend towards 
significance with the SNQ, indicating convergent validity. 
Similar to previous findings in the literature which have demonstrated aged-
related difference in cognitive ToM (Bailey & Henry, 2008; Bottiroli et al., 2016; 
Castelli et al., 2010; Duval et al., 2011; Fischer et al., 2016; German & Hehman, 
2006; Moran et al., 2012; Saltzman et al., 2000), age predicted poorer 
performance in cognitive ToM on the ESCoT. This provides further evidence that, 
as we get older, we experience difficulties in our ability to infer what another 
individual is thinking. Moreover, we found that increasing age predicted poorer 
performance in participants’ ability to infer what another is feeling, comparable to 
some (Bailey et al., 2008; Fischer et al., 2016; Slessor et al., 2007; Sullivan & 
Ruffman, 2004), but in contrast to other studies (Bottiroli et al., 2016; MacPherson 
et al., 2002; Wang & Su, 2006). It could be argued that the findings here are more 
representative of the population, as we included adults aged 18 – 85 years while 
Bottiroli et al. (2016) only included younger and older adults. Or, as Henry et al. 
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(2013) have argued, age-related differences can be the consequence of the type of 
task used. For example, Phillips et al. (2002) examined how well older adults were 
able to assess the severity of contextual emotions of individuals in short stories. 
They found younger and older adults did not significantly differ in this ability. 
However, forced choice tests offer limited insights in understanding the 
relationship between age and social cognition. Primarily because there are few 
real-world social interactions where inferring what another person is feeling is 
forced-choice in nature. Overall, these results suggest that the process of healthy 
aging is associated with difficulties in both components of ToM. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study to assess the ability to understand social 
rules in the same task as ToM and explicitly examine interpersonal (did X behave 
as other people should behave?) and intrapersonal (would you have acted the same 
as X?) understanding of social norms. Age was found to predict poorer 
performance on interpersonal understanding of social norms. These findings add 
to the preliminary findings of Halberstadt et al. (2011) who showed poorer 
performance of older adults compared to younger adults on interpersonal 
understanding of social norms. We provide a novel finding in regards to 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms; we showed that the age of 
participants was not a predictive variable of performance. This suggests that age 
does not impact our own knowledge of how we should behave in social situations, 
and not all our social cognitive abilities are negatively affected by age. Both of these 
findings demonstrate that understanding of social norms warrants further 
investigation.  
Although both cognitive and affective ToM were affected negatively by age, we do 
provide some evidence for a dissociation between the two processes in that 
performance is predicted by different demographic variables. This is analogous to 
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the findings that cognitive and affective ToM correlate with different cognitive 
processes (Bottiroli et al., 2016). Cognitive ToM performance was negatively 
predicted by age while affective ToM was significantly predicted by age and 
gender. Like Duval et al. (2011), we found that both cognitive and affective ToM 
show impairments with advancing age in the same study. The advantage in this 
study was that we were able to measure cognitive and affective ToM within the 
same test, unlike Duval et al. (2011) who relied on different tests to measure these 
abilities and was therefore unable to control for task difficulty. Gender was only 
found to predict performance on affective ToM; this is similar to research found in 
the literature which has shown that women are significantly better at inferring 
what a character is feeling compared to men (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2015; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001). These results show 
that, as well as considering the consequences of aging on our social cognitive 
abilities, we should consider the gender of the sample population. Furthermore, 
they highlight the importance of adopting social cognitive tests that assess 
cognitive and affective ToM separately and suggest composite tests are not 
appropriate to accurately examine ToM in aging populations. Using within 
subjects tests are essential if we are to better understand whether aging does indeed 
affect cognitive and affective ToM in the same way.  
The only test of social cognition that was associated with the measures of the BAP 
was the ESCoT, suggesting that perhaps the ESCoT is more sensitive to difficulties in 
social abilities of individuals on the BAP compared to established tests. Here, lower 
scores in inter- and intrapersonal understanding of social norms were associated 
with higher scores on the AQ. Additionally, we found that the presence of more 
autistic traits predicted poorer overall performance on the ESCoT. These are novel 
findings but makes sense in the context of the BAP, as impaired social cognition is 
related to the milder social-behavioural phenotype described as part of the BAP 
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(Losh & Piven, 2007; Sasson et al., 2013; Wainer et al., 2011). Research on the 
understanding of social norms in healthy aging is limited but these findings are in 
line with research that show that adults with ASD perform poorer than controls on 
tests such as the Faux Pas which implicitly assess social norms understanding 
(Zalla et al., 2009). However, the relationship between ASD and intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms is less clear and requires further investigation For 
example, Baez et al. (2012) found that adults with ASD do not significantly differ 
on this ability compared to controls. Nonetheless, the observed relationship 
between the ESCoT and the AQ demonstrates that this new test of social cognition 
may offer new insights into the relationship between the BAP and social cognition 
in healthy aging populations and may be valuable in ASD research.  
An advantage of the ESCoT over other tests of social cognition, is that overall 
performance was not related to measures of IQ, namely verbal comprehension and 
perceptual reasoning performance. However, this is not the typical finding with 
social cognition measures. Charlton et al. (2009) found that performance on 
Happé’s Strange Stories test (a composite ToM task) was fully mediated by 
performance IQ, executive function, and information processing speed and was 
partially mediated by verbal IQ. Moreover, again on Happé’s Strange Stories test, 
Sullivan and Ruffman (2004) both found that ToM abilities were related to 
perceptual reasoning abilities. In both the current study and previous studies in the 
literature (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Golan et al., 2006; Peterson & Miller, 2012), 
performance on the RME and RMF was found to be predicted by verbal 
comprehension. In one study, the only significant predictor of performance on the 
RME test was verbal comprehension which accounted for 11.7% of the variance 
(Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004). This has implications for 
studies using the RME and RMF to investigate affective ToM as they appear to be 
tests of verbal comprehension as well as affective ToM.  
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A limitation of the present study is that we did not examine the relationship 
between executive functions and the ESCoT. Given that social cognition has been 
associated with executive abilities in aging (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Bottiroli et al., 
2016; Duval et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012), future work might explore 
potential associations between the ESCoT and processes such as inhibition, set-
shifting and updating. Finally, it has been suggested that the clinical assessment of 
social cognition should emulate the way in which individuals process social 
situations in everyday life (Henry et al., 2015). As argued by Henry et al. (2013) 
dynamic-visual information such as images depicting a social interaction that lead 
to a protagonist in a particular mental state is more ecologically valid and 
information-rich compared to verbal narratives. Consequently, dynamic cartoons 
were chosen as the mode of presentation in the ESCoT. This allowed perceivers to 
use many more cues to make inferences (Moran, 2013), similar to real-life. Videos 
of real individuals interacting would be the ideal stimuli for assessing social 
cognitive abilities to maximise ecological validity. However, social interactions are 
highly complex (Van Overwalle, 2009) and social information can be difficult to 
control in real interactions. Therefore, it may be difficult to separate the specific 
social cognitive process that the test is intending to measure. With animated 
characters, specific social cognitive abilities can be more easily isolated and 
individual social differences can be controlled; essentially all of the parameters can 
be regulated. For these reasons, we chose to use animated interactions for the 
ESCoT.  
This study is the first to assess cognitive ToM and affective ToM, as well as 
interpersonal and intrapersonal understanding of social norms within the same test 
in younger, middle-aged and older adults. We have provided further evidence for 
similar but distinct components of ToM and evidence for social norm 
understanding. These findings are useful in furthering our understanding of the 
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consequences of aging on our social cognitive abilities. They also demonstrate 
specific advantages of the ESCoT over other tests of social cognition. The ESCoT is 
able to assess distinct aspects of social cognition within a single task and using a 
within subjects design, allowing for systematic comparisons of these abilities. In 
conclusion, these findings show that the ESCoT is a useful measure of social 
cognition and, unlike established and standard tests of social cognition, 
performance is not predicted by measures of verbal comprehension and perceptual 
reasoning. This is particularly valuable in order to get an accurate assessment of 















Chapter 4: Validation of the ESCoT in Autism Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) 
In Chapter 3 the ESCoT proved to be sensitive to the effects of ageing on social 
cognitive abilities and showed associations with the BAP. To validate it as a test of 
social cognition I utilised it in a sample of adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders 
and again compared it to traditional tests. To further understand the psychometric 
properties of the ESCoT, the associations with personality traits, intelligence and 
age were further examined, but in a population of adults with Autism Spectrum 
Disorders. Moreover, given the associations with age on performance of the ESCoT, 
this chapter also considered the age-adjustments. To aid in the development of the 
ESCoT as a clinical test, in this chapter I also created normative data for the ESCoT 
which could be used to identify abnormal performance.  
Data from the ASD adults were collected by myself. Normative data were collected 
by myself and undergraduate students Maya Bertlich, Rebecca Cameron, Sharon 
Jany and Terin Dorrian.  
2This chapter has been submitted in its complete form as a journal paper to Autism 
Research:  
Baksh, R.A., Abrahams, S., Bertlich, M., Cameron, R., Jany, S., Dorrian, T., Baron-
Cohen, S., Allison, C., Smith, P., MacPherson S.E., & Auyeung, B. (under review). 
Social cognition in adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders: Validation of the 
Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT). Autism Research.  
 
                                                          
2 The section numbering has been changed to fit in with the thesis structure although the format is 




In everyday social interactions, we use abilities such as theory of mind (ToM; i.e., 
the ability to recognize other people’s mental states to understand and predict their 
behaviour) and the understanding of social norms (Baez et al., 2013; Baez et al., 
2012) to interact and respond appropriately to others. These processes are a part of 
our social cognitive abilities (Adolphs, 2009; Baez et al., 2016; Baez et al., 2012; 
Henry et al., 2015; Van Overwalle, 2009). 
Tests that assess social cognition are important in clinical settings because standard 
neuropsychological tests do not assess social abilities (Dodich et al., 2015; 
McDonald, 2012). Social cognition tests are more sensitive than traditional 
neuropsychological tests of cognition at differentiating neurodegenerative diseases 
(Bora et al., 2015; Elamin, Pender, Hardiman, & Abrahams, 2012; Gregory et al., 
2002). Adenzato and Poletti (2013) and Pardini et al. (2012) highlight the 
importance of including social cognition tests in clinical assessments since deficits 
in this domain can occur without other cognitive impairments. 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized 
by difficulties in social functioning and communication, alongside repetitive 
behaviours and/or unusually narrow interests (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). ASD adults experience social isolation (Orsmond et al., 2004; Orsmond et 
al., 2013), superficial and less supportive friendships (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2003; Orsmond et al., 2013) and have difficulties maintaining 
meaningful relationships (Palmen et al., 2012). These social difficulties occur 
despite ASD adults having a desire for intimacy and social connectedness (Müller 
et al., 2008). Underlying these difficulties are impairments in social cognition 
(Baez & Ibanez, 2014; Baez et al., 2012; Dziobek et al., 2006; Murray et al., 2017; 
Scheeren et al., 2013). 
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As a defining characteristic of ASD adults is some level of impairment in social 
interactions (Brewer, Young, & Barnett, 2017), ToM is an important social 
cognitive ability in explaining some of the social functioning impairments seen in 
ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Happé, 1994). ToM difficulties cause significant social 
deficits which can profoundly limit functional capacity to engage in meaningful 
interpersonal relationships and quality of life (Henry et al., 2015). Researchers 
have postulated that specific ToM impairments in ASD adults may be the 
consequence of deficits in the ability to interpret the verbal and non-verbal social 
communications of other individuals or in communicating with others in 
accordance with normative expectations (APA 2013). These impairments in ToM 
can manifest themselves as difficulties in the ability to take the perspective of 
another individual in ASD adults (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001).  
ToM is a multi-dimensional concept, with processes differing based on whether 
they refer to cognitive or affective judgments (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). 
Cognitive ToM is defined as the ability to make inferences about the intentions and 
beliefs of another individual. Affective ToM refers to the ability to make inferences 
about what another individual is feeling (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 2011; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010). Considerable research has shown that ASD adults 
experience difficulties in both aspects of ToM (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et 
al., 2001; Mathersul et al., 2013; Murray et al., 2017).   
Early studies examining social cognition in adults used false-belief tests designed 
for children and found that ASD adults performed as well as neurotypical controls 
(NC) (Happé, 1994; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999; White et al., 2009) but still 
showed marked problems in social interactions in everyday life (Dziobek et al., 
2006; Palmen et al., 2012). To overcome this limitation in sensitivity, researchers 
developed more advanced tests and demonstrated difficulties in adults with ASD in 
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Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 
2001), the Awkward Moments Test (Heavey et al., 2000), the Movie for the 
Assessment of Social Cognition (MASC) (Dziobek et al., 2006), Reading the Mind 
in Films Test (RMF) (Golan et al., 2006) and The Awareness of Social Inference Test 
(TASIT) (Mathersul et al., 2013). People with ASD also perform poorly on story-
based tests such as the Strange Stories test (Happé, 1994) and the Faux Pas (Spek et 
al., 2010; Zalla et al., 2009).  
When examining social cognition in ASD, some authors suggest utilizing context-
sensitive tests involving real-world scenarios (Baez & Ibanez, 2014). This notion is 
supported by evidence that ASD adults can pass forced-choice social cognition tests 
(Baez et al., 2012; Izuma et al., 2011; Klin, 2000; Schilbach et al., 2012), but have 
difficulties on tests which require spontaneous attributions of mental states (Senju 
et al., 2009).  
Traditional ToM tests using written stories do not capture contextually specific 
ToM abilities used in everyday social interactions (Frith, 2004; Klin, 2000; 
Lugnegård et al., 2013). ASD individuals can pass the Strange Stories test but still 
exhibit difficulties in real-world social interactions (Scheeren et al., 2013). The 
abstract nature of these tests limits their ecological validity because the relationship 
to real-world functioning is unclear (Mathersul et al., 2013). In an attempt to 
address this limitation, McDonald et al. (2003) developed the Awareness of Social 
Inference Test (TASIT), which uses short-clips of social interactions. The TASIT is 
sensitive to clinical populations such as Traumatic Brain Injury patients and 
predictive of real-world function (McDonald et al., 2004). However, it is a lengthy 
test with an administration time of 60-75 minutes (Mathersul et al., 2013; 
McDonald et al., 2003), which limits the TASIT’s application in time-sensitive 
clinical environments.  The MASC (Dziobek et al., 2006) is similar to the TASIT, 
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however it is dubbed in English and there is limited validation of its use in English 
speaking populations. 
Other limitations include a lack of content validity among social cognition tests in 
ASD (Spek et al., 2010) and mixed results in terms of impaired ASD performance 
compared to NC (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Couture et al., 
2010; Roeyers et al., 2001). In addition performance appears to be related to 
intellectual abilities. Verbal comprehension significantly correlates with or predicts 
performance on the RME (Baker et al., 2014), Strange Stories test (Kaland et al. 
(2002), Reading the Mind in the Films (RMF; Golan et al., 2006) and the TASIT 
(McDonald et al., 2003). Perceptual reasoning also significantly correlates with 
performance on the RME (Baker et al., 2014). Such findings may limit the 
interpretation from these tests. 
Social cognition consists of several different abilities that are simultaneously 
required during social interactions, although existing tests typically assess only one 
or two aspects. Furthermore certain social cognitive abilities have received less 
attention in the literature. An individual's interpersonal (how another person 
should behave) and intrapersonal (how they themselves should behave) 
understanding of the social norms that govern their behaviour are important social 
cognitive abilities. Violating a social norm can be detrimental to existing 
relationships or opportunities to form social relationships. These abilities have been 
examined separately in ASD adults, showing mixed findings (Baez et al., 2012; 
Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Lehnhardt et al., 2011; Thiébaut et al., 2016; Zalla et 
al., 2009). To our knowledge, there is currently no clinical test of inter-and 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms within the same test. Similarly, these 
abilities have never been examined alongside ToM abilities within the same test. 
Researchers typically investigate social norm understanding and ToM using 
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different tests. For example, Baez et al. (2012) found that ASD adults were not 
impaired on affective ToM measured by the RME or intrapersonal understanding of 
social norms; assessed by the Social Norms Questionnaire (Rankin, 2008). This 
makes direct comparisons problematic, since the tests may vary in difficulty.  
4.1.1. Aims of the current study 
We recently developed the Edinburgh Test of Social Cognition (ESCoT; Baksh, 
Abrahams, Auyeung, & MacPherson, under review), which assesses cognitive and 
affective ToM and inter- and intra-personal understanding of social norms within 
the same test. We have demonstrated that poorer performance on inter- and intra-
personal understanding of social norms and ESCoT total scores were both predicted 
by the presence of more autism-like traits. Age predicted poorer performance on 
inter-personal understanding of social norms and ESCoT total scores. Poorer 
performance on the cognitive and affective ToM ESCoT subtests was predicted by 
increasing age while female participants were better at inferring what another 
person was feeling. Finally, performance on the ESCoT was not predicted by verbal 
comprehension or perceptual reasoning abilities unlike established tests. Here, we 
sought to validate the ESCoT in a sample of ASD adults. While new tests have been 
published such as Strange Stories Film Task (Murray et al., 2017) and Story-based 
Empathy Task (Dodich et al., 2015), these tests only assess ToM. Moreover, none of 
them assess social cognitive abilities in a contextually-driven and within-subjects’ 
manner.  
Our first aim was to examine the convergent validity of the ESCoT against 
established tests of social cognition. We predicted that better performance on the 
ESCoT would correlate with better performance on the traditional tests of social 
cognition. Our second aim was to compare ASD adults and NC adults on the ESCoT 
and established tests of social cognition. We predicted that ASD adults would be 
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impaired on cognitive ToM (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002; Klin, 2000; 
Murray et al., 2017); affective ToM (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; 
Dziobek et al., 2006; Golan et al., 2006) and interpersonal understanding of social 
norms (Thiébaut et al., 2016; Zalla et al., 2009), but not intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms (Baez et al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013) 
compared to NC adults. We evaluated the psychometric properties of the ESCoT 
and compared these to traditional social cognition tests by examining the influence 
of intelligence, ASD traits, empathy and systemizing traits on performance. This 
final aim was to derive normative data for the ESCoT from a neurotypical 
population.  
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT) 
The ESCoT consists of eleven dynamic, cartoon-style social interactions (each 
approximately 30 seconds long): one practice interaction, five interactions 
involving social norm violations and five interactions without social norm 
violations. Participants watched the animated interaction on a computer screen 
and a static storyboard depicting a summarized version of the interaction was 
presented at the end. The storyboard remained on the screen during the 
subsequent questions for each interaction.   
Participants were asked five questions after viewing each animation relating to: (1) 
general story comprehension; (2) cognitive ToM; (3) affective ToM; (4) 
interpersonal understanding of social norms; and (5) intrapersonal understanding 
of social norms. See Table 5 for details.  
To allow participants to give their optimal interpretation of each interaction and 
capture the quality of their response, they were prompted with the question, “Can 
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you tell me more about what you mean by that?” or “Can you explain that in a 
little bit more detail?” Participants were prompted if they gave a limited response 
or their response lacked important information from the interaction. Each 
participant was prompted only once for each question. The general comprehension 
question was not scored as omissions and misinterpretations would become evident 
in the subsequent questions. Participants were still asked the social cognition tests 
even if they misinterpreted the social interaction. Each question was awarded a 
maximum of 3 points, resulting in a score of 12 points for each social interaction. 
The total maximum score for the test was 120 points and the ESCoT took 
approximately 20 – 25 minutes to complete. We recently reported high inter-rater 
reliability (0.90) and acceptable levels of Guttman's Lambda 4 reliability (0.70) for 












4.2.1.1. Table 5. Description of the questions from the ESCoT 
ESCoT question Social cognitive ability Purpose 
Can you tell me what's happening in this story, 
starting with the first picture and finishing with 
the last picture? 
– Examine whether participants understood 
what occurred in the interaction. 
What is X thinking? Cognitive ToM Assess participants’ ability to make 
inferences about another person’s cognitive 
state. 
How does X feel at the end of the animation? Affective ToM Assess the ability to make inferences about 
the affective states of the character in the 
interaction. 
Did X behave as other people should behave? Interpersonal understanding of 
social norms 
Assess participants’ understanding of the 
subtle societal rules that govern social 
behaviour and whether the character in the 
interaction was adhering to these rules. 
Would you have acted the same as X in the 
animation? 
Intrapersonal understanding of 
social norms 
Assess how the participants themselves 
would have acted in the interaction. 
The responses for cognitive ToM, affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms were scored similarly. Scores were 
based on the quality of the answer with maximum points awarded for successfully extracting and integrating the relevant 
information and articulating it in a contextually specific manner. Importantly, response length was not related to quality; participants 
could score maximum points with a minimal response. For the intrapersonal understanding of social norms, responses that 




4.2.2. Participants.  
4.2.2.1 Experiment 1  
We recruited 236 NC between the ages of 18 and 85 years (some were included in 
this study as controls) to establish normative data and derive ESCoT cut-off scores 
for the subtests and total scores based on the lowest 5th percentile.  
This included 147 younger adults (67 males, M age = 23.39, SD = 4.11, range = 
18-35, M education = 16.90, SD = 2.20), 30 middle-aged adults (15 males, M = 
50.60, SD = 5.77, range = 45-60, M education = 15.53, SD = 2.86) and 59 older 
adults (23 males, M = 72.44, SD = 6.05, range = 65-85, M education = 14.58, SD 
= 2.88).  
None of the NC had any self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders based on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) exclusion 
criteria (Wechsler, 1997).  
4.2.2.2 Experiment 2 
Nineteen adults (12 males) aged 19-66 years (M = 38.47, SD = 15.63) with a 
diagnosis of Asperger's Syndrome (AS) or High-Functioning Autism (HFA) 
according to established DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
were recruited from charities and support groups in Edinburgh, UK and from the 
Cambridge Autism Research Database, UK. Participants confirmed their clinical 
diagnosis of ASD via official diagnosis letters. A comparison group of thirty-eight 
NC adults (23 males) aged 19-67 years (M = 37.50, SD = 17.75) were recruited 
using online advertisement and through a research volunteer panel in Edinburgh.  
Informed consent was obtained from all individuals and the study was approved by 
the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences (Psychology) Ethics 
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committee at the University of Edinburgh. The participants’ demographic 
information, ASD screening questionnaires and IQ scores are reported in Table 7. 
4.2.3. Measures  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence, Second Edition (WASI-II) (Wechsler, 
2011): The WASI-II was administered as a measure of verbal comprehension and 
perceptual reasoning. Participants completed four subtests: Vocabulary; 
Similarities; Block Design; and Matrix Reasoning. Scores were converted into age-
adjusted standardized scores. The Vocabulary and Similarities subsets provided a 
Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) and Block Design and Matrix Reasoning 
provided a Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI) (McCrimmon & Smith, 2013; 
Wechsler, 2011b). 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 
2001): The AQ is a self-report questionnaire that assesses whether individuals with 
a normal IQ possess traits related to the autism spectrum (maximum score = 50).  
The Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).the EQ 
measures the ability to identify and understand the thoughts and feelings of others 
and to respond to these with appropriate emotions (maximum score = 80).  
The Systemizing Quotient (SQ) (Wheelwright et al., 2006): the SQ assesses the 
drive to analyse or construct systems such as mechanical systems (maximum score 
= 150). The higher the scores, the more autistic characteristics the individual 
possesses. 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 
2001): Participants were presented with photographs of the ocular region of 
different human faces and were required to make a forced-choice response from 
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four adjectives (one target and three foils) which best described what the 
individual was thinking or feeling. Prior to performing the test, participants were 
provided with a glossary to clarify what each adjective meant, if they were unsure 
or unfamiliar with the word. Participants were given unlimited time to respond, 
responses were recorded verbally and 1 point was awarded for each correct 
answer, giving a total score out of 36. 
The Reading the Mind in Films (RMF) (Golan et al., 2006): Participants viewed 
short scenes of varying durations involving social interactions from feature films. 
They were instructed to make a forced-choice response from four adjectives (one 
target and three foils) that best described what the protagonist was thinking or 
feeling at the end of the scene. Again, participants were provided with a glossary of 
the adjectives for clarification and responded verbally. There was no time limit for 
responses and a correct response was awarded 1 point, giving a total out of 22. 
The Social Norms Questionnaire (SNQ) (Rankin, 2008): The SNQ was developed to 
screen patients for potential behaviour changes and examines how well 
participants understand the social standards that govern their behaviour in UK 
mainstream culture. Participants were given a list of behaviours (e.g., tell a 
stranger you don’t like their hairstyle?) and asked to indicate whether or not the 
behaviours were socially acceptable to perform in the presence of a stranger or 
acquaintance, not a close friend or family member. A total score (maximum score 
= 22) was calculated, with higher scores reflecting better performance. The SNQ 
also calculates the types of errors made by participants. An over-adherence error 
occurs when the statement is socially acceptable but the participant disagrees with 




Participants completed the WASI-II, ESCoT, RME, RMF and SNQ in a single session, 
which took approximately two hours to complete. The ASD questionnaires were 
completed online. The order of the tasks was the same for each participant and 
regular breaks were provided.  
4.2.5. Statistical analysis  
Parametric and non-parametric analyses were conducted based on initial 
exploratory analyses (Shapiro-Wilk test, p > 0.05). Correlational analyses were 
conducted on all participants using Spearman’s rho correlational analyses to 
examine the relationship between the ESCoT and the established social cognition 
tests. To examine overall differences on the ESCoT subtests (cognitive ToM, 
affective ToM, inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms) and SNQ 
subtests (over-adherence and rule break), a Friedman Test was used. If this yielded 
a significant difference, follow-up analyses were conducted using independent 
samples and paired-samples t-tests for cognitive and affective ToM while Mann-
Whitney U and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were performed for inter-and 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms and the SNQ subtests. An independent 
sample t-test was performed to examine mean group differences on the RME. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were performed on ESCoT total scores, RMF and SNQ total 
scores. The alpha values were set at p < 0.05 and the Holm correction to adjust for 
multiple comparisons was applied. Effect sizes using both partial eta squared (ηp²) 
and Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988, 1992) were calculated.  
The relationship between performance on all social cognition tests and the ASD 
screening questionnaires (AQ, EQ and SQ) were examined using an exploratory 
regression analysis. In the first stage, the background predictors (age, gender, years 
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of education) which significantly correlated with the outcome variables (ESCoT 
total scores and established social cognition tests) at a pre-specified significance 
level of p < 0.20 were entered into the analysis (Altman, 1991) using the enter 
method. We chose a significance level of p < 0.20 over more traditional levels such 
as p < 0.05 since p < 0.05 can fail in identifying variables known to be important 
to the outcome variable and simulation studies have shown that a cut-off of p < 
0.20 yields better outcomes (Bursac et al., 2008; Lee, 2014). VCI scores were 
included in the first stage of the regression analysis if VCI scores correlated with 
the outcome variables (ESCoT total score, RME, RMF and SNQ total scores) at p < 
0.20. In the second stage, AQ, EQ and SQ scores were entered using the stepwise 
method (entry criterion p < 0.05, removal criterion p > 0.10). Finally, we 
conducted a Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) curve analysis to examine the 
ability of the established tests and the ESCoT to differentiate ASD and NC 
participants and accurately assign them to their respective group.  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1 Experiment 1: Cut-off scores to detect abnormal performance on the ESCoT  
Raw score age adjustments were applied (see Baksh et al., under review) (see 
supplementary information; Appendix 1.6). We derived ESCoT cut-off scores for 
the subtests and total scores based on the lowest 5th percentile. Using the cut-off 
scores, we found that 6.77% of our 236 NC were impaired on the cognitive ToM 
subtest, 4.66% on affective ToM, 6.77% on interpersonal understanding of social 
norms and 6.77% on intrapersonal understanding of social norms. A total of 5.50% 
of NC adults were impaired on the ESCoT total score. Table 6 shows the cut-offs for 




4.3.1.1. Table 6. Cut-off scores for ESCoT subtests and total score based on the 5th percentile 










Cognitive ToM 21.98 
(3.00) 
20 18 17 15 - 29 30 17 or less 
Affective ToM 24.56 
(3.21) 
23 20.70 18.85 12 - 30 30 19 or less 




23 19.70 18 15 - 30 30 18 or less 




25 23 22 17 - 30 30 22 or less  
ESCoT total score  97.75 
(7.97) 






4.3.2. Experiment 2: Table 7. Demographics information of participants: Mean (SD) 
 Max score ASD   
n = 19 
NC 
n = 38 
Sig* ηp² (d) 
Age   38.47 (15.63) 37.50 (14.75) ASD = NC 0.001 (0.09) 
Gender (M:F)  12:7 23:15 ASD = NC - 
Years of full-time education  15.21 (2.53) 16.16 (2.54) ASD = NC 0.03 (0.36) 
AQ  50 34.63 (7.43) 16.34 (5.07) ASD < NC 0.69 (2.95) 
EQ  80 14.21 (8.55) 29.92 (7.20) ASD < NC  0.49 (1.97) 
SQ  150 48.11 (19.88) 45.32 (12.71) ASD = NC 0.01 (0.22) 
VCI  160 95.50 (15.62) 105.02 (9.97)a ASD < NC 0.19 (0.96) 
PRI 135 99.06 (21.13) 107.94 (13.07)a ASD = NC 0.10 (0.68) 
ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; AQ, Autism Spectrum Quotient; EQ, Empathy Quotient; SQ, Systemizing Quotient; VCI, Verbal 
Comprehension Index; PRI, Perceptual Reasoning Index. *Analyses were conducted using parametric and non-parametric tests where 




4.3.3. ESCoT convergent validity  
4.3.3.1. Table 8. Correlations between the tests of social cognition for all participants  











0.64***       
Affective ToM 0.58*** 0.33*      
Interpersonal 
norms  
0.86*** 0.39** 0.28*     
Intrapersonal 
norms 
0.47*** 0.002 - 0.08 0.55***    
RME 0.48** 0.36** 0.25 0.38** 0.27*   
RMF 0.42** 0.39** 0.36** 0.30* 0.10 0.62***  
SNQ 0.34* 0.33* 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.33* 0.39** 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. ESCoT; Edinburgh Social Cognition Test, RME, Reading the Mind in the Eyes, RMF, Reading the 
Mind in Films, SNQ, Social Norms Questionnaire. Analyses were conducted non-parametric tests.
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As Table 8 shows the cognitive ToM subtest of the ESCoT significantly correlated 
with the RME, RMF and SNQ. The affective ToM subtest positively correlated with 
the RMF. Interpersonal understanding of social norms significantly correlated with 
the RME and RMF. Intrapersonal understanding of social norms significantly 
correlated with the RME.   
ESCoT total scores significantly positively correlated with the RME, RMF and the 
SNQ. The RME test significantly correlated with the RMF and SNQ. Performance on 
the RMF positively correlated with performance on the SNQ.  
4.3.4. ESCoT subtest correlations  
Cognitive ToM significantly correlated with affective ToM and interpersonal 
understanding of social norms. While affective ToM positively correlated with 
interpersonal understanding of social norms. Performance on interpersonal 
understanding of social norms was only correlated with intrapersonal 










4.3.5. Group comparisons between ASD adults and NC on ESCoT and established 
social cognition tests  
4.3.5.1. Figure 17. Performance of adults with ASD and NC on the subtests of the 
ESCoT. Adults with ASD performed poorer than NC on all subtests (all p < 0.01) 
 
Error bars = Standard error 
A non-parametric Friedman test showed a statistically significant difference 
between the subtests of the ESCoT (χ2(3) = 74.91, p < 0.001) for NC and ASD. 
Post-hoc analysis with Holm correction for multiple comparisons demonstrated 
performance was poorer on the cognitive ToM than affective ToM (t(56) = – 7.17, 
p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.20, d = 1.04). As shown in figure 1, ASD adults scored 
significantly lower than NC adults on cognitive ToM (t(23.26) = – 4.40, p < 
0.001, ηp² = 0.45, d = 1.82) and affective ToM, (t(23.76) = – 3.70, p = 0.002, 
ηp² = 0.37, d = 1.52).  
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All participants performed poorer on inter- compared to intra-personal 
understanding of social norms, (Z = – 6.31, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.70, d = 3.05). 
Furthermore a significant difference was found between groups, with the ASD 
group performing poorer than NC, on the inter-personal understanding of social 
norms  (U = 140.50, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.25, d = 1.15) and intra-personal 
understanding of social norms (U = 226.50 p = 0.021, ηp² = 0.09, d = 0.64).  
Table 9 shows the group comparisons on the established social cognition tests and 
ESCoT total scores. Overall performance on the ESCoT was significantly poorer for 
the ASD group than the NC group. Moreover, scores were significantly lower for 
the ASD group on the RME and RMF compared to NC.  
As Table 9 shows ASD adults performed poorer than NC on the SNQ total scores. 
However there were no statistically significant differences between ASD adults and 
NC for the SNQ subtests (χ2(1) = 0.49, p = 0.484). 




n = 19 
NC 
n = 38 
Statistic  
(df) 















t(55) = – 



























ESCoT; Edinburgh Social Cognition Test, RME, Reading the Mind in the Eyes, RMF, 
Reading the Mind in Films, SNQ, Social Norms Questionnaire. Analyses were 
conducted using parametric and non-parametric tests where appropriate. aNC n = 
37. 
4.3.6. Relationship between social cognition tests, ASD screening questionnaires 
and IQ for all participants  
The variables that correlated with ESCoT total scores at p > 0.20 were age (rs (57) 
= – 0.19, p = 0.155), years of full-time education (rs (57) = 0.32, p = 0.016) and 
VCI scores (rs (55) = 0.39, p = 0.003). These were included in the regression 
analysis using the enter method in the first stage. None of the predictor variables 
correlated significantly at p < 0.01, therefore the effect of suppressor variables was 
not examined. In the stepwise regression analysis for ESCoT total score, years of 
full-time education (β = 0.84, p = 0.022) and AQ scores (β = – 0.62, p < 0.001) 
were retained in the model and accounted for a significant proportion of variance 
in ESCoT total scores (R = 0.78, R2 = 0.61, F(4, 50) = 19.86, p < 0.001).  
Only VCI significantly correlated with RME scores at p < 0.20 (rs (55) = 0.30, p = 
0.025). This was included in the regression analysis using the enter method in the 
first stage. In the final model, VCI scores (β = 0.09, p = 0.041) and EQ scores (β = 
0.14, p = 0.009) accounted for a significant proportion of variance in RME 
performance (R = 0.44, R2 = 0.19, F(2, 52) = 6.20, p = 0.004). 
For the RMF, participant gender (1 = male, 2 = female, rs (56) = 0.25, p = 0.059) 
and VCI scores (rs (54) = 0.45, p = 0.001) were included in the first stage of the 
analysis. In the final model, VCI scores (β = 0.10, p < 0.001) and AQ scores (β = – 
0.11, p = 0.001) were retained and accounted for a significant proportion of 
variance in RMF scores (R = 0.65, R2 = 0.42, F(3, 50) = 12.15, p < 0.001). 
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Participants’ VCI scores was included in the first stage of the regression analysis for 
SNQ scores (rs (55) = 0.34, p = 0.010). In the final model, VCI scores (β = 0.06, p 
= 0.004), EQ scores (β = 0.06, p = 0.009) and SQ scores (β = 0.03, p = 0.038) 
accounted for a significant proportion of variance in SNQ scores (R2 = 0.32, F(2, 
52) = 7.87, p < 0.001). 
4.3.7. ROC analysis for social cognition tests 
4.3.7.1. Figure 18. ROC curves for the ESCoT, RME and SNQ 
 
The closer the curve comes to the reference line, the less accurate the test. 
Our ROC curve analysis (see Figure 18) shows the accuracy of the social cognition 
tests in correctly assigning participants to their group. The Area Under the Curve 
(AUC) values and 95% confidence intervals for the tests were: 0.91 (0.83 – 0.98) 
for the ESCoT total score, 0.77 (0.65 – 0.89) for the RME, 0.87 (0.77 – 0.97) for 
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the RMF and 0.71 (0.57 – 0.86) for the SNQ total score. One NC participant was 
unable to complete the RMF, and the RMF was not included. 
3.3.8. Number of ASD adults impaired on the ESCoT 
Based on our cut-off scores, 36.84% of ASD adults were impaired on the cognitive 
ToM subtest compared to 6.77% of NC adults, and 26.31% were impaired on 
affective ToM compared to 4.66% of NC. On interpersonal understanding of social 
norms, 36.84% of the ASD group was impaired compared to 6.77% of the NC 
group. A total of 15.79% of adults with ASD were impaired on intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms compared to 6.77% of the NC adults. Finally, 
42.11% of ASD adults were impaired on overall ESCoT scores compared to 5.50% 
of the NC adults.  
4.4. Discussion 
We present a new test of social cognition that assesses cognitive ToM, affective 
ToM and inter-and intra-personal understanding of social norms within the same 
clinical test. We investigated the convergent validity of the ESCoT against 
traditional tests and compared performance of ASD adults to NC adults on these 
tests. Moreover, we examined the influence of intelligence and ASD diagnosis on 
the ESCoT and traditional tests of social cognition. The ESCoT showed good 
convergent validity with more traditional social cognition tests with significant 
correlations with the RME, RMF and SNQ. Furthermore ASD adults performed 
poorer on all subtests of the ESCoT and traditional tests compared with NC. The 
regression results showed that better overall performance on the ESCoT was 
predicted by more years of education and lower AQ scores. Similar to our previous 
findings (Baksh et al., under review), ESCoT total score was not predicted by the 
two measures of intelligence; verbal comprehension (VCI) and perceptual 
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reasoning (PRI). This contrasts with performance on the traditional social cognition 
tests included in this study. We found that higher VCI scores predicted better 
performance on the RME, higher VCI and EQ scores predicted better performance 
on the RMF while higher VCI, EQ and SQ scores predicted better performance on 
the SNQ. Finally, the ESCoT was superior to the traditional tests in assigning ASD 
and NC to their respective groups. A total of 42.11% of ASD adults were impaired 
on the ESCoT compared to 5.50% of NCs.  
We have provided evidence of convergent validity for the ESCoT as a test of social 
cognition by demonstrating significant associations between the ESCoT and 
traditional social cognition tests. Of note, we found that the cognitive and affective 
ToM subtests of the ESCoT positively correlated with the RME. There is currently 
debate relating to what the RME assesses and some authors have argued that the 
RME is a test of emotional recognition (Oakley, Brewer, Bird, & Catmur, 2016). 
While it could be argued that the RME is an affective ToM measure (Duval et al., 
2011), our findings suggest that it relates to both components of ToM. Indeed, the 
RME asks participants to infer what the person is thinking or feeling. Intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms did not correlate with cognitive and affective ToM 
of the ESCoT, but was positively correlated with the RME. Furthermore the RME 
also correlated with our measure of empathy. Perhaps the RME may be related to 
several aspects of social cognition. The positive correlations between the subtests of 
the ESCoT (particularly cognitive and affective ToM) suggests that performance on 
one ability is associated with performance on other abilities, but still show 
differentiation in that they are predicted by different but overlapping variables. 
Performance on  cognitive ToM was predicted by age, but performance on affective 
ToM was predicted by age and gender  (Baksh, Abrahams, Auyeung, & 
MacPherson, under review). These findings further show that while cognitive and 
affective ToM are distinct, they do overlap (Kalbe et al., 2010; Sebastian et al., 
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2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010) and both should be considered when assessing 
ToM.  
Poorer performance of ASD adults compared to NC on cognitive ToM, affective 
ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms supports previous findings 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2002; Golan et al., 
2006; Murray et al., 2017; Thiébaut et al., 2016; Zalla et al., 2009). Although the 
ESCoT showed good sensitivity on all subtests of the test, the finding that ASD 
adults showed impaired intrapersonal understanding of social norm is somewhat 
in contrast to our prediction and previous findings of intact performance (Baez et 
al., 2012; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013). Our findings show that ASD adults have 
difficulties with how they should behave in social interactions. However it is 
possible that the ASD group had difficulties in processing the wider context of the 
interaction, due to difficulties in weak central coherence (the inability to 
understand context) (Frith, 1989, 2003). In this study, individuals with ASD 
generally knew when a social norm had been violated and responded 
appropriately to the yes/no aspect of the question. However, in general 
participants with ASD gave egocentric responses (e.g. I’m a nice person) regarding 
why they would/would not have behaved as the character in the animation. 
Instead of referencing the wider context of the interaction (e.g. they needed help, 
helping others is the right thing to do) to explain why they would have behaved in 
a particular way.  
A major advantage of the ESCoT over existing tests is the magnitude of the reported 
effects. Our effects sizes for the strength of the group differences on cognitive and 
affective ToM is greater than those on the RME and RMF. Increased ecological 
validity may explain the greater effect sizes found for the ESCoT compared to the 
RME, which lacks important contextual information, and the RMF, which uses pre-
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existing stimuli that are overdramatized (Murray et al., 2017).  With the ESCoT, 
we have shown that contextually-driven tests more clearly demonstrate group 
differences between ASD and NC. Performance on the ESCoT may be more 
representative of the everyday difficulties faced by ASD adults compared to NCs. 
There are several other advantages of the ESCoT over existing tests in the social 
cognition literature. Firstly, unlike tests like the TASIT, the ESCoT is a short and 
detailed test of social cognition with self-contained interactions. The ESCoT also 
provides researchers and clinicians with two subtests of ToM and social norm 
understanding.  
We found that all participants performed better on affective ToM, compared to 
cognitive ToM, which is similar to previous findings (Bottiroli et al., 2016; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007). Moreover, participants were better on intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms compared to interpersonal understanding. While 
other studies may find differential performance on social cognitive abilities using 
different tests, these tests are not matched for difficulty. Matching social cognition 
components for equivalent difficulty is challenging to achieve. Future studies could 
examine ways of controlling for level of difficulty between subtests. The ESCoT 
assesses different aspects of social cognition within the same test. Similar to 
previous findings (Murray et al., 2017), we found that poorer performance on the 
ESCoT in the ASD group could not be explained by general cognitive abilities while 
performance on the traditional tests was predicted by VCI and PRI, similar to 
previous studies (Baker et al., 2014; Golan et al., 2006; Kaland et al., 2002; 
McDonald et al., 2003). This is an advantage for the ESCoT as it can be used in 
clinical populations in which intelligence may be compromised. Moreover, our NC 
group did not perform at ceiling on the test. The variability of performance in the 
control group is extremely beneficial for a test in nonclinical populations as it 
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increases the sensitivity of the test. Further usefulness of the ESCoT is its superior 
ability at differentiating the ASD and NC groups with an AUC value of 0.91.  
A limitation of this study is the small sample size for the ASD group. However, the 
large effects sizes (e.g. Cohens d = 1.79) for the ESCoT indicate that, even with a 
sample size of ASD adults, we were able to detected meaningful group differences. 
ASD is a heterogeneous condition (Ghaziuddin and Mountain-Kimchi (2004) and 
this is reflected in our findings. Overall, ASD performed poorer then NC, but 
individually, 42.11% were impaired on the ESCoT. This highlights the complexity 
of ASD and suggests that perhaps individuals with ASD should not be examined in 
terms of group means. The groups were not matched on verbal comprehension 
scores, this should be noted when considering the results of the traditional social 
cognition tests. Finally, while ASD adults provided independent verification of 
diagnosis, having the participants complete a more in depth interview about their 
diagnosis would have been beneficial.   
4.4.1. Conclusion  
We found that adults with ASD perform poorer than NCs on cognitive ToM, 
affective ToM and inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. These 
impairments may be responsible for the difficulties frequently observed in social 
interactions. The convergent validity between the ESCoT and established tests of 
social cognition show that the ESCoT is a sensitive test of social cognition in ASD 
adults. We showed that the ESCoT is able to detect large effects with a limited 
sample and shows better diagnostic accuracy than established tests. Many of the 
current tests of social cognition have limited use in clinical settings (Dodich et al., 
2015) but we have demonstrated that the ESCoT may be a useful test to assess 




Chapter 5: Sex, the Broader Autism Phenotype, Social Anxiety 
Disorder, Empathy and the ESCoT in younger adults 
Chapter 1 introduced the BAP in relation to social cognition, while Chapter 3 
investigated its rate of occurrence in the neurotypical population. It also looked at 
the relationship between sex, BAP and IQ on performance of the ESCoT across age 
groups. The relationship between sex and the BAP and performance on tests of 
social cognition will be examined in greater detail in the forthcoming chapter. 
Here the complex interplay between sex, empathy, and subclinical expressions of 
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) and performance on the ESCoT will also be 
examined but within a specific cohort. I explored whether performance of younger 
(18 – 35 year olds) neurotypical adults was influenced by the sex of participants 
and measures of BAP, empathy and subclinical levels of SAD. The secondary aim of 
this chapter was to further examine the efficacy of the ESCoT as a research tool to 
identify the variables which influence performance on tests of social cognition.  
Data in this chapter were collected by undergraduate students Sharon Jany and 









5.1. Introduction  
Research on social cognition is often concerned with group comparisons across 
populations. For example, comparing performance between age groups (Chapter 
3), NC and adults with ASD (Chapter 4) or NC and neurodegenerative diseases 
(Bora et al., 2015). It is also interesting to examine social cognition within a 
population, and investigate the influence of personality traits on our social abilities. 
Research has shown that while men and women are similar in cognitive abilities, 
there are sex differences in cognition (Hyde, 2016). Mental health conditions such 
as Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) and clinical disorders such as ASD manifest in the 
general population in subclinical forms (Freeth, Bullock & Milne, 2013). The 
subclinical presentations of these conditions are particularly interesting since they 
are associated with social cognitive impairments (Losh & Piven, 2007; Samson, 
Lackner, Weiss, & Papousek, 2012), show sex differences (Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; Fehm, Pelissolo, Furmark, & Wittchen, 2005; 
Toussaint & Webb, 2005) and interact with empathy (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Carroll & Chiew, 2006). Consequently this 
chapter was interested in investigating the effects and interplay of sex, personality 
traits and empathy in younger (18 – 35 years old) men and women on the ESCoT. 
This study differed from Chapter 3 in that it examined performance on the ESCoT 
within a cohort. 
5.1.1. Sex differences in Social cognition  
Sex-related differences in social cognitive abilities have not been well-established. 
Sex differences have been found on cognitive ToM tests, with women 
demonstrating significantly better perspective-taking than men (Davis, 1980; 
Nettle & Liddle, 2008; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007). Research into potential sex-related 
differences in affective ToM have reported similar findings to those found in 
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cognitive ToM, again, with women performing better than men (Ahmed & Miller, 
2011; Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, 
Miller, & Pulos, 2013; Schiffer, Pawliczek, Müller, Gizewski, & Walter, 2013; 
Vellante et al., 2013; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). For example, a recent meta-
analysis by Kirkland et al. (2013) reported a small (g = 0.18) but significant 
female advantage on the RME, demonstrating that women are better at inferring 
what another individual is thinking or feeling compared to men.  
While, studies report a female advantage in ToM, Russell, Tchanturia, Rahman, and 
Schmidt (2007) found that men performed significantly better than women on 
Happé’s Strange Stories test. Other researchers have failed to find a female 
advantage in affective ToM with men and women performing similarly (Adenzato 
et al., 2017; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Jarrold, Butler, 
Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000; Mar, Oatley, Hirsh, dela Paz, & Peterson, 2006; Nettle 
& Liddle, 2008). However, many other studies do not report sex-related results 
(e.g., Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, and David, 2004). Consequently it is 
unclear whether sex-related differences were not examined in the first place, or if 
no sex-related differences were found  and therefore not reported (Kirkland et al., 
2013).  
A recent study by Adenzato et al. (2017) has highlighted the need to consider sex 
when investigating social cognition. They reported that transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS) over the medial prefrontal cortex selectively enhanced cognitive 
ToM performance in women participants but not men. They showed that females 
that received anodal tDCS over the medial prefrontal cortex performed better on 
the cognitive ToM task compared with females that received tDCS over the vertex. 
This effect was observed in female participants but not male. The authors suggest 
that investigating sex-related differences should be mandatory in studies of social 
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cognition. However, the Adenzato et al. (2017) study only included 16 participants 
in each group and the study did not report a baseline assessment of cognitive ToM 
between men and women, but administered tDCS to half of participants. Therefore 
it is difficult to interpret whether sex differences existed prior to administering 
tDCS. Overall, the evidence for a female advantage in tests of social cognition 
remains equivocal.  
5.1.2. Sex differences in the BAP  
Some authors have found substantial sex discrepancies in the diagnosis of ASD. 
One study found a sex ratio (M:F) of 9:1 from a community sample in England 
(Brugha et al., 2011). However the consensus sex ratio is approximately 4:1 
(Werling & Geschwind, 2013). Unsurprisingly in neurotypical populations, men 
typically present with more autistic-like traits than women (Austin, 2005; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; Freeth, Bullock, & Milne, 2013; Ruzich 
et al., 2015). These sex differences are typically found using self-report measures 
such as the AQ (Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Voracek & Dressler, 2006; Wheelwright et 
al., 2006). Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al. (2001) found that men 
scored significantly higher on the AQ than women, with 40% of men scoring at 
intermediate levels (AQ score 20+) compared to 21% of women.  
5.1.3. Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) 
Another variable which has shown sex-related differences, and associations with 
social cognition, is Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD). SAD is the most common anxiety 
disorder and is characterised by marked or intense fear of social or performance-
based situations where scrutiny or evaluation by others may occur. Individuals 
with SAD fear social or performance-based situations because they are concerned 
they will say or do something that will result in embarrassment or humiliation. As 
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a result, exposure to feared situations is typically accompanied by anxious 
anticipation, distress, and avoidance. In some cases, individuals’ concerns can be so 
pronounced that they avoid most social interactions (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013; Bögels et al., 2010; Stein & Stein, 2008). SAD is a debilitating 
disorder which can impede social development and is associated with significant 
functional impairments (Lipsitz & Schneier, 2000).  Moreover, SAD is associated 
with a number of negative outcomes such as suicidal ideation, financial 
dependency, and the development of comorbid psychiatric disorders  (Schneier, 
Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). 
While SAD is a clinical disorder, there is a need for accurate estimates of social 
anxiety in the general population for the appropriate development of mental health 
interventions (Furmark et al., 1999). SAD affects millions of people worldwide 
with a lifetime prevalence of approximately 12% (Kessler et al., 2005).  
5.1.4. Sex differences in SAD  
Anxiety disorders are more prevalent among women than among men (Bekker & 
van Mens-Verhulst, 2007). Prevalence rates for SAD based on sex show rates 
ranging from 10.3% – 15.5% for women and 8.7% – 11.1% for men (Kessler et al., 
1994; McLean, Asnaani, Litz, & Hofmann, 2011). Yet, sex differences in terms of 
SAD are inconsistent in the literature. Some studies have reported higher rates of 
SAD in women compared to men (Fehm et al., 2005; Freeth et al., 2013; Furmark 
et al., 1999; Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle, & Kessler, 1996; Offord, Boyle, 
Campbell, & Goering, 1996; Schneier et al., 1992). Others, however, have found 
no sex differences in prevalence rates between women and men in populations in 
the United States. (Bourdon et al., 1988; McLean et al., 2011). Consequently, the 
influence of sex on SAD is unclear and requires further investigation.  
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5.1.5. Social cognition and SAD  
Similarly to ASD where traits of the disorder are distributed in the general 
population and influence performance on tests of social cognition, the same is 
found in SAD (Freeth et al., 2013). However, despite difficulties in social 
interactions being a primary characteristic of individuals with SAD, only a handful 
of studies have attempted to objectively measure social cognitive abilities such as 
ToM in individuals with SAD. Samson et al. (2012) found that higher self-reported 
levels of social anxiety in neurotypical adults was significantly related to lower 
enjoyment of cartoons that involved cognitive ToM inferences,  but not of semantic 
cartoons or visual puns. Individuals with a diagnosis of SAD also perform poorer 
than controls on measures of affective ToM (Hezel & McNally, 2014; Washburn, 
Wilson, Roes, Rnic, & Harkness, 2016). Furthermore, Hezel and McNally (2014) 
and Washburn et al. (2016) both found that, in comparison to controls, individuals 
with SAD are more likely to attribute greater meaning to what others were 
thinking and feeling in social interactions.   
5.1.6. Empathy  
Empathy can broadly be defined as our reaction to the observed emotional 
experiences of another individual (Davis, 1980). Empathy is an interesting 
phenomena to examine in the general population because it plays an important 
role in social understanding (Lawrence et al., 2004). A popular tool for assessing 
empathy in neurotypical populations is the EQ. Using this questionnaire Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) have found that neurotypical adults exhibit 
subclinical difficulties in empathising with another individual in the absence of 
any clinical disorder.  
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5.1.7. Sex differences in empathy   
Sex-related differences are typically found in empathy, with considerable research 
demonstrating that women are more empathic than men (Davis, 1980; Davis & 
Franzoi, 1991; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Hall, 1978; Han, Fan, & Mao, 2008; 
Hoffman, 1977; Rueckert & Naybar, 2008; Toussaint & Webb, 2005). Using the 
EQ, many studies have shown sex differences favouring women compared to men 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Carroll & Chiew, 
2006; Lawrence et al., 2004; Mar et al., 2006; Voracek & Dressler, 2006; 
Wheelwright et al., 2006). Moreover, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2004) 
found that 14% of neurotypical men scored in the “ASD range” on the EQ (i.e., 
equal to or fewer than 30 points) compared to 4% of neurotypical women.  
5.1.8. Empathy and social cognition    
The RME is a common test that is used when investigating the relationship between 
social cognition (affective ToM) and empathy. However, using this test, researchers 
report mixed findings. In neurotypical individuals, higher scores on the RME are 
associated with higher levels of empathy (Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Cook & Saucier, 
2010; Lawrence et al., 2004; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). However, no association 
between affective ToM and empathy has been found using the RME and EQ 
(Vellante et al., 2013) or RME and The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Mar et al., 
2006).  
On the other hand, neuroimaging data shows that the concepts of empathy and 
ToM are closely related (Reniers, Völlm, Elliott, & Corcoran, 2014). Neuroimaging 
studies have found that empathy and ToM activate similar, as well as distinct 
neural networks. Common regions of activation included the medial PFC, TPJ and 
temporal poles. Compared to empathy, ToM tests also activate the lateral 
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orbitofrontal cortex, middle frontal gyrus, cuneus and superior temporal 
gyrus.(Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Reniers et al., 2014; Saxe & Powell, 2006; Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, 
Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003; Völlm et al., 2006). In an attempt to more directly 
compare empathy and ToM in a single study, Völlm et al. (2006) found that 
empathy and ToM rely on the networks associated with making inferences about 
the states of others, but empathising requires neural networks involved in 
emotional processing such as the anterior and posterior cingulate and amygdala. 
5.1.9. The relationship between the BAP, SAD and empathy     
Difficulties in empathic abilities are often cited as a typical characteristic of adults 
with ASD (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Blacher, Kraemer, & Schalow, 
2003; Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, & Convit, 2007). Adults with ASD show 
lower levels of empathy than neurotypical individuals, resulting in difficulties in 
interpersonal interactions and relationships (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Baron-
Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Rogers et al., 2007). Indeed, studies investigating the 
relationship between the AQ and EQ often show a negative association between 
autistic-like traits and levels of empathy (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Baron-Cohen 
& Wheelwright, 2004; Carroll & Chiew, 2006). Moreover, research suggests a 
positive relationship between autistic-like traits and subclinical social anxiety, 
wherein individuals who exhibit higher scores on the AQ demonstrate higher 
levels of social anxiety (Freeth et al., 2013; Kunihira, Senju, Dairoku, 
Wakabayashi, & Hasegawa, 2006; Liss, Mailloux, & Erchull, 2008; Rosbrook & 
Whittingham, 2010; White, Ollendick, & Bray, 2011).   
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5.1.10. Interim summary  
To summarise, the research discussed above suggests that there is a complex 
interplay between sex, personality and social cognition. Research has found 
evidence of some sex-related differences in social cognition (Adenzato et al., 2017; 
Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Nettle & Liddle, 2008). Men exhibit more autistic-like 
traits (Austin, 2005; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; Freeth et 
al., 2013) and lower levels of empathy than women (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 
2004; Lawrence et al., 2004; Mar et al., 2006). The findings on sex-related 
differences in subclinical presentations of SAD are mixed, some studies find sex 
differences, while others have failed to find differences between men and women 
(Fehm et al., 2005; Freeth et al., 2013; McLean et al., 2011). Moreover, these 
subclinical presentations of clinical disorders and lower levels of empathy are 
frequently associated with difficulties in social cognition (Losh & Piven, 2007; 
Samson et al., 2012; Voracek & Dressler, 2006) 
5.1.11. Rationale for the present study  
Social cognition impairment is a major problem underlying difficulties in 
interpersonal relationships in several psychiatric populations (Patin & Hurlemann, 
2015). It is important to examine and identify the variables which might influence 
performance on social cognition tests such as empathy, the BAP and subclinical 
levels of SAD. While neurotypical individuals can exhibit autistic-like traits and 
subclinical levels of SAD, the consequence of these personality traits in everyday 
functioning is unclear (Sasson et al., 2013). Moreover, subclinical expressions of 
SAD are often not considered on tests of social cognition. However, SAD is 
important to consider with the other variables mentioned because of the positive 
associations between autistic-like traits and subclinical levels of SAD (e.g. Freeth et 
al., 2013) and the negative associations between social cognition and autistic-like 
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traits (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It may be possible that subclinical levels of 
SAD are a mediating factor between these variables. Moreover, there is little 
research investigating the relationship between empathy and SAD, but these may 
be important to consider together in understanding the influence of personality 
traits on social cognition. Furthermore, the limited studies investigating ToM in 
SAD highlight the need to further understand the social cognitive difficulties faced 
by individuals with SAD, since high social anxiety is often associated with 
difficulties in developing and sustaining interpersonal relationships (Alden & 
Taylor, 2004). Research suggests that relative to individuals with ASD, individuals 
with SAD make “excessive” ToM errors compared to non-anxious controls. 
Specifically, they are more likely to attribute greater meaning to what others are 
thinking and feeling.  In this regard, their ToM impairments are in the opposite 
direction to individuals with ASD (Hezel & McNally, 2014; Washburn et al., 
2016). A limitation of the current literature is that studies which use self-report 
questionnaires of the BAP, empathy and SAD make assumptions about the 
consequences of the relationships they find on our social abilities, but do not 
include tests of social cognition. Therefore, these studies are unable to identify their 
influence on objective tests of social cognition.  
In the current study, younger adults were chosen as the population to examine the 
relationship between social cognition, the BAP, empathy and SAD for several 
reasons. Firstly, studying SAD in younger adults is important as this cohort shows 
the highest prevalence rates compared to older adults (Bourdon et al., 1988; Fehm 
et al., 2005; Offord et al., 1996) and onset of SAD after the age of 25 years is 
uncommon (Schneier et al., 1992). Additionally, SAD is associated with 
educational underachievement (Lipsitz & Schneier, 2000). Therefore, it is 
important to understand subclinical presentations of the disorder in the 
neurotypical population, particularly, in student populations where individuals 
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experience significant changes to their daily lives when they undertake higher 
education.  
Research has shown that students exhibiting more autistic-like traits score 
significantly lower on questionnaires assessing adaptation to university life 
(Trevisan & Birmingham, 2016). Likewise, the BAP significantly predicts 
relationship outcomes in newly formed social relationships at university (Faso, 
Corretti, Ackerman, & Sasson, 2016). Neurotypical students who score above the 
clinical threshold for symptoms of ASD self-report higher levels of social anxiety 
than students with fewer autistic traits. Moreover, higher BAP traits are 
significantly correlated with subclinical expressions of SAD in students (White et 
al., 2011). Recent results in this population also suggests that social situations in 
particular induce anxiety in individuals who have more autistic-like traits (Freeth 
et al., 2013). Furthermore, empathy and SAD are positively correlated in students 
(Tibi-Elhanany & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011), demonstrating that highly socially 
anxious individuals show elevated levels of empathic tendencies. While these 
relationships are interesting, there is limited research examining the relationship 
between social cognitive abilities, SAD and empathy in this population.  
Similar to the ageing literature, research into sex-related differences in social 
cognition has tended to focus on single measures such as the RME (Voracek & 
Dressler, 2006) and examine cognitive and affective ToM using separate tests (e.g., 
Adenzato et al., 2017). Some studies use composite measures that assess both 
cognitive and affective ToM, but only report a single score (e.g., Hezel & McNally, 
2014; Russell et al., 2007) and researchers have yet to examine sex differences in 
inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. The ESCoT provides a 
research tool to address these limitations. Moreover, it would be interesting to 
examine the relationship between EQ and measures of ToM on the ESCoT because 
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research has suggested that many of the items on the EQ tap ToM abilities (Rogers 
et al., 2007), for example ‘it is hard for me to see why some things upset people so 
much.’ 
5.1.12. Aim and hypotheses of the present study  
The aim of this chapter was to explore potential sex-related differences in 
personality measures and social cognition. Specifically, it sought to investigate the 
associations between the BAP, levels of empathy, social anxiety and the ESCoT 
subtests. The study aims to determine whether autistic-like traits, empathy and 
subclinical presentations of SAD predict performance on the ESCoT in a 
neurotypical younger (18 – 35 years old) adult population.  
It was predicted that:  
1. Women would perform better than men on the subtests of the ESCoT. 
2. The sex of participants would affect scores on measures of the BAP, 
empathy and social anxiety. Women would score lower on the BAP, higher 
on empathy and higher on social anxiety than men.   
3. There would be strong associations between the BAP, levels of empathy, 
social anxiety and the ESCoT subtests. BAP would negatively correlate with 
social anxiety, ESCoT subtests and empathy. Autistic-like traits and 
subclinical social anxiety would positively correlate. Social anxiety would 
negatively correlate with levels of empathy and the ESCoT subtests. 
4. The BAP, levels of empathy and social anxiety would predict performance 
on the subtests of the ESCoT.  
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5.2. Method  
5.2.1. Participants  
Participants were recruited as part of an undergraduate Year 4 Honours 
dissertation project which Professor Abrahams, Dr Auyeung and I supervised 
during the 2015/2016 academic year. These data were reanalysed in the current 
study using altered research questions and different statistical techniques.  
A total of sixty participants (35 females) aged between 18 and 25 years took part 
in the study. They were recruited through online platforms such as Facebook and 
from the local undergraduate community. Participants were entered into a prize 
draw to win a £20 voucher for participation. The study was approved by the 
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences (Psychology) Ethics 
committee.  
A summary of the participants’ demographic information can be found in Table 
10.  
5.2.2. Materials  
The Edinburgh Social Cognition Test (ESCoT), a full description of the ESCoT can be 
found in Chapters 3, section 3.2.2.3.  
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 
2001)  
Empathy Quotient (EQ) (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004).  
Full descriptions of the AQ and EQ can be found in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2.2. 
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Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS) (Liebowitz, 1987).  The LSAS is a commonly 
used self-report scale for the assessment of SAD (Fresco et al., 2001). It consists of 
11 social and 13 performance situations, which are rated on a 4-point (0-3) scale 
of fear/anxiety and avoidance behaviours. Participants are required to rate how 
anxious or fearful they feel in a situation and how often they avoid the situation. A 
total score was generated by summing the fear and avoidance ratings for all items. 
The maximum score was 144, with higher scores suggesting higher levels of social 
anxiety.  
5.2.3. Procedure 
The study was completed in two parts. In part 1, participants completed an online 
survey which consisted of demographic questions, and the AQ, EQ and LSAS and 
took approximately 15 minutes to complete. Part 2 consisted of a 30 minute face-
to-face assessment in which participants completed the ESCoT. On completion of 
parts 1 and 2, each participant was debriefed to the purpose of the study.  
5.2.4. Data Analysis 
ESCoT subtest raw scores were age-adjusted based on the findings from Chapter 3. 
Parametric and non-parametric analyses were conducted based on initial 
exploratory analyses (Shapiro-Wilk test, p > 0.05).  
Group differences between men and women on the ESCoT subtests were performed 
using a Friedman Test to examine if there was an overall statistically significant 
difference. Follow-up analyses were conducted Wilcoxon signed-rank test for 
comparisons between cognitive and affective ToM and inter-and intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms. An independent t-test was used to compare 
performance between men and women on cognitive ToM. While Mann-Whitney U 
tests were used for group comparisons on affective ToM and inter-and 
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intrapersonal understanding of social norms. Correlational analyses were 
conducted using Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient to examine the relationship 
between the BAP, levels of empathy, social anxiety and the ESCoT subtests. The 
alpha values were set at p < 0.05 and the Holm correction was used to adjust for 
multiple comparisons.  
The relationship between performance on the ESCoT total scores and subtests and 
the personality questionnaires (AQ, EQ and LSAS) were examined using regression 
analysis. In the first stage, the background predictors (age, sex, years of education) 
which showed a correlation with the outcome variables (ESCoT total scores subtests 
scores) at a pre-specified significance level of p < 0.20 was entered into the 
analysis (Altman, 1991) using the enter method. A significance level of p < 0.20 
was chosen over more traditional levels such as p < 0.05 since p < 0.05 can fail in 
identifying variables known to be important and simulation studies have shown 
that a cut-off of p < 0.20 yields better outcomes than a cut-off of p < 0.05 (Bursac 
et al., 2008; Lee, 2014). In the second stage, AQ, EQ and LSAS scores were entered 
using the stepwise method (entry criterion p < 0.05, removal criterion p > 0.10) to 




5.3.1. Differences between male and female participants  
5.3.1.1. Table 10. Demographic information and personality measures of male and female participants  
Variable Overall mean  
(n = 60) 
Male 
(n = 27) 
Female 
(n = 33) 
Range   Statistic (df)  p-value  
Age (SD) 22.38 (3.22) 22.37 (1.93) 22.39 (4.01) 18 – 35  U = 387.50 p = 0.381 
Years of education 16.37 (1.23) 16.15 (1.13) 16.55 (1.30) 14 – 19 U = 318.00 p = 0.038 
AQ (max = 50) 17.25 (7.67) 19.81 (7.32) 15.15 (7.40) 4 – 41  U = 279.50 p = 0.013 
EQ (max = 80) 44.73 (11.98) 39.07 (11.05) 49.36 (10.78) 15 – 68  t = -3.63 
(55.12) 
p = 0.001 
LSAS (max = 144) 40.98 (21.17) 40.04 (21.64) 41.76 (21.08) 9 – 95  t = -0.31 
(55.07) 
p = 0.757 
AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient; EQ = Empathy Quotient; LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale. Analyses were conducted using 
parametric and non-parametric tests where appropriate. Significant group differences are in bold.
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Table 10 shows the results of sex-related differences on measures of the BAP, 
empathy and levels of social anxiety. In this sample, there was a significant 
difference in years of education between men and women. Additionally, men 
exhibited significantly more autistic-like traits than women and self-reported 
lower levels of empathy compared to women. There was no statistically significant 
difference in self-reported levels of social anxiety between men and women. 
5.3.1.2. Figure 19. Performance of male and female participants on the ESCoT 
 
Error bars = Standard error 
There was no statistically significant difference between men and women in overall 
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Error bars = Standard error. **p < 0.01 
A Friedman Test for all participants found that there was a statistically significant 
difference in performance between the subtests of the ESCoT, χ2(3) = 80.23, p < 
0.001.   
For the following analyses p-values were adjusted using the Holm correction. 
There was a significant difference in cognitive ToM compared to Affective ToM, Z 
= -3.35, p = 0.003, where performance was poorer on cognitive ToM than 
affective ToM. There was a significant difference in performance between 
interpersonal and intrapersonal understanding of social norms, Z = -3.45, p = 
0.003. Participants performed better on intrapersonal understanding of social 































As Figure 20 shows, there was a statistically significant sex-related difference on 
affective ToM performance, U = 235.00, p = 0.003. Women performed better than 
men on this subtest of the ESCoT.  
There was no significant sex-related difference between men and women on 
cognitive ToM, t(58) = -1.79, p = 0.079, interpersonal understanding of social 
norms, U = 402.00, p = 0.515 and intrapersonal understanding of social norms, U 




5.3.4. The relationship between autistic traits, empathy, social anxiety and subtests of the ESCoT and ESCoT total score  
5.3.4.1. Table 11. Correlations between the BAP, empathy and social anxiety scores 
 EQ AQ LSAS Cognitive ToM Affective ToM Interpersonal 
understanding of 
social norms 
AQ       -0.66*      
LSAS       -0.29     0.57*     
Cognitive ToM 0.27    -0.007  0.07    
Affective ToM 0.12       -0.18  0.09 0.21   
Interpersonal understanding of 
social norms 
0.10 -0.19 -0.12 0.20 0.32*  
Intrapersonal understanding of 
social norms 
      -0.03   0.10  0.12 0.07 0.04 0.43* 
AQ = Autism Spectrum Quotient; EQ = Empathy Quotient; LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale. *Correlations were conducted 




The table above (Table 11) shows that participants who scored higher on the AQ 
subsequently scored lower on the EQ. Higher scores on the EQ also resulted in 
lower self-reported levels of SAD. Participants who performed better on 
interpersonal understanding of social norms also performed significantly better on 
affective ToM and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. After the Holm 
correction was applied, the positive correlation between EQ scores and cognitive 
ToM and the negative correlation between EQ and LSAS scores were not significant 
(both p = 0.05).   
ESCoT total score. The predictor variables that correlated with ESCoT total scores at 
p < 0.20 were sex (r = 0.18, p = 0.165), years of education (r = 0.38, p = 0.003) 
and age (r = 0.17, p = 0.104), 
Years of education (p = 0.012) was the only significant predictor of performance 
on ESCoT total scores, R = 0.40, R² = 0.16 (F (3, 56) = 3.58, p = 0.019).  Higher 
levels of education predicted better overall performance. AQ, EQ and LSAS scores 
were not retained in the final model.     
Cognitive ToM. The predictor variables that correlated with cognitive ToM scores 
were years of education (r = 0.32, p = 0.007) sex (male = 1, female = 2, r = 0.23, 
p = 0.040) and age (r = 0.44, p < 0.001) and were included in the regression 
analysis using the enter method in the first stage.  
In the regression model, age (p = 0.003) was a significant predictor of cognitive 
ToM performance with an R = .51, R² = 0.26 (F(3, 56) = 6.43, p = 0.001). Being 
older predicted better performance on cognitive ToM. The sex of participants 
showed a trend toward statistical significance (p = 0.078). AQ, EQ and LSAS scores 




Affective ToM. The predictor variables that correlated with affective ToM scores at 
the p < 0.20 level were age (r = -0.13, p = 0.168), sex (r = 0.42, p < 0.001) and 
years of education (r = 0.13, p = 0.158). These were included in the first stage 
using the enter method.  
In the regression model, only sex (p = 0.002) was a significant predictor of 
performance on affective ToM, R = 0.46, R² = 0.22 (F (3, 56) = 5.11, p = 0.003).  
Being female predicted better performance on this subtest of the ESCoT. AQ, EQ 
and LSAS scores were not retained in the final model.     
Interpersonal understanding of social norms. Years of education (r = 0.39, p = 
0.001) and age (r = 0.13, p = 0.159) correlated with interpersonal understanding 
of social norms and meet criteria for inclusion in the first stage of the regression 
model. Sex (r = -0.10, p = 0.223) did not meet criteria for inclusion in the first 
stage of the regression model.  
Years of education (p = 0.004) was a significant predictor of performance on 
interpersonal understanding of social norms, R = 0.39, R² = 0.15 (F (2, 57) = 5.20, 
p = 0.008). Higher levels of education predicted better performance in 
interpersonal understanding of social norms. AQ, EQ and LSAS scores were not 
retained in the final model.     
Intrapersonal understanding of social norms. The predictor variables that 
correlated with intrapersonal understanding of social norms scores at the p < 0.20 
level were sex (r = -0.11, p = 0.196) and years of education (r = 0.16, p = 0.116) 
and were included in the regression analysis using the enter method in the first 
stage. Age (r = 0.02 p = 0.432) did not meet criteria for inclusion in the first stage 




This regression model was not statistically significant, R = 0.21, R² = 0.04 (F (2, 
57) = 1.32, p = 0.276. 
5.4. Discussion  
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of sex, measures of the BAP, 
empathy and SAD on performance on the ESCoT. Unlike initial predictions, the 
only significant sex difference between men and women was found in affective 
ToM. Here, women performed significantly better than men. As predicted, women 
exhibited fewer autistic-like traits and higher levels of empathy compared with 
men. Contrary to the predictions, men and women did not differ in their levels of 
social anxiety. Performance on the AQ and EQ were negatively correlated, while 
social anxiety was positively associated with AQ scores. It was predicted that the 
BAP, levels of empathy and social anxiety would be related to performance on the 
subtests of the ESCoT. However, regression analyses found that younger individuals 
who are older (age range 18 – 35 years old) performed better on cognitive ToM, 
while being female predicted superior performance on affective ToM.   
Also noteworthy was a statistically significant difference in subtest performance 
between cognitive and affective ToM.  In this instance, participants performed 
better in the affective ToM subtest than the cognitive ToM subtest. Participants also 
performed better on intrapersonal understanding of social norms compared to 
interpersonal understanding of social norms. Higher years of education resulted in 
better performance in interpersonal understanding of social norms. Finally, higher 
years of education also predicted better overall performance on the ESCoT.  
A sex-related difference was found in affective ToM, with women performing 
better than men in this social cognitive ability. This is similar to much of the 




Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Kirkland et al., 2013; Schiffer et 
al., 2013; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). However, this is in contrast to Jarrold et al. 
(2000) who found no sex-related difference in affective ToM in neurotypical 
students. Jarrold et al. (2000) may not have found a significant difference because 
they used the RME which some authors have argued is a test of emotional 
recognition (Oakley et al., 2016). Moreover, it remains unclear whether sex 
differences exist in emotional processing (Deng, Chang, Yang, Huo, & Zhou, 
2016). In the present study, both the group comparisons and the regression 
analysis found no significant difference or associations between sex and cognitive 
ToM. This is similar to the findings of Chapter 3 but is in contrast to previous 
literature, which showed that women are better than men at inferring what 
another person is thinking (Davis, 1980; Nettle & Liddle, 2008; Stiller & Dunbar, 
2007). A potential explanation for the null finding may be task related; previous 
studies have used tests which may have also assessed affective aspects of ToM by 
the nature of the questions. This study included explicit questions of cognitive and 
affective ToM. These findings demonstrate that sex is an important variable to 
consider when investigating affective ToM, but not cognitive ToM in younger 
neurotypical populations.  
Consistent with the BAP literature examining sex-related differences, women self-
reported fewer autistic traits than men (Austin, 2005; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, et al., 2001; Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Freeth et al., 2013; Ruzich et al., 
2015; Voracek & Dressler, 2006; Wheelwright et al., 2006). This would appear to 
suggest that men are closer to the clinical end of the Autism spectrum than women. 
A possible mechanism for this finding is that lower severity of autistic traits in 
women may be the result of increased sensitivity to early environmental influences 
that operate to promote social competency. Research has found no evidence to 




Imaeda, & Sumi, 2008). But there is evidence from structure equation modelling 
that shows that girls are more sensitive, compared to boys, to environmental 
influences that improve their ability to develop reciprocal social behaviours. 
Consequently reducing the penetrance of genetic liability for autistic-like traits 
(Constantino & Todd, 2003). Alternatively, these results might suggest that fewer 
women identify with the list of traits typically associated with ASD as measured by 
the AQ. The behaviours that the AQ probes are extremely specific and at times, 
male orientated, for example ‘I usually notice car number plates or similar strings 
of information’. Indeed, Haney (2016) has recently suggested in a sex-bias criteria 
used to identify ASD, leaving females with ASD undiagnosed or misdiagnosed. 
Therefore, this could perhaps decrease the probability of a female participant 
responding to exhibit that behaviour. Participants are asked if they agree that they 
exhibit the stated behaviour, for example ‘I am fascinated by dates’. A participant 
may answer ‘definitely disagree’ because they are not interested in dates. This 
would suggest that they do not exhibit this narrow interest, however they may be 
fascinated by colours, which is another specific interest, but was not mentioned in 
the questionnaire. It is worth noting that there were no significant correlations 
between cognitive and affective ToM and BAP traits which is similar to Sasson et al. 
(2013), Kunihira et al. (2006) and the results from Chapter 3. This suggests that 
while BAP traits may indicate difficulties in social cognition, establishing a link 
between self-reported BAP traits and objective measures of social abilities such as 
ToM is more challenging.  
Performance on the AQ was similar to previous studies investigating autistic-like 
traits in neurotypical students (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001; 
Freeth et al., 2013). In this sample, the overall mean score on the AQ was 17.25, 
with men scoring 19.81 and women scoring 15.15. These results are similar to 




highest score on the AQ was 41, which is substantially above the recommended 
cut-off of 32 in neurotypical populations (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et 
al., 2001). In fact, 3 participants scored above the cut-off, indicating the presence 
of considerable autistic-like traits. However, removing these participants did not 
change the results of the present study.  
The distribution of AQ scores reported here provides support for the notion that 
autistic-like traits lie on a continuum in the neurotypical population (Constantino 
et al., 2006; Constantino & Todd, 2005). Unfortunately, information regarding the 
incidence of participants with relatives with ASD was not collected in the current 
sample. Therefore, it is unclear whether the participants who scored higher on the 
AQ have a family history of ASD. Future studies would benefit from obtaining this 
information to provide a possible explanation for higher scores of participants in 
the neurotypical population. Future studies might also explore the broader, 
medium and narrow autism phenotype suggested by Wheelwright, Auyeung, 
Allison, and Baron-Cohen (2010). Using the AQ they defined the narrow autism 
phenotype (NAP) as scores which are ≥ 3 SD above the mean. Individuals on the 
NAP have a large number of autistic-like traits, and most (but not all) will have a 
diagnosis of ASD. An individual with the medium autism phenotype (MAP) has a 
medium number of autistic traits (defined as individuals scoring between 2 to 3 
SDs above the mean on the AQ). Separating participants into these groups may 
allow for better analysis of the relationship between subclinical autistic-like traits 
and social cognitive abilities, since the social abilities of these different groups 
along the autism spectrum could then be examined.  
Using the EQ, these results reaffirmed previous findings (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; 
Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Carroll & Chiew, 2006; Lawrence et al., 




women exhibit higher levels of self-reported empathy than men. Of the 5 
participants (8%) who scored in the “ASD range” (i.e., equal to or fewer than 30 
points), 4 of them were men. Moreover, the 17 participants who scored lower than 
40 points on the EQ, 12 of them (70%) were men. Nevertheless, when interpreting 
the sex-related differences found in empathy, it is worth considering that sex 
differences have been found to be a function of the assessment methods used. In a 
meta-analysis, Eisenberg and Lennon (1983) found the largest effect sizes for sex-
related differences favouring women in empathy with self-report scales. Moderate 
differences were found for self-report measures in laboratory situations. No sex-
related differences were found for physiological or unobtrusive observations of 
nonverbal reactions to another's emotional state. Therefore, it is unclear whether 
the sex-related difference in EQ scores is due to the sex of participants or the self-
report method used to measure empathy.   
Unlike the findings of Freeth et al. (2013), who showed that female students scored 
significantly higher on the LSAS than their male counterparts, the present study did 
not find this sex-related difference. The present finding shows that neurotypical 
adults do not differ in self-reported levels of social anxiety, similar to Bourdon et 
al. (1988) and McLean et al. (2011). A possible reason for the contrary findings to 
Freeth et al. (2013) is sample size. Potential sex-related differences were 
investigated in 1325 students in Freeth et al.’s (2013) study; here the sample only 
consisted of 60 participants. Yet, Bourdon et al.’s (1988) sample consisted of 
10,954 women and 7,618 men while McLean et al.’s (2011) consisted of 11,463 
women and 8,550 men. Another potential explanation is age of the sample 
population. SAD has a very early onset (Stein & Stein, 2008) and the prevalence of 
SAD decreases with age (Grant et al., 2005; Kessler et al., 2005). The samples of 
Bourdon et al. (1988) and McLean et al. (2011) were much older than the current 




in younger adults, as found in Freeth et al.’s (2013) student population, however 
this study may have been under-powered and not able to detect the presence of 
sex-related differences in subclinical expressions of SAD. A similar limitation 
which may have impacted the results of the present study was that few participants 
reported experiencing high levels of social anxiety, resulting in less variance in the 
data.  
There was a highly significant negative correlation between EQ scores and AQ 
scores. This is a common association found between empathy and autistic-like 
traits (Baron-Cohen et al., 2003; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Carroll & 
Chiew, 2006). Moreover, autistic-like traits and social anxiety were positively 
correlated, much like the results reported by Freeth et al. (2013), White et al. 
(2011) and others. These results show that the presentation of less severe autistic 
traits is associated with difficulties in understanding the observed emotional 
experiences of another individual and increased levels of anxiety about social 
situations. Consequently, in populations like the current sample, there is a need to 
provide support for individuals who exhibit higher levels of the BAP. Especially in 
higher education situations, as the transition to university life is significant for 
students, both academically and socially (Hanley et al., 2015). This is further 
highlighted by previous research which has shown that the BAP can have adverse 
outcomes on real-world social functioning (Jobe & White, 2007; Wainer et al., 
2011). For example, one study found that the BAP was associated with increase 
loneliness, fewer friendships and shorter durations of friendships in student 
populations (Jobe & White, 2007).  
It is interesting to note that while previous imaging research has shown that ToM 
and empathy are related (Reniers et al., 2014),  an association between affective 




previous authors using the RME and self-report measures of empathy in younger 
neurotypical populations (Mar et al., 2006; Vellante et al., 2013). An important 
caveat of the imaging data is the researchers concluded that ToM and empathy 
were related because they activated the same brain regions. However similar 
activation does not always mean that cognitive processes are related, given the 
interconnectivity of neural networks. These findings suggest that perhaps empathy 
and ToM are not as related as previously proposed. Another reason for the lack of a 
significant correlation may be because these domains were measured using 
different methods. Empathy was assessed using a self-report questionnaire, while 
ToM was measured using a more objective measure. Similar to the results between 
the BAP and ToM, the lack of a significant correlation could potentially reflect the 
difficulties of pairing self-report and objective tests. To date, no study has 
compared self-report empathy to self-report ToM or objective measures of 
empathy to objective tests of ToM. Future studies might use objective and self-
report measures of empathy and examine their relationship to ToM to further 
investigate this notion.      
The neurotypical students in this study performed significantly better on affective 
ToM compared to cognitive ToM. This finding is similar to the findings reported 
elsewhere in the literature in younger adults (Bottiroli et al., 2016; Shamay-Tsoory 
et al., 2007). However, the findings in the present study are novel compared to 
those previously reported as it explicitly assessed cognitive and affective ToM in the 
same test. Unlike, Bottiroli et al. (2016) who adapted the Faux Pas test to measure 
cognitive and affective ToM. As I have previously argued, the Faux Pas test is 
primarily an affective ToM and social norm understanding test. Moreover, 
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2007) used a basic cognitive and affective ToM test (JoP) 
with low ecological validity since participants simply have to point to the picture 




In this study it was possible to directly measure the disassociation between 
cognitive and affective ToM in a more ecological test, one that was specifically 
designed to assess cognitive and affective ToM in a single test. This finding adds 
further support for related but distinct aspects of ToM reported by several lesion 
and imaging studies (Sebastian et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 
2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005). These findings 
further emphasise the need to assess cognitive and affective ToM separately, rather 
than using composite tests such as Happé’s Strange Stories test. Furthermore, 
employing tests which only assess single apects of ToM such as the RME may not 
provide a comprehensive representation of ToM performance.  
Results showed that age positively predicted performance on cognitive ToM. 
However, in Chapter 3, increasing age predicted poorer scores on cognitive ToM. 
The participants in this study were relatively young (M = 22.38, SD = 3.22). 
Therefore it is reasonable to suggest that their cognitive ToM abilities may still be 
developing (De Luca et al., 2003). Moreover, some aspects of social cognition will 
undoubtedly be experienced based, so the youngest adults in the sample may not 
have been exposed to enough situations to effectively infer what an individual is 
thinking, as optimally as the older adults in the sample. The results of this study 
and those of Chapter 3 might suggest that our cognitive ToM ability may continue 
to develop to a certain age, reach an optimal level of effectiveness and then 
decrease as we get older. Further detailed investigation is needed before any 
conclusions can be drawn.  
Finally, the results showed that participants with higher levels of education 
performed better on interpersonal understanding of social norms and overall on 
the ESCoT. In this instance, years of education accounted for 15% of the variance 




performance. Higher levels of education were also found to significantly predict 
overall performance on the ESCoT in Chapter 4 with adults with ASD and 
neurotypical controls. In Chapter 3, years of education did not significantly predict 
overall performance on the ESCoT, nor did verbal comprehension and perceptual 
reasoning. Interestingly, in Chapter 3, there was a greater distribution of years of 
education (M = 15.70, SD = 3.00) compared to a much smaller distribution here 
(M = 16.37, SD = 1.23). It is currently unclear what could be behind this finding 
and future studies could examine the exactly nature for the effect of education, 
particularly when Chapter 3 and 4 did not find a significant effect of measures of 
IQ.  
The present study showed the importance of considering sex when investigating 
such constructs as the BAP and empathy. It replicated previous findings examining 
the relationship between the BAP and empathy and the BAP and SAD in a 
neurotypical younger population. Moreover, this study was a further utilization of 
the ESCoT as a research tool. While measures of the BAP, empathy and social 
anxiety were not found to be associated with performance on the ESCoT, this study 
showed that the ESCoT is capable of replicating previous findings associated with 
sex-related differences in affective ToM and suggests a dissociation between 
cognitive and affective ToM performance. Moreover, it demonstrated some novel 
findings in terms of the relationship between cognitive ToM and age. Taken 
together, these results show that using the ESCoT can provide fresh and interesting 





Chapter 6: The clinical validity of the ESCoT: Relation to 
behaviour change in dementia 
So far I have shown that the ESCoT is an advantageous and valid research tool. 
However, when the ESCoT was developed, the overall aim was to design a valid 
tool to aid in identifying social cognitive difficulties in clinical settings. Therefore, 
the aim of this chapter was to investigate whether the ESCoT would be sensitive to 
impairments in dementia. 
















Many clinical disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder exhibit social 
cognitive impairments at initial presentation of the disease or as a consequence of 
disease progression (Green et al., 2015; Henry et al., 2015; Poletti et al., 2012). In 
addition to clinical disorders, neurodegenerative diseases often exhibit declines in 
social abilities and behaviour (Elamin et al., 2012; Shany-Ur et al., 2012). 
Additionally, social cognition may play an important role in the clinical care of 
neurodegenerative diseases like dementia (Elamin et al., 2012) in identifying 
patients who may need extra post-diagnostic support. Consequently, there is a 
critical necessity for tests which assess our social cognitive abilities in clinical 
settings (Henry et al., 2015). As previously mentioned, there are important 
limitations that hinder the use of current tests of social cognition in clinical 
settings. For example, few tests of social cognition examine more than one or two 
abilities within the same test, limiting their representation of our social abilities.  
Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a progressive neurological disease which causes 
irreversible loss of neurons and eventually leads to a dementia. The main 
characteristics of AD includes progressive impairment in memory, judgment, 
decision making, orientation to physical surroundings, and language (Dubois et al., 
2007). While they are poorly understood because of confounding variables such as 
general cognitive functioning, difficulties in social abilities are found in mild AD 
(Kemp et al., 2012). Frontotemporal dementia (FTD) consists of three subtypes, 
behavioural variant FTD (bvFTD), semantic dementia and progressive non-fluent 
aphasia (Rascovsky et al., 2011). Major hallmarks of bvFTD patients are insidious 
changes in personality and behaviour, but relatively intact performance on 




AD and frontotemporal dementia (FTD) are common types of dementia (Bora et al., 
2015). AD is the most common form of dementia among older adults and FTD is 
the second-most common young-onset dementia (Poletti et al., 2012). Structured 
social cognition tests may be useful particularly in AD and bvFTD (Henry, Von 
Hippel, Molenberghs, Lee, & Sachdev, 2016) since traditional neuropsychological 
tests are limited at assessing social cognition (Bora et al., 2015; Gregory et al., 
2002). Moreover, extensive research has shown that social cognitive abilities are 
impaired in dementias like AD and bvFTD (Bora et al., 2015; Gregory et al., 2002; 
Poletti et al., 2012).  
6.1.1. ToM difficulties in patients with dementia  
Brain regions which are important for ToM are specifically affected by 
neurodegenerative processes in patients with age-related pathologies (Kemp et al., 
2012). However the research examining ToM in neurodegenerative patients is 
mixed. Research has shown that AD patients have intact first-order cognitive ToM 
abilities. Koff, Brownell, Winner, Albert, and Zaitchik (2004) found that compared 
to NC adults AD patients showed no deficits in their ability to attribute a false belief 
to another person or in identifying their own previous false beliefs. Yet, in another 
study, 65% of AD patients failed a second-order false belief test (Cuerva et al., 
2001). Studies utilising both first and second-order false belief tests have shown 
that AD patients are impaired on second-order tests (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & 
Black, 2009; Gregory et al., 2002) but show intact performance on first-order false 
belief (Gregory et al., 2002) or perform at ceiling (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2009) 
compared to NC adults. Youmans and Bourgeois (2010) examined first-order and 
second-order false belief tests with and without memory support in AD patients 
and NC adults. They found significant cognitive ToM difficulties when a memory 
support was provided and showed that group differences in ToM impairments 




should be noted that in this study, first and second-order stimuli were combined 
for analysis, so these results may be difficult to interpret given the research 
discussed. With the exception of Youmans and Bourgeois (2010), the cognitive 
ToM impairments found in AD appear to be test specific, first-order false belief 
abilities are intact, compared to more demanding second-order false belief tests 
(Kemp et al., 2012). This has led to the suggestion that cognitive ToM impairments 
relating to false-belief tests in AD are secondary to more global cognitive 
impairments, rather than a primary cognitive ToM impairment (Kemp et al., 2012; 
Koff et al., 2004).  
Similar inconclusive findings have been found for affective ToM. Laisney et al. 
(2013) and Castelli et al. (2011)  have both reported impairments in the ability to 
infer what another individual is feeling in AD patients using the RME, but Gregory 
et al. (2002) found intact affective ToM on the RME. In the same study by Gregory 
et al., (2002), patients with AD performed as well as NC adults on the Faux Pas, 
but they failed the control questions. Moreover, a case report of a 75-year-old 
woman with AD showed no impairments on affective ToM assessed by the RME 
and Faux Pas (Modinos, Obiols, Pousa, & Vicens, 2009). From these studies, it is 
evident that research examining cognitive and affective ToM in AD patients is 
extremely convoluted.  
The literature on bvFTD is much clearer, showing that ToM impairment is a robust 
finding in patients (Bora et al., 2015). Both cognitive and affective ToM are 
consistently and reliably impaired in these patients using such tests like the RME 
and false-belief (Eslinger et al., 2007; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2009; 
Gleichgerrcht, Torralva, Roca, Pose, & Manes, 2011; Gregory et al., 2002; Lough et 
al., 2006; Snowden et al., 2001; Snowden et al., 2003; Torralva et al., 2007). 
Gregory et al. (2002) showed that bvFTD patients were significantly impaired on 




difficulties with the control questions (used to examine general comprehension 
and memory). This has been replicated by Modinos et al. (2009) who reported a 
64-year-old man with bvFTD who presented similar impairments in first-order 
and second-order false beliefs tests of cognitive ToM. However these results have 
only been partially supported by another study. Fernandez-Duque et al. (2009) 
showed intact performance for first-order false belief abilities, but impaired 
second-order false belief. In regards to affective ToM, impairments of this social 
cognitive ability has been found using the Faux Pas (Gregory et al., 2002; Torralva 
et al., 2007). Performance by bvFTD patients on the Faux Pas was significantly 
worse than NC, showing pronounced errors on the test. These included failing to 
identify when something hurtful or inappropriate had been said by one character 
and stating something inappropriate had been said intentionally. Moreover, other 
patients failed to accurately infer the belief states of the story characters. Similar 
findings has been observed in case reports by Modinos et al. (2009) using the Faux 
Pas. On the RME, bvFTD patients frequently attribute the wrong emotions to eye 
expressions compared to NC adults (Gregory et al., 2002; Lough, Gregory, & 
Hodges, 2001; Lough et al., 2006; Modinos et al., 2009; Torralva et al., 2007). 
These findings demonstrate that patients with bvFTD have difficulty inferring what 
another person is thinking and what they are feeling during social interactions.  
To clarify the mixed findings from studies of AD patients, Poletti et al. (2012) 
conducted a meta-analysis in both AD and bvFTD patients. The results suggested 
that bvFTD and AD patients are impaired on cognitive ToM measured by second-
order false-belief tests. Whereas bvFTD patients are markedly impaired on affective 
ToM assessed by the Faux Pas and RME. Findings on whether affective ToM is 
impaired in AD are inconclusive. A more recent a meta-analysis of 30 studies 
found that cognitive and affective ToM is impaired in both bvFTD (Cohen’s d = 




severe impairments in advanced social cognition tests such as the Faux Pas 
compared to AD patients, where their impairments are relatively modest (Bora et 
al., 2015). However on closer examination of the specific ToM abilities that are 
found to be impaired, the research is mixed, deficits in social abilities have been 
found, but inconsistently between studies.  
6.1.2. Social norms understanding difficulties in patients with dementia  
Inappropriate social behaviour and disregard for social rules are also found  in 
bvFTD patients (Rascovsky et al., 2011). BvFTD patients are impaired in their 
interpersonal understanding of social norms abilities (Eslinger et al., 2007). 
Moreover, bvFTD patients struggle to recognise a faux pas in a social interaction 
(Bora et al., 2015), which could be argued as demonstrating an inability to make 
interpersonal judgements about social norms. In terms of intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms (i.e., how you should behave in a social interaction), 
the results are mixed. Similar to ToM in AD, deficits in social abilities have been 
found, but inconsistently between studies. BvFTD patients perform poorer than NC, 
but AD and bvFTD patients perform similarly (Possin et al., 2013). Other studies 
have failed to find a difference between bvFTD and NC populations (Baez et al., 
2014; Lough et al., 2006). One recent study found that compliance to basic social 
norms can be maintained in bvFTD, however, more complex normative behaviours 
that require integration of social contextual information are impaired (O'Callaghan 
et al., 2016).  
6.1.3. Interim summary  
Neurodegenerative patients often exhibit declines in social abilities and behaviour; 
this is particularly true in patients with a diagnosis of dementia (Bora et al., 2015; 




difficulties in their social abilities (e.g., Torralva et al., 2007) but this is not the case 
for patients with AD as some studies find impairment while others do not (Poletti et 
al., 2012). Overall, these studies suggest that social cognition can be affected in 
both AD and bvFTD although only some abilities are differentially affected. These 
observations provide the opportunity to examine the validity of the ESCoT as a 
clinical test of social cognition.   
6.1.4. Rationale for the present study 
The previous chapters have shown the ESCoT to be sensitive to social cognitive 
difficulties in ageing, ASD adults and sex differences in neurotypical younger 
adults. These studies show that the ESCoT is a valuable research tool to investigate 
social cognition. Given the advantages of the ESCoT over traditional tests in terms 
of ecological validity, effect sizes and the number of social cognitive abilities 
assessed in a single test, it has the potential to be useful in patients who may exhibit 
difficulties in their social cognitive abilities (e.g., Chapter 4). Therefore, the present 
study was interested in examining social cognitive impairments in patients using 
the ESCoT.  
6.1.5. Aims of the present study 
The aims of this chapter were to investigate whether the ESCoT could detect 
impairments in patients with dementia as compared with NC.  
It was predicted that: 




6.2. Method  
6.2.1 Participants  
A total of 50 participants were recruited for this study. They consisted of 25 
patients who were attending a young onset dementia service (males = 16) who 
were diagnosed according to the current consensus criteria for bvFTD  (n = 9) 
(Rascovsky et al., 2011), AD (n = 12) (Dubois et al., 2007) and amnestic Mild 
Cognitive Impairment (MCI; n = 4) (Albert et al., 2011). These patients were 
recruited through The Edinburgh Cognitive Diagnosis Audit Research and 
Treatment Register (ECog-DART), which was approved by the Scotland A Research 
Ethics Committee (12/SS/0196).  
Age, education and IQ matched NC were taken from participants in Chapter 3 (n = 
25; males = 12). These participants were recruited using online advertisement and 
through a research volunteer panel at the University of Edinburgh. None of the NC 
had any self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders based on the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) exclusion criteria (Wechsler, 1997). 
All participants were administered the tests of social cognition (listed below). The 
standardized neuropsychological tests, described below, were administered to the 
patient group only.  
A summary of the demographic information for the patients and NC are reported 




6.2.2. Materials  
6.2.2.1. Measures for patients  
The neuropsychological tests were completed as part of the patients’ clinical care 
and were administered by Professor Sharon Abrahams. Premorbid IQ was assessed 
using the Test of Premorbid Functioning (TOPF) (Wechsler, 2011a). 
Patients were assessed on five cognitive domains (memory, executive function, 
fluency, language, and visuospatial function). Memory (recall and recognition) 
was assessed using the BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery (BMIPB) 
(Coughlan, Oddy, & Crawford, 2007). Executive functions were investigated using 
the Trail Making test (Reitan, 1955; Reitan & Wolfson, 1993), letter fluency 
(Abrahams et al., 2000) and the Card Sorting test from Delis-Kaplan Executive 
Function System (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Language functions were 
assessed using the Graded Naming test (McKenna & Warrington, 1983), the 
Warrington spelling test (Baxter & Warrington, 1994) and the Test for the 
Reception of Grammar (TROG) (Bishop, 2003). Visuospatial skills were examined 
using a subsection of the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery (Warrington 
& James, 1991).  
Patients completed the Edinburgh Cognitive and Behavioural Amyotrophic Lateral 
Sclerosis Screen (ECAS) (Niven et al., 2015) which is a brief cognitive and 
behavioural assessment routinely used in this clinic. While the ECAS was developed 
for patients with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, some of these patients suffer from 
FTD symptoms and it has been shown to be sensitive to FTD clinically. The ECAS 
assesses memory, executive functions, fluency, language and visuospatial abilities. 
Patients could score a maximum of 135 on the cognitive assessment, with a cut-off 




6.2.2.2. Assessment of behaviour change in patients  
Behaviour change was assessed using the Frontal Behaviour Inventory (FBI) 
(Kertesz, Davidson, & Fox, 1997).  
6.2.2.3. Measures for NC adults 
In the NC group, the WASI-II (Wechsler, 2011b) was used to assess IQ. A full 
description of the WASI-II can be found in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1. 
6.2.2.4. Measures of social cognition for patients and NC adults 
To assess social cognition, all participants completed the ESCoT, the RME (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001) and the SNQ (Rankin, 2008). A full 
description of these tests of social cognition can be found in Chapter 3, section 
3.2.2.3. 
6.2.3. Procedure 
All participants completed the tests of social cognition in one session which took 
approximately 1.5 hours to complete. NC completed the WASI in the same session, 
while the FBI was administered to a caregiver after the patients completed the 
battery of social cognition tests.  
6.2.4. Statistical Analyses  
The analysis for this chapter was divided into two sections. Firstly, performance of 
a total patient group (12 AD, 9 bvFTD and 4 MCI) was compared to performance 
of NC on the ESCoT, RME and SNQ. These were conducted using parametric and 
non-parametric analyses based on initial exploratory analyses (Shapiro-Wilk test, p 
> 0.05). The statistical techniques applied in previous Chapters were used here 




conducted using Hochberg’s GT2 where appropriate and p-values were adjusted 
using Holm corrections. The alpha values were set at p < 0.05. ESCoT subtest raw 
scores were age-adjusted based on the findings from Chapter 3. Correlational 
analysis was conducted using Spearman's rank correlation to examine any 
potential relationships between the ESCoT and the ECAS in the patient group in this 
section as well. Next, a preliminary subgroup analysis was undertaken and the 
patient group were divided based on diagnosis (AD, bvFTD, MCI) and their 
performance was compared to NC. Amnestic MCI exhibit relative high rates of 
conversion rates to AD (Mauri, Sinforiani, Zucchella, Cuzzoni, & Bono, 2012) and 
show social cognitive impairments (Bora & Yener, 2017). Consequently due to few 
patients in this group, they were combined into the AD group. This section used the 
same statistical techniques as the previous section.  
6.3. Results  
Data were missing from the patient groups for several of the neuropsychological 
measures and tests of social cognition, these are highlighted beneath each 
individual table.   
6.3.1. Patients and NC  
Firstly, data from the patient group and NC adults were compared (see Appendix 








6.3.1.1. Table 12. Demographic data for patients and NC adults   
 Patients  
(n = 25) 
NC 
(n = 25) 
p-value 
Age (SD) 62.28 (6.27) 62.64 (9.12) p = 0.872 
Years of education 12.06 (2.25)a 13.32 (2.05) p = 0.051 
IQ* 102.57 (10.81)b 108.68 (14.96) p = 0.126 
*IQ was assessed using the TOPF (Test of premorbid functioning) for patients and 















6.3.1.2. Table 13. Performance of patients on the ECAS 
 Maximum score Patients 
(n = 25) 
Numbers 
impaired* 
Language  28 21.89 (5.13) 17  
Fluency  24 7.11 (6.09) 14  
Executive functions 48 19.44 (8.63) 19  
Memory  24 9.22 (6.22) 19  
Visuospatial  12 10.67 (1.66) 8  
Total 136 71.33 (19.08) 21  














6.3.1.3. Comparison between patient group and NC on tests of social cognition  
Performance on the tests of social cognition were investigated between the patient 
group and NC adults on the ESCoT, RME and SNQ.  
6.3.1.3.1. Figure 21. Performance of patients and NC on the ESCoT 
Error bars = Standard error 
Comparisons using a Mann-Whiney U test between patients (M = 84.33, SD = 
13.37) and NC (M = 95.52, SD = 7.80) on ESCoT total scores showed a significant 
difference (U = 149.50, p = 0.003). On the subtests of the ESCoT (Figure 21) the 
patient group performed significantly worse than NC on affective ToM (t(47) = -
2.71, p = 0.009) interpersonal understanding of social norms (t(47) = -3.72, p = 
0.001) and intrapersonal understanding of social norms (t(35.57) = -2.51, p = 
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6.3.1.3.2. Table 14. Means (SD) of patients and NC on the RME and SNQ 
Test of social cognition Patients  
(n = 25) 
NC  
(n = 25) 
RME 23.41 (6.22)a 26.68 (3.67) 
SNQ 17.57 (2.29)b 19.20 (1.58) 
apatients n = 22; bpatients n = 23.  
The groups did not significantly differ on the RME (U = 189.00, p = 0.07) but did 
significantly differ on the SNQ (U = 161.00, p = 0.008); the NC group performed 
better than the patients.  
6.3.1.4. Examining the number of patients impaired on the ESCoT 
Using the cut-off scores calculated in Chapter 4, the number of patients who were 
impaired on the ESCoT was summated. 
6.3.1.4.1. Table 15. Percentage of patients impaired on the ESCoT based on cut-off 
scores from Chapter 4 
 % of patients impaired  
(n = 24) 
Cognitive ToM 20.83% 
Affective ToM 37.50% 
Interpersonal understanding of social norms 37.50% 
Intrapersonal understanding of social norms 29.16% 




According to the cut-offs derived in Chapter 4, more patients were impaired on 
affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms compared to the 
other two subtests, the least percentage of patients were impaired on cognitive 
ToM. Total scores showed similar levels of impairments as affective ToM and 
interpersonal understanding of social norms.  
6.3.1.5. Examining the associations between the ECAS and measures of social 
cognition in patients  
Potential relationships between performance on the ECAS domains and tests of 
social cognition were examined using Spearman’s correlations to determine 







6.3.1.5.1. Table 16. Correlations between the ECAS and tests of social cognition  
 Cognitive 
ToM 
Affective ToM Interpersonal 
understanding 
of social norms 
Intrapersonal 
understanding 
of social norms 
ESCoT total RME SNQ 
Language 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.19 0.35 0.49 0.62* 
Fluency 0.17 0.23 0.48 0.03 0.27 0.24 0.52 
Executive 
function 
0.27 0.45 0.59* 0.37 0.47 0.24 0.54 
Memory 0.07 0.31 0.05 0.33 0.19 0.11 0.17 
Visuospatial 0.24 0.21 0.28 -0.11 0.20 0.07 0.12 
ECAS total 0.27 0.38 0.47 0.22 0.39 0.38 0.53 




Table 16 shows that the only significant correlations after Holm corrections were between 
performance on language of ECAS and the SNQ, and executive functions of the ECAS and 
interpersonal understanding of social norms. Better performance on language and 
executive functions correlated with better performance on social norm understanding. 
6.3.2. Subtypes of dementia patients and NC adults  
To examine the sensitivity of the ESCoT at identifying social cognitive impairments in 
different subtypes of dementia, preliminary analyses were undertaken between the 
subgroups where the performance of AD and bvFTD patients were compared to the NC 
adults. Amnestic MCI exhibit relatively high rates of conversion rates to AD (Mauri et al., 
2012) and show social cognitive impairments (Bora & Yener, 2017). Consequently, due to 
the low numbers in the groups, amnestic MCI and AD patients were combined to an 
AD/MCI group. These analyses were preliminary due to the relatively small sample of 
AD/MCI and bvFTD patients.  
Demographic information and neuropsychological testing of FTD and AD/MCI patients for 










6.3.2.1. Table 17. Demographic information of patients by subtypes and NC adults  
 FTD  
(n = 9) 
AD/MCI  
(n = 16) 
NC 
(n = 25) 
p-value 
Age (SD) 65.33 (6.44) 60.56 (5.66) 62.64 (9.12) p = 0.338 
Years of education 11.78 (2.22) 12.23 (2.32)a 13.32 (2.05) p = 0.087 
IQ* 98.00 (10.02)b 104.86 (10.80)c 108.68 (14.96) p = 0.301 
*IQ was assessed using the TOPF (Test of premorbid functioning) for patients and WASI-II (Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 








6.3.2.2. Table 18. Neuropsychological testing of FTD and AD/MCI patients  
 FTD  
(n = 9) 
AD/MCI  
(n = 16) 
p-value 
Memory    
BMIPB – story recall 
Immediate  13.56 (7.97) 10.94 (7.48) p = 0.187 
Delay  10.89 (9.05) 7.69 (7.67) p = 0.452 
% retained  69.67 (43.41) 60.00 (41.22) p = 0.718 
BMIPB – figure recall    
Copy 73.78 (11.73) 72.80 (9.77)a p = 0.379 
Immediate recall 44.33 (18.14) 32.56 (18.94) p = 0.144 
Delayed recall 37.33 (21.57) 29.40 (20.54)a p = 0.378 
% retained 80.78 (18.32) 76.20 (28.13)a p = 0.861 
BMIPB – FSCRT    
Free recall 13.63 (7.09)b 13.19 (8.16) p = 0.899 




Sensitivity to cuing (%) 85.75 (10.58)b 72.67 (22.04)a p = 0.068 
Delay 4.88 (1.73)b 3.54 (3.80)c p = 0.132 
Cued 14.63 (1.51)b 11.85 (3.98)c p = 0.093 
Executive functions    
Trail Making Test (seconds) 
Part A 48.25 (21.43)b 50.06 (23.46) p = 0.928 
Part B 118.86 (35.90)d 115.25 (78.00)e p = 0.432 
Letter fluency     
Total score 17.33 (14.37) 33.31 (15.46) p = 0.014 
Animal fluency  12.14 (4.81)d 14.50 (4.24) p = 0.252 
D-KEFS card sorting (scaled score) 8.00 (2.07) 7.88 (3.18) p = 0.734 
Language functions     
Graded naming test 13.33 (8.86) 17.69 (7.25) p = 0.196 
Warrington spelling test 17.43 (10.23)d 22.09 (6.56)g p = 0.253 
TROG 34.17 (7.78)f 37.92 (15.83)c p = 0.791 




Number location 8.20 (1.92)g 6.60 (3.63)h p = 0.751 
Dot counting  9.80 (0.45)g 9.90 (0.32)h p = 0.604 
Behaviour change    
FBI 
Negative behaviours 22.80 (3.56)g 8.69 (8.02)c p = 0.007 
Disinhibition  16.80 (5.67)g 5.62 (5.99)c p = 0.012 
Total  39.60 (7.30)g 14.31 (13.44)c p = 0.007 
BMIPB, BIRT Memory and Information Processing Battery; FSCRT, Free and selective cued reminding test; D-KEFS, Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function System; TROG, Test for Reception of Grammar; FBI, Frontal behaviour inventory. Significant group differences are 
in bold. aAD/MCI n = 15; bbvFTD n = 8; cAD/MCI n = 13; dbvFTD n = 7; eAD/MCI n = 12; fbvFTD n = 6; gAD/MCI n = 11; gbvFTD 
n = 5; hAD/MCI n = 10; Number of patients in each group. 
As Table 18 shows, the bvFTD group and AD/MCI group did not differ on many of the neuropsychological tests. The two groups 
showed significant differences on the cued recall of the FSCRT. On this measure of memory, the MCI/AD group performed poorer 
than the bvFTD group. The groups significantly differed on letter fluency, with bvFTD patients showing poorer performance. The 






6.3.2.3. Table 19. Performance of FTD and AD/MCI patients on the ECAS  
 Maximum score FTD  
(n = 9) 
AD/MCI  
(n = 16) 
p-value Numbers impaired* 
Language  28 21.89 (5.13) 24.38 (5.19) p = 0.127 17 (7 bvFTD, 10 AD/MCI) 
Fluency  24 7.11 (6.09) 14.81 (6.92) p = 0.011 14 (8 bvFTD, 6 AD/MCI) 
Executive functions 48 19.44 (8.63) 30.31 (9.82) p = 0.011 19 (9 bvFTD, 10 AD/MCI) 
Memory  24 9.22 (6.22) 7.06 (6.18) p = 0.411 19 (6 bvFTD, 13 AD/MCI) 
Visuospatial  12 10.67 (1.66) 11.00 (2.00) p = 0.409 8 (4 bvFTD, 4 AD/MCI) 
Total 136 71.33 (19.08) 87.31 (24.15) p = 0.102 21 (9 bvFTD, 12 AD/MCI) 
Significant group differences are in bold. *Cut-offs from Niven et al. (2015).  
As Table 19 shows, the bvFTD group significantly differed from the AD/MCI groups on measures of fluency and executive functions 
on the ECAS. In both cases, they performed poorer than the AD/MCI group. It is evident that both groups were cognitively impaired, 




6.3.2.4. Table 20. Mean (SD) performance of bvFTD, AD/MCI patients and NC on the tests of social cognition   
Social cognition tests  bvFTD  




(n = 25) 
p-value Post hoc 
ESCoT total  78.50 (15.28) 87.25 (11.75) 95.52 (7.10) p  = 0.005 NC > bvFTD & 
AD/MCI 
Cognitive ToM 19.25 (4.53) 20.75 (3.92) 21.76 (2.95) p = 0.284 – 
Affective ToM 18.63 (6.59) 20.75 (3.49) 23.52 (4.28) p = 0.020 NC > bvFTD 
Interpersonal understanding of social 
norms 
17.25 (3.58) 20.69 (4.33) 23.72 (3.48) p < 0.001 NC > bvFTD & 
AD/MCI 
Intrapersonal understanding of social 
norms 
23.38 (3.54) 25.06 (3.39) 26.52 (1.92) p = 0.020 NC > bvFTD 
RME 22.38 (8.03) 24.00 (5.16)a 26.68 (3.67) p = 0.077 – 
SNQ 17.00 (2.20) 17.87 (2.36)b 19.20 (1.58) p = 0.017 NC > bvFTD 
aAD/MCI = 14; bAD/MCI n = 15; Number of patients in each group. Post hoc comparisons were conducted using Hochberg’s GT2. 




6.3.2.5. Examining the number of patients impaired on the ESCoT 
Using the cut-off scores calculated in Chapter 4, the number of dementia patients 
who were impaired on the ESCoT was investigated.     
6.3.2.5.1. Table 21. Percentage of patients impaired on the ESCoT based on cut-off 
scores from Chapter 4 
 bvFTD  
(n = 8) 
AD/MCI  
(n = 16) 
Cognitive ToM 12.5% 25.0% 
Affective ToM 62.5% 25.0% 
Interpersonal understanding of social norms 62.5% 25.0% 
Intrapersonal understanding of social norms 37.5% 25.0% 
ESCoT total  50.0% 31.3% 
More patients with a diagnosis of AD/MCI were impaired on cognitive ToM than 
bvFTD patients while this was the reverse for affective ToM and inter-and 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms. Here, more bvFTD than AD/MCI 
patients were impaired. Finally, half of the bvFTD patients were impaired on ESCoT 
total scores compared to 31.5% of AD/MCI patients.  
6.4. Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to investigate the sensitivity of the ESCoT in 
patients with dementia. Even with a small sample of patients (n = 24), the ESCoT 




predicted, patients were impaired compared to NC on ESCoT total scores, affective 
ToM and inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. However, the 
groups did not differ on cognitive ToM. Correlational analyses showed a significant 
relationship between social norms understanding and fluency and executive 
functions measured by the ECAS. Moreover, preliminary results showed that ESCoT 
total scores and interpersonal understanding of social norms were sensitive to 
impairments in bvFTD and AD/MCI patients. Affective ToM and intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms were impaired in bvFTD patients compared to NC.  
Poorer performance of the patients compared to NC is consistent with previous 
research on tests of social cognition (Bora et al., 2015; Gregory et al., 2002; Poletti 
et al., 2012); suggesting that the ESCoT is sensitive to the social cognitive 
impairments found in patients with dementia. Consequently, the ESCoT may be a 
helpful clinical test for clinicians to use with patients who they suspect may have 
difficulties in social cognition. This study adds to the literature showing that 
patients experience difficulties in affective ToM (Poletti et al., 2012) and could 
potentially explain the difficulties patients face in their interpersonal relationships 
when engaging in social situations with others since they appear to show 
impairments in inferring what another person is feeling. Unlike previous literature 
(Bora et al., 2015; Poletti et al., 2012) the present study did not find a difference on 
cognitive ToM between NC and patients. This is an unexpected finding since the 
patients showed impairment in affective ToM and may suggest dissociation in 
performance on the two aspects of ToM in patients. Perhaps in patients, compared 
to cognitive ToM, their affective ToM abilities are more sensitive to neural changes 
as a consequence of neurodegeneration. These findings also contrast to Chapter 3 
in which age-related differences were found for both cognitive and affective ToM. 




healthy and pathological ageing. Future studies could examine this finding more 
closely by investigating healthy and pathological ageing within the same study.  
The patients in this study showed impairments on both inter-and intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms compared to NC adults. This is consistent to the 
literature on these social cognitive abilities (Bora et al., 2015; Eslinger et al., 2007; 
Possin et al., 2013). Compared to NC adults, but similar to the ASD adults in 
Chapter 4, patients show marked impairments in understanding how someone else 
should behave in a social interaction and how they should behave themselves. The 
observation that ASD adults and patients experience difficulties in these two 
abilities is concurrent with the difficulties both groups face in social interactions 
(Baez et al., 2012; Eslinger et al., 2007). The present study added a novel finding to 
research on inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms since it 
examined these two abilities within the same test. Here, it was also shown that 
performance on interpersonal understanding of social norms was associated with 
better performance on executive functions. Perhaps to understand how someone 
else should behave in a social interaction, an individual needs to recall a list of 
social norms, inhibit their own opinions of how to behave, and apply this 
information to another person. This is another novel finding using the ESCoT since 
research only typically examines the relationship between ToM and executive 
functions (Gregory et al., 2002; Lough & Hodges, 2002; Lough et al., 2006). 
According to the results of the correlational analysis, the influence of executive 
functions on a patient’s interpersonal understanding of social norms warrants 
future investigations. The only caveat for this finding is that it is unclear which 
executive function was significantly associated with interpersonal understanding 
of social norms. Therefore future studies could examine this relationship by 




While the numbers of the groups were small, splitting the patient group by 
diagnosis did show some intriguing preliminary results. Firstly, it highlighted the 
mixed findings of cognitive ToM in dementia research. As no statistically 
significant difference was found between the groups, this is similar to previous 
researchers for AD patients (Koff et al., 2004) and bvFTD (Fernandez-Duque et al., 
2009) but inconsistent to results typically found for bvFTD patients on cognitive 
ToM (Bora et al., 2015). It is worth noting that the cognitive ToM question in this 
study was a first-order cognitive ToM question which may explain the null 
findings, as second-order cognitive ToM questions typically find significant group 
differences (Kemp et al., 2012). The impaired affective ToM abilities found in the 
bvFTD group adds to the usual findings for this social cognitive ability when 
compared to performance of NC adults (Gregory et al., 2002; Lough et al., 2001; 
Lough et al., 2006; Modinos et al., 2009; Torralva et al., 2007). It was also shown 
that compared to AD patients, bvFTD patients are impaired on affective ToM while 
AD and NC adults do not significantly differ, which has been previously found 
(Funkiewiez, Bertoux, de Souza, Lévy, & Dubois, 2012). Affective ToM appears to 
be more significantly impaired in bvFTD than AD which may explain why this 
group reports more difficulties in social interactions (Bora et al., 2015).  
Like Possin et al. (2013) but not others (Baez et al., 2014; Lough et al., 2006),  it 
was found that bvFTD patients performed poorer than NC on intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms, but bvFTD and AD patients did not differ. This may 
have been due to the small sample size of the groups. Alternatively, it could have 
been because the intrapersonal understanding of social norms subtest of the ESCoT 
requires integration of social contextual information, which has been shown to be 
impaired in bvFTD patients (O'Callaghan et al., 2016). The ESCoT is the first test to 
objectively measure inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms abilities 




on inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms compared to NC may 
explain the socially inappropriate behaviours frequently seen in these patients 
(Rascovsky et al., 2011). The results suggest that they are unable to explain why 
another individual behaved appropriately or inappropriately in a social interaction 
or how themselves would have behaved in the interaction.  
Based on the cut-off scores, it would seem that, in bvFTD patients, affective ToM 
and interpersonal understanding of social norms are the most impaired social 
abilities on the ESCoT compared to AD/MCI patients. The cut-off scores also show 
that bvFTD patients are more impaired on the ESCoT than AD/MCI patients, 
similar to previous findings by Bora et al. (2015), this is particularly evident for 
ESCoT total score where 50% of patients were impaired compared to 31.5% of 
AD/MCI patients. Since similar to previous suggestions (Bora et al., 2015), the 
traditional neuropsychological tests were limited in their ability to differentiate 
bvFTD and AD/MCI. While the study sample size is limited, these results provide 
preliminary evidence that the ESCoT could be used to differentiate these two types 
of dementia. 
In this study, it was found that, unlike the RME, the ESCoT was sensitive to 
impairments in the patients with dementia, showing a clear advantage over this 
established test. The SNQ demonstrated a significant difference between bvFTD and 
NC. However, it only measures a single social cognitive ability. On the other hand, 
the ESCoT assesses four abilities in the same test, giving clinicians a more 
representative view of the abilities that are used in social interactions. However, 
there are limitations that should be addressed. Firstly, the sample of dementia 
patients, especially in the FTD group, was limited, which may explain the null 
finding in cognitive ToM. This was a particularly unexpected finding since 
previous studies have shown that both bvFTD and AD are impaired on this social 




combining the AD and MCI patients. While MCI patients exhibit relative high rates 
of conversion rates to AD (Mauri et al., 2012) and show social cognitive 
impairments (Bora & Yener, 2017) combining patients in the prodromal stages of 
neurodegeneration, who are more functionally independent, with those with a 
diagnosis of AD may have inflated the performance of the AD patients, skewing the 
performance of this group.  Consequently, future studies should use larger sample 
sizes to examine cognitive and affective ToM in dementia patients separately. 
Furthermore, both of the dementia groups were impaired, with 84% (21/25) of 
patients scoring below cut-off on the ECAS. Therefore, it is difficult to conclude 
whether the social cognitive impairments observed were independent of general 
cognitive functioning.  
In the present study, it was demonstrated that patients experience difficulties in the 
abilities that are required for successful social interactions. Moreover, the results of 
this study provide validation of the ESCoT as a test of social cognition in patients 
with dementia and patients with bvFTD. Consequently, there is evidence to suggest 









Chapter 7: The positivity bias, age and stimuli type 
The previous chapters have investigated social processes in healthy ageing, ASD 
adults, younger adults and patients with dementia. In Chapter 3, I found that 
affective ToM performance was negatively predicted by increasing age, suggesting 
an age-related difference in the ability to infer what another individual is feeling. 
However, this is only one aspect of processing emotional information, other 
abilities may remain intact, and may be less susceptible to age-related changes. The 
following chapter returns to examining the consequences of healthy ageing on 
social processes. Here I looked at the relationship between the positivity bias found 
in older adults and its relationship to different types of stimuli in older, middle-
aged and younger neurotypical adults.  














The ability to process emotive content is an important skill for individuals because 
it is required for social functioning (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999). 
As Chapter 3 demonstrated, healthy ageing is associated with a change in affective 
ToM. This finding suggest that this social cognitive ability is negatively predicted 
by age and as individuals get older, they demonstrate measurable differences in 
affective ToM compared to their younger counterparts.  
While affective ToM inferences are important, it is not the only emotive content we 
process in our environment (Adolphs, 2009). Age-related changes in affective ToM 
abilities leads to the question of what is the consequence of healthy ageing on our 
ability to process other emotional content. Indeed, there is research to suggest that 
the processing of emotional information changes with age. For instance, with 
declines in physical health and cognitive abilities, there is reason to believe well-
being would decrease with age (Mather & Carstensen, 2005). Yet with advancing 
age, older adults experience improvements in emotional well-being (Scheibe & 
Carstensen, 2010). Researchers have argued that this is partly due to age-related 
changes in the processing of emotional information (Carstensen & Mikels, 2005). 
With an ever-increasing ageing population, the relationship between ageing and 
the changes to specific processes is one of the important issues to be solved 
(Meguro et al., 2001). Consequently, it would be interesting to examine this age-
related change in greater detail.  
7.1.1. The Socioemotional Selectivity Theory  
The Socioemotional Selectivity Theory proposes that the perception of time plays a 
fundamental role in the selection and pursuit of social goals, specifically 




It suggests that when time is perceived as expansive, individuals concentrate on 
gathering information and experiencing novel situations. When constraints on 
time are perceived, an individual will prioritise regulating emotional states to 
optimise well-being and maximise the limited time. According to the 
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory, as individuals get older, the assessment of time 
left to live causes a shift in importance from information forced goals to emotion-
related goals (Carstensen, 1993; Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999; English 
& Carstensen, 2015; Mather & Carstensen, 2005).  
There is empirical evidence to support the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory in 
both younger and older adults. Previous authors have shown that when individuals 
are asked whom they would choose to spend time with, younger adults indeed 
show a preference for novel situations and gathering social information. This is in 
contrast to older adults who prefer spending time with friends and family members 
(Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990; Fung, Carstensen, & Lutz, 1999). Additionally, 
Carstensen and Fredrickson (1998) found that younger adults with terminal 
illnesses tend to show the same preference for emotion-related goals as older 
adults. When older adults are asked to imagine medical advances which would 
offer them longer life, they show a preference for information-focused goals 
commonly found in younger adults (Fung et al., 1999). Recently Barber, Opitz, 
Martins, Sakaki, and Mather (2016) asked younger and older participants to think 
of time as limited or expansive while completing a recall task of emotional stimuli. 
They found that regardless of age, when participants were asked to imagine time as 
limited, this improved their ability to recall positive stimuli.  
7.1.2. The positivity bias  
A consequence of the time constraints faced by older adults to prioritise emotional 




potentially favouring positive information when attending to or recalling 
information (Barber et al., 2016). Indeed, one prediction of the Socioemotional 
Selectivity Theory is that since older adults are particularly focused on emotion-
related goals associated with emotional satisfaction, their processing of information 
should shift towards positive information (Reed, Chan, & Mikels, 2014).  
Based on this notion of age-related differences in processing information suggested 
by the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory, Mather and Carstensen (2003) tested 
whether emotionally gratifying biases influence initial attention. Their assumption 
was that, when viewing faces, older adults would orientate towards positive and 
away from negative stimuli. They investigated the influence of sad, angry and 
happy faces on the attentional resources of younger and older adults using a dot-
probe task. One emotional and one neutral face appeared side by side on a 
computer screen for one second. Once these faces disappeared, a dot appeared 
behind one of the faces and participants were instructed to respond to the dot. 
When older adults were shown pairings of neutral and negative faces, they were 
faster to respond to the target stimulus if a neutral face preceded it. Moreover, 
older adults were faster when the dot appeared behind positive faces than neutral 
faces; younger adults did not show this preference. Overall, it was demonstrated 
that older adults appeared to significantly attend to positive faces over negative 
faces. Based on these findings, the authors suggested that an age-related positivity 
bias exists for older adults (Reed et al., 2014).  
7.1.3. Support for a positivity bias in older adults   
Since the publication of the original study by Mather and Carstensen (2003), the 
positivity bias has been studied extensively in healthy ageing (Reed et al., 2014). 
Researchers have found supporting evidence for the positivity bias in an array of 




2006b) where older adults exhibited a significant preference away from negative 
faces and toward positive ones. Older adults attended more to happy than to sad 
faces but younger adults did not show such a preference. Researchers have also 
found the positivity bias in decision-making between older and younger adults. For 
example, when asked to review choice criteria that contained positive, negative, 
and neutral information, older adults reviewed and recalled a greater proportion of 
positive than of negative information compared with young adults (Löckenhoff & 
Carstensen, 2007). Similar results have been found between older and younger 
adults when remembering choices about decisions they made, like choosing the 
best university to attend from a list of advantages and disadvantages  (Mather, 
Knight, & McCaffrey, 2005), word lists (Piguet, Connally, Krendl, Huot, & Corkin, 
2008) and health messages (Shamaskin, Mikels, & Reed, 2010).  
The positivity bias has been extensively studied in memory. In one 
autobiographical memory study (Kennedy, Mather & Carstensen 2004), older 
participants showed a tendency to remember their past more positively compared 
to younger adults. Charles, Mather, and Carstensen (2003) found better long-term 
memory for positive information over negative information in older adults 
compared to younger adults. While working memory abilities for verbal and visual 
information are found to be lower in older compared to younger adults (Park et al., 
2002), working memory involving emotional stimuli are unimpaired in older 
adults (Mikels, Larkin, Reuter-Lorenz, & Carstensen, 2005). Mikels et al. (2005) 
also showed that, while older adults performed better on positive relative to 
negative emotion trials, this pattern of performance was reversed for younger 
adults. Other studies have found that older adults tend to remember their decisions 
as being associated with more positive outcomes compared to younger adults 
(Mather & Johnson, 2000). Moreover, as individuals age, they can recall and 




(Charles et al., 2003; Mather & Knight, 2005). Other studies have shown that 
emotional memory for words and faces also shows a small positivity bias as both 
older and younger adults recall proportionately more positive than neutral and 
negative words and faces. However, this effect is slightly more evident in older 
adults (Leigland, Schulz, & Janowsky, 2004). Rapid visual attention related to the 
recognition of emotional stimuli also demonstrates a positivity bias in older adults 
(Steinmetz, Addis, & Kensinger, 2010). Finally, a recent meta-analysis of 100 
empirical studies showed the age-related positivity bias is reliable, and increases in 
magnitude as the age disparity between younger and older adults increases (Reed 
et al., 2014).  
7.1.4. Evidence for no positivity bias in older adults  
The results discussed above suggest that the positivity bias is an observable effect in 
healthy ageing that is generalizable in terms of stimuli. Nonetheless, there are 
studies which have contested the existence of the positivity bias. These studies have 
found minimal or no age-related differences in preference for positive over 
negative information due to differing paradigm of measuring the effect (Gallo, 
Foster, & Johnson, 2009; Grühn, Smith, & Baltes, 2005; Majerus & D’Argembeau, 
2011; Williams & Drolet, 2005).  
Some research suggests that the positivity bias is not a general theory of older 
adults preferring positive information over negative (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008). 
When attention to emotional stimuli in older adults has been assessed in voices, 
matching faces to voices and in bodies/contexts, mixed findings have been found 
with some studies finding an age-related preference for positive stimuli over 
negative but others failing to find this effect (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008; Reed & 
Carstensen, 2012). While Isaacowitz et al. (2006b) found partial support for a 




and away from angry ones; the only preference shown by young adults was toward 
afraid faces. Another study failed to show a significant difference between younger 
and older adults for negative–neutral pairings with the dot-probe task (Isaacowitz 
et al., 2006a). Grühn and colleagues (2005) have explicitly noted the lack of 
consistency regarding the positivity bias, as they failed to find an age-related 
memory advantage for positive material using emotionally toned words.  
Studies which examine the positivity bias with an attention paradigm often report 
null findings between older and younger adults (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008).  For 
example, Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, and Schlangel (2009) used a eye-tracking 
paradigm to measure the precise timeline of attentional shifts and Williams et al. 
(2006) used an event-related potential (ERP) design to track the temporal pattern 
of neural responses while older and younger adults viewed emotional faces. In 
both cases, the authors failed to find the presence of the positivity bias in the rapid 
processing of emotional stimuli as performance was similar across age groups. 
Moreover, a meta-analysis by Murphy and Isaacowitz (2008) found that both 
younger and older adults show small to medium preferences for emotionally 
valence stimuli over neutral stimuli. Both age groups show a positivity and 
negativity preference compared to neutral stimuli, importantly few age-related 
differences were found overall. Age-related positivity bias has only been found for 
specific measures and the type of measurement and stimuli influences the 
magnitude of the effect (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008). 
While memory studies typically find a positivity bias, this result is also not 
consistent. No positivity bias has been found in the automatic processing in 
memory for arousing versus non-arousing words. In this study, the author 
presented participants with list of words varying in both valence and arousal and 




related difference in remembering high-arousal words. Similarly, Majerus and 
D’Argembeau (2011) reported no positivity bias for recalling emotional lists of 
words between older and younger adults. Recognition of emotional word lists 
(Budson et al., 2006) and emotional pictures (Gallo et al., 2009) have both failed 
to report a positivity bias advantage in older adults. Budson et al. (2006) showed 
no difference in the number of emotional versus non-emotional items recognized 
by younger and other adults. Gallo et al. (2009) found no memory benefit for 
positive information for older adults compared to younger adults.  
Other variables appear to also be important when investigating the positivity bias. 
It would seem that sample population plays a significant role in observing the 
positivity bias.  Using an eye-tracking paradigm in older adults from Hong Kong, 
Fung et al. (2008) found that older adults looked away from happy facial 
expressions compared to younger adults.  This result suggests that older adults 
from Eastern cultures do not show the same attentional preference for positive 
stimuli as found in Western cultures. However, when Kwon, Scheibe, Samanez-
Larkin, Tsai, and Carstensen (2009) used a recall and recognition task of the 
emotional images in older Korean adults, they found that the relative preference 
for positive over negative stimuli in memory observed previously in older 
Americans adults. 
7.1.5. Interim summary  
To review, research suggests that the processing of emotional information differs 
between age groups, and the Socioemotional Selectivity Theory posits that this is 
due to a shift in social goals, as individuals come to the realisation that time is not 
expansive. Consequently, as individuals get older, perceived time constraints cause 
a shift to emotion-related goals to maximise well-being (Carstensen, 1993; 




The Socioemotional Selectivity Theory suggests that older adults should show a 
preference for positive information over negative (Reed et al., 2014), a term 
authors have coined the positivity bias (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). While a 
number of studies have found the presence of the positivity bias in older adults, 
many have failed to observe this phenomenon (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008; Reed 
& Carstensen, 2012). Evidently, the existence of a positivity bias in older adults is 
contested in the literature.  
7.1.6. Rationale for the present study 
The presence of a positivity bias in older adults is debated in the literature, with 
evidence in favour and against the notion of older adults preferring positive over 
negative information. It would appear that differences in paradigms and type of 
measurement (attention or memory) influence the presence of the effect.   
With such findings, it is challenging to understand the consequences of healthy 
ageing on an individual’s ability to process emotional information. While the 
positivity bias has been extensively studied, there are still areas of research to be 
examined for new insights. For instance, although social interactions have 
previously been used to examine the positivity bias showing a positivity bias in 
older adults (Charles et al., 2003), the authors used recall and recognition memory 
tasks and this effect has not been examined in a attentional task. To date, there 
appears to be no attempt to examine the positivity bias with stimuli involving social 
interactions or examined it across types of stimuli (faces and social interactions) 
within the same attentional task. However, given research showing that stimuli 
type influences the presence of the positivity bias (Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008), 
examining this across types of stimuli might be insightful.  To fully understand the 
age-related differences in preference for positive and negative stimuli, it is essential 




differences in processes specific to emotional processing. Moreover, studies have 
tended to only compare performance of older and younger adults when 
investigating the positivity bias. However, middle-aged adults are important to 
consider in relation to life-span perspective theories such as the SST. Studying the 
group in the middle of the typical age-related change in the processing of 
emotional stimuli might provide new insights into the effect. Moreover while it has 
been investigated in autobiographical memory and eye tracking, there has been no 
research on whether the positivity bias is specific to humanistic features such as 
facial expression or a social interaction phenomenon associated with social 
emotional interactions and abstract but emotionally valence stimuli such as scenes. 
It would be interesting to examine whether emotional scenes replicated the 
positivity bias because to date no study has attempted to use this type of stimuli to 
investigate the positivity bias.  
7.1.7. Aims and hypotheses of the present study   
The aim of the current study was to examine the age-related positivity bias and 
investigate whether it is a function of the type of stimuli used within the same task 
in younger, middle-aged and older adults.  
It was predicted that:  
1. Older adults would show a preference for positive over negative stimuli in 
accordance with the positivity bias, while middle-aged and younger adults 




7.2. Method  
7.2.1. Participants  
A total of 83 participants were recruited for this study: 30 younger adults (19 
females), 28 middle-aged adults (15 females) and 25 older adults (15 females). A 
proportion of the participants in this study were included in Chapter 3. None of the 
participants had any self-reported history of neurological or psychiatric disorders 
based on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III) exclusion criteria 
(Wechsler, 1997). Participants were recruited from the University of Edinburgh 
volunteer panel and online advertisements and were reimbursed for their time. The 
study was approved by the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language 
Sciences (Psychology) Ethics committee. 
A summary of the participants’ demographic information can be found in Table 
23.  
7.2.2. Materials  
7.2.2.1. Background measure of intelligence  
Block Design and Matrix Reasoning from the WASI-II (McCrimmon & Smith, 
2013; Wechsler, 2011b) were used to measure performance IQ (FSIQ-2). Full 
descriptions of block design and matrix reasoning can be found in Chapter 3, 
section 3.2.2.3. 
Reaction time task (D'Hondt et al., 2013). The paradigm used to measure the 
positivity bias was adapted from an attentional task designed by D'Hondt et al. 
(2013). For each trial, pairings of pictures were presented on a laptop screen on 
either side of a fixation cross for 500 milliseconds (msec). Participants were 




arrow (<) or right arrow (>). This arrow appeared congruent or incongruent to 
the picture of the specific condition. A congruent presentation was defined as 
where the detection target appeared looking to the left picture (see Figure 22). In 
the same trial, an incongruent trial occurred when the detection target pointed to 
the right picture (see Figure 23). This was the distinction between congruent and 
incongruent trials and was used for later analysis of each participants’ response to 
indicate the correct response for that trial.  
The fixation cross reappeared for an inter-stimulus interval of between 1000 and 
2000 msec in duration. Each block consisted of counterbalanced presentation of 
each pairing of pictures. The stimulus onset asynchrony varied randomly between 
200, 250, 300, 350 and 400 msec following the presentation of the pictures. The 
detection target that the participant was instructed to respond to then appeared for 
150 msec. Participants were instructed to keep their gaze on the fixation cross in 
the centre of the screen throughout the course of the experiment without moving 
the eyes at any time and to indicate the direction of the arrow as quickly as possible 
by pressing either the A or L keys on the keyboard. Participants were instructed to 
press the A key or the left arrow (“<”) and the L key for the right arrow (“>”).  
There was one 10-trial practice block followed by 26 experimental blocks, 
comprised of 10 trials (5 congruent and 5 incongruent) to each, for a total of 260 
trials. The stimuli on the left of the screen indicated the current condition. For 
example, if a positive and negative face appeared on screen and the positive face 
appeared on the left, this was a positive condition. The reaction time (RT) of 
participants’ responses on each trial and their accuracy were recorded. Only the 





7.2.3.1. Protocol for experimental task  











7.2.3.1.2. Figure 23. Examples of the positive conditions for an incongruent trial 
 
Stimuli were taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, 
2005). There were three types of stimuli: faces, scenes and social interactions. 
Faces and scenes consisted of positive, negative and neutral faces and scenes. While 
social interactions stimuli consisted of positive and negative stimuli. There were no 
neutral social interaction stimuli because it proved difficult find these in the IAPS 
database. The stimuli were selected based on ratings of valence. Positive stimuli 
were high on ratings of valance while negative stimuli were low on ratings of 
valance, neutral stimuli were in the middle of positive and negative stimuli in 
terms of valance. As sex differences have been found in processing emotional 
stimuli (Collignon et al., 2010) there were different sets of stimuli for male and 




7.2.3.2. Combination of stimuli  
Below is a list of the different combinations of stimuli presented to participants, 
with congruent and incongruent conditions for each pairing of stimuli.  
7.2.3.2.1. Table 22. Combination of stimuli  
Positive & negative faces  Positive faces & social interaction 
positive 
Positive & neutral faces Positive faces & social interaction 
negative  
Negative & neutral faces  Negative faces & social interaction 
positive 
Positive & negative scenes  Negative faces & social interaction 
negative  
Positive & neutral scenes Neutral faces & social interaction 
positive  
Negative & neutral scenes Neutral faces & social interaction 
negative 
Social interaction positive & social 
interaction negative  
 
7.2.4. Data analysis  
Analyses were conducted using parametric and non-parametric analyses based on 
initial exploratory analyses (Shapiro-Wilk test, p > 0.05). Demographic data was 
analysed using parametric analyses. Data from the reaction time task were 
analysed using non-parametric methods. Overall significant differences were 
examined using the Friedman test. If a significant difference was found, follow-up 




tests and Mann-Whitney U tests to investigate significant differences between the 
groups. RT and accuracy data were analysed using the same statistically techniques 
(Friedman test, Kruskal-Wallis test etc.). The alpha values were set at p < .05 and 
the Holm correction was used to adjust for multiple comparisons. 
7.3. Results  
Data for the experimental task were missing for five participants (4 younger adults 
and 2 middle-aged adults) as two participants did not complete the task and the 
correct response rate was 50% or below for four participants. Three middle-aged 
participants did not complete the WASI-II due to time constraints.  
7.3.1. Outliers  
Trials were removed if each participants’ reaction times (RT) were 2 SD above the 
mean or less than 150 msec in each condition. A total of 3.28% (M number of 




7.3.2. Demographic information for the younger, middle-aged and older participants 
7.3.2.1. Table 23. Comparisons of demographics information between the age groups  
 Older  adults               
(n = 25) 
Middle-aged 
adults (n = 28) 
Younger adults 
(n = 30) 
Statistic (df) p-value Post-hoc 
Male:Female 10:15 13:15 11:19  –  – – 
Age, years (SD) 71.80 (5.79) 51.14 (5.52) 25.03 (4.84)  –  – – 
Education, years 14.68 (2.78) 15.61 (2.87) 17.63 (2.85) F(2, 80) = 7.94 0.001 YA > MA & OA 
Performance IQ 115.16 (10.41) 104.16 (14.90) 107.17 (8.10) F(2, 77) = 6.81 0.003 OA > MA & YA 




As Table 23 shows, younger adults had significant more years of education, while 
older adults had higher performance IQ compared to both younger and middle-
aged adults.  
7.3.3. Examining RT of all congruent versus incongruent trials  
Firstly, whether the RT task worked as a measure of attention was considered. 
When considering participants as one group, the difference in RT between 
congruent (M = 459.15, SD = 77.13) and incongruent trials approached 
significance (M = 461.44, SD = 78.15), Z = - 1.94, p = 0.052.  
Next the effect that types of faces, scenes and social interactions had on attention in 
congruent and incongruent trials for older, younger and middle-aged adults was 












7.3.4. Examining the difference in RT for positive, negative and neutral faces in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.4.1. Table 24. Mean (SD) RT in msec for positive, negative and neutral faces in older, middle-aged and younger adults  
Pairing of faces* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  










































Table 24 shows that older adults were faster in congruent trials compared to 
incongruent trials regardless of face type. Younger adults and middle-aged adults 
also showed this pattern in RT. All participants were faster to respond to congruent 
compared to incongruent trials for positive and negative faces. Older and middle-
aged adults were faster to respond in congruent trials compared to incongruent 
trials for the positive and neutral faces condition. The opposite pattern was found 
for younger adults. In all three age groups there was little difference in RT between 
congruent compared to incongruent trials for negative and neutral faces.  
To examine the effect of age on RT of faces, firstly a Friedman test was conducted. 
This test examined overall differences in RT of all participants and found a 
statistically significant difference, χ2(5) = 14.83, p = 0.011. Follow-up Kruskal-
Wallis tests found no significant differences between the groups in terms of RT for 
congruent trials in the positive and negative faces condition, χ2(2) = 0.57, p = 
0.752, congruent trials in the positive and neutral faces condition, χ2(2) = 3.34, p 
= 0.188 or congruent trials in the negative and neutral faces condition, χ2(2) = 
3.61, p = 0.164. There were also no significant differences in RT for incongruent 
trials in the positive and negative faces condition, χ2(2) = 1.82, p = 0.403, 
incongruent trials in the positive and neutral faces condition, χ2(2) = 5.88, p = 
0.053 and incongruent trials in the negative and neutral faces condition, χ2(2) = 
3.00, p = 0.192. 
In the older adult group, Wilcoxon signed ranks tests found no significant 
differences in RT between congruent and incongruent positive and negative faces, 
Z = -1.12, p = 0.264, congruent and incongruent positive and neutral faces, Z = -
1.17, p = 0.242 or congruent and incongruent negative and neutral faces, Z = -




In the middle-aged group, there was a significant difference in RT between 
congruent and incongruent trials for the positive and neutral faces condition, Z = - 
2.73, p = 0.006. On congruent trials, middle-aged participants were faster to 
respond to the direction of the target arrow if a positive face was on the left of the 
screen. This was found in the positive and neutral faces condition. There was no 
significant difference in RT between congruent and incongruent in the positive and 
negative faces condition, Z = -0.57, p = 0.568 and congruent and incongruent 
negative and neutral faces condition, Z = -0.32, p = 0.751.  
Younger adults did not statistically differ in their RTs for congruent and 
incongruent trials in the positive and negative faces condition, Z = -0.78, p = 
0.439, congruent and incongruent trials in the positive and neutral faces 
condition, Z = -0.70, p = 0.485 or congruent and incongruent trials in the 




7.3.5. Examining the difference in RT for positive, negative and neutral scenes in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.5.1. Table 25. Mean (SD) RT in msec for positive, negative and neutral scenes  
Pairing of scenes* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger-adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  








































The table (Table 25) above shows that older adults were faster to respond to 
congruent trials compared to incongruent trials for positive and negative scenes 
and positive and neutral scenes. In these same conditions, there was little 
difference in RT for middle-aged and younger adults. The RT for negative and 
neutral scenes was similar across the groups.  
The Friedman test was not statistically significant, χ2(5) = 5.07, p = 0.408, 




7.3.6. Examining the difference in RT for positive and negative social interactions in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.6.1. Table 26. Mean (SD) RT in msec for social interaction stimuli and social interaction compared to faces  
Pairing of scenes* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  



















In Table 26, it is evident that middle-aged adults were faster to respond in the 
congruent than incongruent trials for positive and negative social interactions, 
however older adults were faster in incongruent trials. For positive and negative 
social interaction stimuli, the Friedman test found no statistically significant 
difference, χ2(1) = 0.33, p = 0.569, consequently follow-up tests could not be 
performed. 
Next the potential differences in RT between the pairing of faces and social 










7.3.7. Examining the difference in RT for social interactions compared to faces in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.7.1. Table 27. Mean (SD) RT in msec for social interaction compared to faces  
Pairing of scenes* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  
























































































The RT in Table 27 shows that for pairings of negative faces and social interaction 
stimuli, both older and middle-aged adults were faster in congruent than 
incongruent trials, however younger adults were faster for incongruent trials. RT 
for negative faces and negative social interactions parings for congruent and 
incongruent were similar across the three age groups. Middle-aged and younger 
adults were faster in congruent than incongruent trials for positive faces and 
positive social interaction stimuli and positive faces and negative social interaction. 
Older adults were faster in incongruent trials for these two conditions. In both 
neutral faces and positive social interaction and neutral faces and negative social 
interaction conditions, all three groups were faster in congruent than incongruent 
trials.  
Friedman test found no statistically significant difference, χ2(3) = 0.46, p = 0.928, 
when pairing negative faces to positive and negative social interaction conditions 
for congruent and incongruent trials. When positive faces were paired with 
positive and negative social interaction, the Friedman test was not significant, χ2 
(3) = 0.38, p = 0.944. For neutral faces and positive and negative social 
interaction, the Friedman test was not significant, χ2 (3) = 2.47, p = 0.481.  
7.3.7. Congruent versus incongruent trials across stimuli type (faces, scenes and 
social interaction)  
To examine whether stimuli type influenced responses, congruent and incongruent 
trials were compared separately across the stimuli type (faces and scenes, faces and 
social integration and social interactions scenes). This could only be carried out for 





The RTs for positive and negative stimuli types were compared for the congruent 
trials using a Friedman test. This analysis was not significant χ2(2) = 0.10, p = 
0.949. The Friedman test for incongruent trials was also not significant, χ2(2) = 
1.35, p = 0.509. 
Following analysis of RT data, accuracy of responses was examined. This was done 






7.3.8. Examining the difference in accuracy (%) for positive, negative and neutral faces in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.8.1. Table 28. Mean (SD) accuracy (%) for positive, negative and neutral faces in older, middle-aged and younger adults  
Pairing of faces* Older adults(n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  
Positive and negative faces 91.20 (8.45) 93.07 (8.70) 94.57 (7.64) 94.32 (8.16) 96.46 (4.64) 95.13 (8.04) 
Positive and Neutral faces  97.51 (5.37) 95.51 (7.20) 97.27 (8.32) 99.62 (1.96) 98.03 (4.11) 98.41 (4.73) 
Negative and Neutral faces 97.16 (6.19) 95.51 (8.76) 97.27 (6.72) 96.28 (6.72) 96.11 (7.56) 98.33 (5.08) 




In regards to accuracy, older adults were the least accurate for positive and 
negative faces in both congruent and incongruent trials compared to the other age 
groups. Accuracy did not differ greatly across the age groups for positive and 
neutral faces or negative and neutral faces.  
The Friedman Test examining overall differences for all participants found a 
statistically significant different, χ2(5) = 25.18, p < 0.001. 
Post-hoc Wilcoxon signed ranks tests for older adults’ accuracy scores for the 
congruent and incongruent trials were not significant between the positive and 
negative faces condition, Z = -1.16, p = 0.246, positive and neutral faces 
condition, Z = - 1.14, p = 0.254 or the negative and neutral faces condition, Z = -
0.72, p = 0.472. This was also the case for middle-aged adults in the positive and 
negative faces condition, Z = -0.61, p = 0.545, positive and neutral faces 
condition, Z = -1.51, p = 0.131 and the negative and neutral faces condition, Z = 
-1.07, p = 0.285.  In younger adults, Wilcoxon signed ranks tests did not find a 
significant difference in accuracy between congruent and incongruent trials in the 
positive and negative faces condition, Z = -2.00, p = 0.050, positive and neutral 
faces condition, Z = -0.43, p = 0.667 and the negative and neutral faces condition, 
Z = -1.33, p = 0.184. 
Post-hoc Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed a significant difference in accuracy between 
the three age groups in the positive and negative faces condition for congruent 
trials, χ2(2) = 13.35, p = 0.001.  Mann-Whitney U tests found a significant 
difference in accuracy between older and younger adults, U = 161.50, p < 0.001. 
Younger adults were more accurate at responding to the correct direction of the 
detection target than older adults for positive and negative faces in congruent 




aged adults, U = 244.50, p = 0.101 and younger and middle-aged adults, U = 
245.00, p = 0.050.    
There was a significant difference in accuracy between the groups in the positive 
and neutral condition for incongruent trials, χ2(2) = 8.30, p = 0.016. Mann-
Whitney U tests found a significant difference in accuracy between older and 
middle-aged adults, U = 231.00, p = 0.008. Middle-aged adults were more 
accurate than older adults at responding to the correct direction of the detection 
target for positive and neutral faces in incongruent trials. There was no significant 
difference in accuracy between older and younger adults, U = 258.50, p = 0.081 
and younger and middle-aged adults, U = 311.00, p = 0.285.    
For the reminding conditions, Kruskal-Wallis tests found no significant differences 
in accuracy between the groups for congruent positive and neutral faces, χ2(2) = 
0.20, p = 0.906, congruent χ2(2) = 0.50, p = 0.778 and incongruent χ2(2) = 2.48, 
p = 0.289 negative and neutral faces and incongruent trials for positive and 




7.3.9. Examining the difference in accuracy (%) for positive, negative and neutral scenes in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.9.1. Table 29. Mean (SD) accuracy (%) for positive, negative and neutral scenes  
Pairing of scenes* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  
Positive and negative scenes 95.51 (6.74) 97.60 (5.97) 98.76 (4.71) 99.23 (2.72) 98.72 (4.79) 97.99 (5.07) 
Positive and Neutral scenes  98.80 (3.32) 96.00 (7.64) 98.46 (4.64) 98.03 (4.11) 99.61 (1.96) 97.65 (5.21) 
Negative and Neutral scenes  96.34 (6.59) 96.00 (6.44) 98.28 (4.13) 98.08 (4.91) 96.84 (5.61) 96.88 (6.84) 






As Table 29 shows, accuracy for positive, negative and neutral scenes did not differ 
greatly across the three age groups for congruent and incongruent conditions. The 
Friedman test was not statistically significant, χ2(5) = 9.81, p = 0.081, 




7.3.10. Examining the difference in accuracy (%) for positive and negative interaction stimuli in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.10.1. Table 30. Mean (SD) accuracy (%) for positive and negative social interaction stimuli  
Pairing of scenes* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger-adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  
























Accuracy for congruent and incongruent trials in the positive and negative social 
interaction condition was very similar for all age groups.  
Comparing accuracy for positive and negative social interaction conditions for 
congruent and incongruent trials, the Friedman test found no statistically 






















7.3.11. Examining the difference in accuracy for social interactions compared to faces in older, middle-aged and younger adults 
7.3.11.1. Table 31. Mean (SD) accuracy (%) for social interaction compared to faces  
Pairing of scenes* Older adults (n = 25) Middle-aged adults (n = 26) Younger-adults (n = 26) 
 Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  Congruent  Incongruent  























































































As Table 31 shows, the accuracy for responses when faces were paired with social 
interactions were similar for all three age groups for congruent and incongruent 
trials. This was confirmed by statistically testing. The Friedman test found no 
statistically significant difference, χ2(3) = 0.09, p = 0.993, when pairing negative 
faces to positive and negative social interaction conditions for congruent and 
incongruent trials. When positive faces were paired with positive and negative 
social interaction, the Friedman test was not significant, χ2(3) = 3.89, p = 0.274.  
For neutral faces and positive and negative social interaction, the Friedman test was 
not significant, χ2(3) = 3.88, p = 0.275.  
7.3.12. Comparing accuracy (%) across stimuli type (faces, scenes and social 
interaction) for congruent trials  
Similar to RT, whether stimuli type affected accuracy of response for congruent 
and incongruent trials was examined. For congruent trials, the Friedman test found 
a significant difference, χ2(2) = 10.21, p = 0.006.  
For older adults, follow-up Wilcoxon signed rank tests showed a significant 
difference between faces and scenes for positive and negative stimuli, Z = -2.60, p 
= 0.009 and positive and negative faces and social interaction stimuli, Z = -2.43, p 
= 0.015. Older adults were less accurate at responding to the correct direction of 
the detection target for faces compared to social interaction and faces compared to 
scenes in congruent trials. There was no significant difference in accuracy for 
scenes and social stimuli, Z = -0.79, p = 0.433.  
Middle-aged adults showed a near significant difference in accuracy on faces 
compared to scenes, Z = -1.81, p = 0.071 and faces compared to social interaction, 
Z = - 1.85, p = 0.064. There was no significant difference between scenes 




Younger adults did not differ in accuracy for faces compared to scenes, Z = 0.00, p 
= 1.00, faces compared to social interaction, Z = -0.64, p = 0.524 and scenes 
compared to social interaction, Z = -0.42, p = 0.673.  
7.3.13. Comparing accuracy (%) across stimuli type (faces, scenes and social 
interaction) for incongruent trials  
For incongruent trials the Friedman test found a significant difference, χ2(2) = 
20.44, p < 0.001. 
For older adults, there was a significant difference in accuracy for faces and scenes, 
Z = -2.12, p = 0.034 and faces and social interaction, Z = -2.36, p = 0.018 for 
incongruent trials. Older adults were less accurate at responding to the correct 
direction of the detection target on faces compare to social interaction and faces 
compared to scenes. There was no significant difference in accuracy for scenes and 
social interaction, Z = 0.00 p = 1.00. 
Middle-aged adults significantly differed in accuracy for faces and scenes, Z = -
2.86, p = 0.004 and faces and social interaction, Z = -2.41, p = 0.010.  Middle-
aged adults were less accuracy for faces compared to social scenes and faces 
compared to social interaction. There was no significant difference in accuracy for 
scenes and social interaction, Z = -1.00 p = 0.317. 
Younger adults did not differ in accuracy on faces compared to scenes, Z = -1.48, 
p = 0.139, faces compared to social interaction, Z = -1.39, p = 0.165 and scenes 




7.4. Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to examine the positivity bias using the paradigm 
designed by D'Hondt et al. (2013) to investigate whether the positivity bias is a 
function of the type of stimuli used. Firstly, no evidence of a positivity bias in older 
adults was found for faces, scenes or social interaction stimuli. Overall, there was 
little evidenced for the positivity bias previously reported (e.g. Mather and 
Carstensen, 2003).  
The only statistically significant results were between congruent and incongruent 
trials for middle-aged adults where these participants were faster to respond to the 
direction of the target arrow if a positive face preceded it but only in the positive 
and neutral faces condition. Younger adults were more accurate at responding to 
the correct direction of the detection target than older adults for positive and 
negative faces in congruent trials. Middle-aged adults were more accurate than 
older adults at responding to the correct direction of the detection target for 
positive and neutral faces in incongruent trials.  
In terms of stimulus type, older adults were more accurate at responding to the 
correct direction of the detection target when social stimuli were presented 
compared to faces, and scenes compared to faces in congruent trials. This same 
pattern of results was near significant for middle-aged adults (faces and scenes, p 
= 0.071, faces and social interaction, p = 0.064). These stimuli type comparisons 
were not significant for younger adults. For incongruent trials, older adults were 
again more accurate at responding to the correct direction of the detection target 
in social interaction compared to faces, and scenes compared to faces, this was also 
the case for middle-aged adults. Younger adults did not differ in accuracy across 




The results did not show that older adults exhibit a preference for positive 
information over negative information in terms of their attention, which is in 
contrast to the original findings by Mather and Carstensen (2003). However, there 
are other studies that have also failed to demonstrate a positivity bias (Isaacowitz et 
al., 2006b; Murphy & Isaacowitz, 2008). These findings add to the literature of no 
difference in the processing of emotional stimuli between younger and older adults 
(Gallo et al., 2009; Grühn et al., 2005; Majerus & D’Argembeau, 2011; Williams & 
Drolet, 2005). The paradigms used in these studies differed; some were memory 
recognition and recall tasks. However it would appear that when an attentional 
paradigm is used, older adults do not show a preference for positive information 
over negative. These results are similar to the results of the meta-analysis by 
Murphy and Isaacowitz (2008) who examined the positivity bias in attentional 
tasks.  
It was found that middle-aged adults showed a preference for positive information. 
However, this was only observed for positive and neutral faces, not positive and 
negative faces. Yet, the positivity bias is typically found when presented with 
positive and negative information (Reed et al., 2014). Similarly, while younger 
adults were more accurate than older adults for positive and negative faces in 
congruent trials, the middle-aged adults were better at detecting the target for 
positive and neutral faces in incongruent trials. Ideally, an interaction between age 
and congruent for this condition would have more clearly explained this finding. 
However, due to the non-normal distribution of the data, interactions could not be 
examined. Based on these findings and the limitations of the statistical techniques 
employed, this study does not provide evidence for the positivity bias. Future 
studies could use statistically techniques that do not require normal distribution, 





Researchers have not typically examined the potential effect of stimuli type on the 
positivity bias. However, in the older and middle-aged adult groups, stimuli type 
did indeed influence the accuracy of responses for these two age groups, but not 
younger adults. Older and middle-aged adults were less accurate at responding to 
the direction of the target in the faces conditions than social stimuli or scenes. A 
possible reason for this finding is that faces are particularly capable at capturing 
our attention (Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008). This effect also 
appears to be a function of age, since it was observed in older and middle-aged 
adults, but not younger adults.  
The difference in findings relating to accuracy and RT across stimuli type could be 
explained by the type of measurements used. Reaction time responses are reflexive 
orienting responses while accuracy is more of a voluntary and deliberate choice. 
Moreover, voluntary attention affects performance in experiments designed 
around both accuracy and RT (Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005) and attentional 
cueing affect accuracy and RT with different time courses (van Ede, de Lange, & 
Maris, 2012). This is a novel finding in relation to ageing research, thus future 
studies should expand on this finding further. 
One limitation of studies reporting the positivity bias in the literature is that many 
who report the presence of the positivity bias tend to be from the same research 
group. For example, Laura Carstensen or her affiliated authors are featured on a 
large proportion of the studies that have found an age-related positivity bias (e.g. 
Carstensen & Mikels, 2005; Mather & Carstensen, 2003, 2005; Mather & Knight, 
2005; Mather et al., 2005). In contrast, the studies that tend not to find the 
positivity bias come from other laboratories (for example Gallo et al., 2009; Grühn 




observation makes it difficult to interpret the reliability and generalizability of the 
positivity bias.  
Healthy adult ageing is associated with general atrophy in the brain but the frontal 
and temporal regions are particularly susceptible to age-related changes (Bartzokis 
et al., 2001; Raz et al., 2005). These areas are activated during the processing of 
emotional stimuli (Kumfor, Irish, Hodges, & Piguet, 2014), suggesting that changes 
to these regions may account for the age-related difference in attention to positive 
and negative stimuli. Related to this alternative theory, our sample consisted of very 
high-functioning older adults (IQ = 115.16) compared to middle-aged (IQ = 
104.16) and younger adults (IQ = 107.17). If changes in brain regions are 
responsible for the positivity bias, but our older adult group consisted of high-
functioning adults, it is plausible that the null findings related to the positivity bias 
may have been because of their brain reserve. Brain reserve explains why 
individuals with higher IQ experience less severe cognitive changes in the presence 
of age-related pathology (Foubert-Samier et al., 2012; Valenzuela & Sachdev, 
2006). Perhaps because they have experienced less atrophy in their frontal and 
temporal regions as a consequence of their brain reserve (Solé-Padullés et al., 
2009). A combination of these ideas may explain the null findings in this sample.  
Certain limitations related to the methodology may have influenced the current 
results. Some authors have argued that the instructions that researchers provide 
participants in terms of how to process information in the experimental task (e.g., 
asking participants to accurately remember all information) is likely to interfere 
with the positivity bias because they could be primed to know what to expect (Reed 
& Carstensen, 2012). However, this was not the case in this study, as I did not 




Another explanation for the null findings could be related to the slow stimulus 
onset. The current paradigm was adapted from the original paradigm by D'Hondt 
et al. (2013), but I slowed down the stimuli onset to accommodate slower 
processing speed typically found in older adults (Salthouse, 1996). However, the 
stimulus onset may not have been slowed down enough to detect the positivity bias 
(Reed & Carstensen, 2012). Researchers have found that the preference for positive 
stimuli in older adults emerges at 500 msec and later after stimulus onset 
(Isaacowitz et al., 2009). In this same study, attention to negative faces was even 
slower than for positive faces, leading the authors to suggest that an older adult’s 
early attention (within 500 msec) is skewed away from positive faces. Their bias 
toward positive and away from negative faces actually increases linearly over time 
(Isaacowitz et al., 2009). Further evidence for this notion comes from research 
using ERPs (Williams et al., 2006) and assessing memory for arousing versus non-
arousing words (Kensinger, 2004). Another explanation for the absence of the 
positivity bias in the current sample could be related to the IAPS database and the 
stimuli used. While sex differences were controlled for in processing emotional 
stimuli, recent research has shown that the IAPS images vary on more than ratings 
of valence and arousal, they also vary on such ratings as dominance 
(Constantinescu, Wolters, Moore, & MacPherson, 2017). In the current study, I did 
not consider the PAD (Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance) model, which is a 
dimensional framework for measuring emotions and includes pleasure/valence 
arousal, and dominance (Mehrabian, 1996). Specifically, the role of dominance in 
selecting the stimuli was not considered and this may have affected the attention of 
participants (Maner, DeWall, & Gailliot, 2008). Therefore these limitations need to 
be considered when interpreting the results of the present study.  
Overall, this study found that accuracy for stimuli type is a function of age, with 




errors when they are attending to scenes or social interactions, as faces are 
particularly effective at capturing our attention (Langton et al., 2008). When an 
attentional task is used, older adults do not show a preference for positive over 
negative information. However, the experimental paradigm suffered from 
limitations, such as being too quick to detect the positivity bias, this might have 
resulted in the null findings. Consequently, more research is needed on the 

















Chapter 8: General discussion 
 This final chapter provides a summary of the empirical findings and a general 
discussion of the results. Limitations and future directions related to this work are 


















8.1. Aims of this thesis  
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate the validity of a new test called the 
ESCoT, as a research tool and clinical test of social cognition. The ESCoT was 
utilised in neurotypical participants and individuals with clinical disorders, namely 
ASD and dementia. In Chapter 3, the ESCoT was administered to a sample of 
younger adults, middle-aged adults and older adults. In Chapter 4, the ESCoT was 
validated in a sample of ASD adults, and Chapter 5 involved neurotypical younger 
adults. These chapters examined the psychometrics of the ESCoT. In Chapter 6, the 
clinical validity of the ESCoT was examined in patients with dementia. To further 
examine the age-related changes of affective ToM found in Chapter 3, in Chapter 
7, whether the processing of emotional information changes with age, specifically 
relating to the positivity bias was investigated. The individual findings of these 
studies have been discussed previously, however this chapter will discuss the 
results using an all-inclusive approach.  
8.2. Summary of Results 
Table 32 below provides a summary of the aims of each experimental chapter 





8.2.1. Table 32. The main findings of each experimental study   
Chapter Aim of the study Main findings 
Chapter 3 Examine the relationship 
between the ESCoT and: a) age; 
b) measures of intelligence; and 
c) the Broader Autism Phenotype 
in comparison to established tests 
in healthy adults.  
 Cognitive ToM was predicted by age and affective ToM was predicted by 
age and gender. 
 Age and AQ scores predicted interpersonal understanding of social norms 
and AQ scores predicted intrapersonal understanding of social norms 
performance.  
 ESCoT total score was predicted by age and AQ scores.  
 Unlike established social cognition tests, ESCoT was not related to 
measures of intelligence. Performance on the RME correlated with 
performance on the ESCoT. 
Chapter 4 Validate the ESCoT in a sample of 
ASD adults and neurotypicals, 
and compare performance to 
established tests of social 
cognition. 
 ASD adults performed poorer on all subtests of the ESCoT compared to 
neurotypicals.  
 ESCoT subtests and total scores correlated with performance on 
established tests.  
 Unlike the ESCoT, performance on the established tests was predicted by 
verbal comprehension.  
 The ESCoT was more effective than existing tests at differentiating ASD 
adults from neurotypicals. 42.11% of ASD adults were impaired on the 




 Performance on established tests correlated with performance on the 
ESCoT and subtests.  
Chapter 5 Examine the relationships 
between sex, Broader Autism 
Phenotype, social anxiety 
disorder and empathy on 
performance of the ESCoT in 
younger adults. 
 Women performed better than men on affective ToM.  
 Cognitive ToM was predicted by older age and affective ToM was 
predicted by gender.  
 Interpersonal understanding of social norms and ESCoT total scores were 
predicted by more education.  
Chapter 6 Explore the clinical validity of 
the ESCoT in patients with 
dementia. 
 Patients with dementia performed poorer than healthy controls on ESCoT 
total scores, affective ToM, interpersonal understanding of social norms 
and intrapersonal understanding of social norms.   
Chapter 7 Investigate positivity bias found 
in older adults and its 
relationship to the type of stimuli 
(faces, scenes and social 
interactions).  
 There was no evidence of the positivity bias in older, middle-aged and 
younger adults in regards to reaction time or accuracy.  
 Older and middle-aged adults differed in accuracy across stimuli type 
compared to younger adults; they were less accuracy for faces than social 
stimuli.  




As Table 32 shows, the ESCoT was relatively successful as a test of social cognition. 
The ESCoT was able to detect age-related differences in healthy ageing, concurrent 
with some of the literature (Henry et al., 2013). Chapter 3 showed that as 
individuals get older, their social cognitive abilities are negatively affected. The 
interplay between personality traits, sex and performance on the ESCoT was 
investigated in Chapter 5. Limited associations were found between these variables 
and the ESCoT. The ESCoT found sex differences in performance on affective ToM, 
similar to the results of Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, being female predicted better 
performance on affective ToM and in Chapter 5, female participants were shown 
to have better affective ToM abilities than males. This is similar with the findings of 
many studies (Ahmed & Miller, 2011; Baron-Cohen et al., 2015; Carroll & Chiew, 
2006; Kirkland et al., 2013; Schiffer et al., 2013; Voracek & Dressler, 2006). The 
results from these two studies suggest that participants’ sex should also be 
considered when evaluating performance on tests of social cognition. Returning to 
healthy ageing, Chapter 7 found that, while increasing age negatively predicts 
performance on affective ToM, older, middle-aged and younger adults do not 
significantly differ in processing positive and negative emotional stimuli, but do 
differ on their accuracy when processing positive and negative stimuli across 
stimuli type.  
ASD adults were impaired on all subtests of the ESCoT, demonstrating that it is 
sensitive to the typical impairments found by other tests of social cognition (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al., 2001; Mathersul et al., 2013; Murray et al., 
2017). Preliminary evidence of the clinical validity of the ESCoT was found in 
Chapter 6; this chapter showed that a small group of patients with dementia 
experienced difficulties in performance on the ESCoT. These results confirm the 
social cognitive impairments found in dementia (Bora et al., 2015; Gregory et al., 




In regards to psychometrics, the ESCoT correlated with established measures of 
social cognition in Chapter 3 and 4 showing convergent validity. Better 
performance on the ESCoT was significantly related to better performance on 
traditional tests of social cognition. Other psychometric investigations found 
acceptable internal consistency (measured by Guttman's Lambda 4 reliability 
coefficient) and high inter-rater reliability. These results show that the ESCoT has 
good psychometric properties as a test of social cognition.  
8.3. Advantages of the ESCoT as a test of social cognition 
There are many tests of social cognition in the literature, however, as Table 1 in 
Chapter 1 illustrated, many of these tests have important limitations. The ESCoT 
was developed to address some of these limitations. Based on the results of this 
thesis, there are several noteworthy advantages of the ESCoT compared to 
traditional social cognition tests. The chapters (Chapter 4 and 6) which examined 
the validity of the ESCoT found that compared to established tests of social 
cognition, the ESCoT is a superior test of social abilities in terms of diagnostic 
accuracy (see Chapter 4 and 6). A ROC curve analysis in ASD adults and NC found 
that the ESCoT was better at correctly assigning participants to their respective 
group. Additionally, in this chapter, the ESCoT showed the highest AUC values 
compared to the established tests. Higher accuracy rates compared to traditional 
tests suggest that the ESCoT has potential to be used as a clinical test over more 
established measures.  
Even with a limited sample size in a dementia population (n = 25), the ESCoT was 
able to detect significant differences in performance between dementia patients 
and NC. This is in contrast to the RME, which did not find a significant difference. 
Moreover, the effect sizes for the ESCoT were large in Chapter 4, even with a 




social cognition. The ESCoT represents a concise (20 – 25 minutes), informative, 
and now validated test of social cognition to be used in clinical settings. This is in 
contrast to current clinical tests like the TASIT which takes 60-75 minutes to 
administer and the GeSoCS which can take up to 60 minutes to complete. Such a 
short and insightful test like the ESCoT will benefit clinicians and researchers 
interested in measuring social cognitive abilities in time sensitive environments. 
Together with the finding of large effects in small samples, the ESCoT signifies a 
worthy choice for use as a test of social cognition, particularly in clinical 
populations that can be difficult to recruit large numbers of participants 
proficiently.  
Many tests only assess a single social cognitive ability (e.g., RME, RMF and SNQ), or 
measure cognitive and affective ToM using different tests and different stimuli. The 
advantage of the ESCoT is that it assesses four social cognitive abilities, cognitive 
ToM, affective ToM and inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms in 
a single test using the same stimuli. In everyday social interactions, we often 
employ several social cognitive abilities simultaneously. Therefore, the ESCoT has 
an important benefit over existing social cognition tests because it gives researchers 
and clinicians a measure of several social abilities, and perhaps better insights into 
how social cognitive abilities are used in the real world.  
Similarly, many tests of social cognition are not significantly independent of IQ. 
Measures of IQ typically significantly predict performance or correlate with tests of 
social cognition (Baker et al., 2014; Maylor et al., 2002; McDonald et al., 2003). 
However, in Chapters 3 and 4, results showed that this is not a limitation of the 
ESCoT.  
In Chapter 3, Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) predicted the performance on 




performance was predicted by VCI and Perceptual Reasoning Index (PRI) scores. In 
Chapter 4, 19% of variance in performance on the RME was predicted by VCI. 
While 42% of variance in performance was explained by VCI scores and AQ scores 
on the RMF. Finally, VCI scores, EQ and SQ scores predicted 19% of performance 
on the SNQ. It is evident from these findings that while VCI is significantly 
associated with performance on social cognition tests in the literature, it is not 
statistically influential to performance on the ESCoT. This gives the ESCoT a great 
advantage over tests in the literature because it may be more accurately assessing 
social abilities independently from IQ compared to other tests. Additionally, tests of 
social cognition like false-belief and the JoP are often too easy for adult 
participants. On the other hand, the ESCoT does not seem to suffer from this 
limitation; overall the healthy participants did not perform at ceiling on this 
measure. At the same time, the sample populations of ASD adults and dementia 
patients did not exhibit floor effects. Taken together, these findings show that the 
ESCoT can be used in healthy and clinical populations without concerns of test 
difficulty.   
A criticism of many existing tests of social cognition is that the stimuli they use 
were not created to be stimuli for a test of social abilities. For example, stimuli for 
the RME and Awkward Moments Test were created for advertisements, and then 
repurposed for a test of social cognition. This means that the answers are an 
interpretation of the authors, and not intentionally designed to represent a specific 
inference about how a character is feeling or thinking. However, with the ESCoT, 
each animation was created for the specific purpose of measuring cognitive ToM, 
affective ToM and inter-and intrapersonal understanding of social norms. 
Moreover, tests that use verbal texts or static stimuli show low ecological validity 
(Dziobek et al., 2006). Consequently, this questions their relationship to real-world 




interactions to increase ecological validity, giving it another advantage over tests 
like the RME. The ESCoT also addressed the issues of context, which has limited 
many tests of social cognition like the TASIT, RME and RMF. This is because context 
is needed to process social information (Chung et al., 2010; Love et al., 2015; 
Vermeulen, 2015) but many tests lack context. However, the interactions and 
stories, which make up the ESCoT, all contain their own context and can be used 
independently of each other without loss of context or important social 
information.  
Finally, in regards to the scoring systems used by many existing tests, the ESCoT 
was designed to account for variability in participant’s answers by providing 
structured guidelines for responses. For instance, on the affective ToM questions, 
participants could give different affective states instead of trying to give a specific 
answer. This is in contrast to the RME which uses force-choice answers and there 
is only one correct answer. However, in the real world, we do not encounter many 
social interactions that require forced-choice answers, or where there is only one 
interpretation of how someone is thinking or feeling. Perhaps this modification of 
assessing an individual’s social cognitive abilities may explain the large effect sizes 
compared to other tests in Chapter 4. As discussed above, the ESCoT provides many 
advantages over existing tests of social cognition.  
8.4. The ESCoT as a clinical test of social cognition  
The normative data in Chapter 4 provide cut-off scores to detect abnormal 
performance based on 236 healthy individuals. From these data, it was found that 
42.11% of ASD adults were impaired on the ESCoT, with the highest rates of 
impairment on cognitive ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms 




ESCoT total scores compared to 31.5% of AD/MCI patients; this is in contrast to 
5.50% of NC adults.  
The results above show that compared to neurotypical controls, more ASD adults 
and dementia patients were impaired on the ESCoT. This is useful because in 
clinical settings, which do not pool participants and use means to assess 
performance, clinical tests need to be sensitive and able to identity poor 
performance. While the samples of ASD adults (n = 19) and dementia patients (n 
= 24) were relatively small, the ESCoT was still able to identify individuals who 
exhibited social cognitive deficits. Examining the findings separately, the 
discrepancy in impairments of cognitive and affective ToM in the bvFTD and 
AD/MCI suggests that cognitive and affective ToM are differentially affected in 
these subtypes of dementia. Furthermore, the impairments of the bvFTD patients on 
the ESCoT are consistent with clinical presentations of bvFTD patients who 
experience difficulties interacting with family members and exhibit inappropriate 
social behaviours as a core feature of their dementia (Rascovsky et al., 2011).  As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the fact that only 42.11% of ASD adults were 
impaired does raise questions about the usefulness of averaging performance of 
clinical groups. However, to understand social abilities in clinical populations, and 
to also be able to generalise the findings, individual case studies cannot be used 
because they only represent the symptoms of one patient.  
Examining the two clinical groups together, there are noteworthy observations. In 
the ASD group, more individuals were impaired on cognitive ToM compared to 
affective ToM, while in bvFTD patients, the opposite was found. Furthermore, 
fewer ASD adults were impaired on the ESCoT compared to both dementia groups. 
These results suggest that neurodegenerative diseases may have greater impact on 




results suggest a different clinical profile for the type of impairments found in 
these two groups, even though both groups exhibit social cognitive impairments. 
Overall, these findings show that the ESCoT has clinical value as a test of social 
cognition. It would be interesting to confirm these findings in a larger sample to 
compare the profiles and confirm if they are indeed different.   
8.5. Influence of age on ToM and processing emotional stimuli 
In Chapter 3, the regression analysis showed that poorer performance on cognitive 
ToM was significantly predicted by increasing age. This is in contrast to the results 
of Chapter 5. In the younger population of Chapter 5 (age range 18 – 35), 
increasing age predicted better performance on cognitive ToM. These findings 
highlight questions of the nature of social cognitive tests and what they assess. To 
discuss this notion in greater detail, we first need to understand the 
neurodevelopment of the neural regions associated with cognitive processes such 
as executive functions and tests of social cognition. The functional development of 
the abilities associated with the frontal regions may be considered a multistage 
process (Romine & Reynolds, 2005). The most significant developments occur 
between 6 and 8 years of age. There are then moderate increases between 9 and 12 
years old while performance approximates adult levels between adolescence and 
the early 20s, depending on task demands (Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, 
& Catroppa, 2001; Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001; Korkman, Kemp, & 
Kirk, 2001; Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991).  
Specifically relating to ToM abilities, basic perspective taking emerges in the first 
18 months (Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007), while an understanding of first 
order false-belief emerges at around 4 years of age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001) and second order false-belief can be passed by age 6 or 7 (Perner & 




been observed between the ages of 20 and 29 (De Luca et al., 2003), in terms of 
structural and functional developments of the prefrontal cortex and temporo-
parietal regions (Blakemore, 2008; Blakemore, den Ouden, Choudhury, & Frith, 
2007; Shaw et al., 2008). The extended development into adulthood of the brain 
regions involved in ToM might be expected to influence performance on tests of 
social cognition (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). Indeed, Dumontheil et 
al. (2010) showed age-related improvements with ToM abilities from adolescence 
to later adulthood.  
Consequently, it would stand to reason that if the brain regions involved in social 
cognition continue to develop into adulthood, this might result in measurable 
differences in performance, like age positively predicting cognitive ToM 
performance in younger adults as observed in Chapter 5.  
Similarly, it is well established that cognitive processes decline with increasing age 
(Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004), with the frontal regions and tasks tapping those 
regions, being particularly susceptible to age-related changes (Bartzokis et al., 
2001). This may partially explain the results of Chapter 3, with increasing age and 
age-related atrophy in the frontal regions reflecting poorer performance on 
specific social abilities. The results in Chapter 3 suggest that older adults have 
poorer social abilities than younger adults.  
However, given the evidence discussed, perhaps what the ESCoT and tests of social 
cognition are measuring is the structural differences in the ageing brain through 
behavioural tests, rather than any meaningful or real-world age-related difference 
in an individual’s social abilities. Anecdotally speaking, in everyday social 
interactions, it would be difficult to argue that older adults have poorer social skills 
than younger adults. Some would even argue that the opposite is true (Happé et al., 




Overall there is evidence to argue that tests of social cognition are simply proxy 
assessments for structural differences in the brain and not functional age-related 
changes in our social abilities. Furthermore, they may not be as representative of 
real-world social abilities as researchers hope. This notion has important 
implications to interpreting the results of tests of social cognition like the ESCoT 
when used in healthy ageing research. The experimental results show a specific 
effect, but real-world interactions with older adults depict a different picture.  
To further investigate social cognitive processes in healthy populations, the 
positivity bias was examined in a sample of older, middle-aged and younger adults. 
Across three types of stimuli (faces, scenes and social interaction), there was no 
evidence of an age-related preference for positive stimuli over negative stimuli. 
This is in contrast to the results of Chapter 3, where increasing age was predictive 
of poorer performance on affective ToM. Taken together, these two results suggest 
that while an individual’s ability to infer what another person is feeling may be 
impacted by their age, their attention to positive and negative information is not 
affected in relation to response times. The variable that suggested an age-related 
change, similar to affective ToM, was accuracy in responding to positive and 
negative social stimuli when compared to faces and scenes. This age-related 
change was not observed in the younger adult group. Older adults may be less 
accurate with stimuli of faces because of age-related changes in their ability to 
infer emotive states from faces in social interactions. It appears that there may be 
some association between these two emotional processes but the exact nature of 
this this potential relationship is unclear, as they were not examined in the same 
study. Future research could examine accuracy to faces in a positivity bias 
paradigm alongside judgements of affective ToM using the same stimuli to further 
understand this association. In such an experiment, particular precautions would 




onset, since the positivity bias has been shown to only occur after 500 milliseconds 
(Reed & Carstensen, 2012).  
8.6. Social norm understanding measured by the ESCoT 
The ESCoT has added several novel findings to the literature in regards to social 
norm understanding. Firstly, Chapter 3 showed that, while an individual’s 
cognitive ToM, affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms 
might be negatively affected by age; their intrapersonal understanding of social 
abilities remains intact. To date, no study has shown this, nor been able to observe 
this finding within the same test. This contrasts with the intrapersonal abilities of 
ASD adults and bvFTD patients, who were found to be impaired on intrapersonal 
understanding of social norms. Perhaps this introspective skill serves as a 
compensatory ability, which negates the effects of other age-related deficits on 
cognitive ToM, affective ToM and interpersonal understanding of social norms. 
This may explain why even though age-related differences in social cognition 
abilities are similar to those found in ASD adults and dementia patients, the real-
world observations are not as pronounced as in clinical populations. 
Inappropriate social behaviour is a hallmark characteristic of bvFTD (Rascovsky et 
al., 2011), however abilities which may be responsible for this are not routinely 
measured. Chapter 6 showed that patients with bvFTD do in fact perform poorer 
than controls on objective measures of interpersonal understanding of social 
norms. This chapter was also the first study to show a significant correlation 
between cognitive processes and social norm understanding. In dementia patients, 
better language skills on the ECAS were correlated with performance on the SNQ, 
while interpersonal understanding of social norms and executive functions 
measured by the ECAS also showed a positive correlation. These findings suggest 




abilities. However, these were only preliminary results in a small sample (n = 24). 
Consequently, future studies could examine this in a larger sample and examine 
the associations between AD and bvFTD patients separately. This type of analysis 
may be useful to understand why bvFTD patients exhibit inappropriate social 
behaviours such as breaking social rules (Carr et al., 2015). The advantage of the 
ESCoT is that executive functions can be examined alongside objective measures of 
inter-and intrapersonal understand of social norms within the same test to 
examine potential dissociations. Moreover, ASD adults also appear to experience 
difficulties in this ability and this may explain why they struggle with social 
interactions, because they are unable to understand how another individual should 
behave in a social interaction.  
Another novel finding observed with the ESCoT was that poorer performance on 
interpersonal understanding of social norms was predicted by more autistic traits 
in an ageing population. Firstly, this confirms that there is a distribution of autistic-
like traits in the neurotypical population (Constantino et al., 2006; Constantino & 
Todd, 2005) and that these traits have a measurable influence on an individual’s 
ability to understand social norms in the context of how they believe someone else 
should behave in an interaction. Moreover, for the first time, inter-and 
intrapersonal understanding of social norms have been assessed, firstly within the 
same test and secondly within the same test as ToM abilities. This is a great 
contribution to our understanding of social cognition in healthy ageing research, 
investigation into the interplay of social abilities with personality traits, and clinical 
research. The ESCoT also provides a clinical measure of these two abilities that 
currently does not exist. Until now, there have been limited measures of an 
individual’s understanding of the rules that govern their behaviour in social 




objectively assessed in a test, this has great potential to add new insights into how 
different sample populations process social information about social norms.  
8.7. Limitations and future directions 
There are important limitations of this thesis that should be considered. A 
limitation of the present series of studies is that they did not include an 
investigation into the effects of executive functions on performance of ToM and 
social norm understanding in ASD or healthy ageing. However, examining the 
relationship been executive functions and ToM using the ESCoT would have been 
insightful, given the debate regarding the relationship between ToM and executive 
functions (Bottiroli et al., 2016). There is contradictory evidence from correlational 
studies regarding the relationships between these two constructs. In dementia 
research, case studies of bvFTD patients have found relatively intact executive 
function but extremely impaired ToM abilities, suggesting a dissociation between 
ToM and executive functions, at least in bvFTD patients (Bertoux et al., 2012). This 
finding has been replicated by other studies (Gregory et al., 2002; Lough & Hodges, 
2002; Lough et al., 2006). But some researchers have failed to find this 
dissociation, showing correlations between social cognition and executive abilities, 
and suggesting they might rely (at least in part) on similar processes (Eslinger et 
al., 2007; Snowden et al., 2003; Torralva et al., 2007). A similar pattern of findings 
is also true in the ageing research, some researchers find a relationship between 
the two (Bottiroli et al., 2016; Charlton et al., 2009; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 
2007; Phillips et al., 2011; Rakoczy et al., 2012), while others have not (Cavallini, 
Lecce, Bottiroli, Palladino, & Pagnin, 2013; Maylor et al., 2002; Wang & Su, 2013). 
Consequently, future studies should examine the relationship between ToM and 





Measures of IQ did not significantly predict performance on the ESCoT, however 
full-time education predicted better performance on ESCoT total scores in both 
Chapters 4 and 5. This is an unexpected finding because IQ performance and 
education are typically correlated (Deary, Strand, Smith, & Fernandes, 2007), 
which would suggest that if one predicts performance, so should the other. 
However, this was not observed, and it is currently uncertain why these results 
were found. The education levels of participants in both groups were relatively 
high, resulting in limited variance, but it is unclear how this would affect 
performance. It may have been a cohort effect in the younger adults because 
education was treated as a continuous variable in the regression analysis but due to 
a limited range, it was not continuous but a near zero predictor in terms of 
variance. As all participants in Chapter 5 had roughly the same years of education, 
the regression model may have had limited reference points to examine the 
predictor variable against the outcome variable. Consequently, the results of this 
chapter may not be able to offer insights into the effects of education on 
performance on the ESCoT. However, future studies could more specifically 
examine this unexpected finding by having more varied levels of education. The 
results may have implications for the scoring of the ESCoT, which may require 
education adjustments, similar to tests like the Mini-Mental State Examination 
(Crum, Anthony, Bassett, & Folstein, 1993).  
Convergent validity, internal consistency and inter-rater reliability for the ESCoT 
were all examined in this thesis, with all showing favourable results for the ESCoT. 
Yet, it would be beneficial to examine further psychometric properties of the ESCoT 
such as test-retest reliability. This is particularly important if the ESCoT is to be 
used as a clinical test of social cognition. If the ESCoT is to be used in clinical 
settings, how participants perform on it after multiple testing should be 




unlike social cognition tests like the RME or RMF, participants are not shown the 
potential answers, and due to the vague nature of the questions (e.g., what is X 
thinking?), they may not give the same answer every time. Nonetheless, future 
research would greatly benefit from examining the test-retest reliability of the 
ESCoT. Further convergent validity with newer tests which more closely measure 
the same abilities like the ESCoT such as the Strange Stories Film (Murray et al., 
2017) would be valuable. Comparing the ESCoT to newer tests would also be 
beneficial to investigate which of these tests are best suited to assessing social 
cognition.  
While this thesis demonstrated that social cognitive abilities measured by the 
ESCoT are negatively impacted by age, future studies might assess the real-world 
consequences of poorer performance on tests of social cognition in older adults. 
This might be achieved by examining social functioning (e.g., engagement in social 
activities, activities of daily living) and social networks (e.g., peer support and 
friendship groups) and how these relate to performance on the ESCoT. It would be 
insightful to examine whether individuals who engage in more social activities, 
and have more friendship groups objectively differ in performance on the ESCoT 
compared to individuals who engage in fewer social activities or have limited 
interpersonal relationships in older age. There is research to suggest that adults 
who exhibit better social cognitive abilities are more competent at social 
interactions (Bora, Eryavuz, Kayahan, Sungu, & Veznedaroglu, 2006). Although 
ToM and social functioning are often measured in the same study, level of social 
functioning is not typically used as the independent variable. Furthermore, social 





While it would require refining presentation timings, the easy administration 
(simply watching an animation and answering questions) of the ESCoT might 
mean it could be utilised in neuroimaging studies to observe the neural networks 
that the ESCoT activate. Firstly, to further confirm Shamay-Tsoory and colleagues 
theory of distinct but overlapping types of ToM (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 
2007; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2010; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007; Shamay-Tsoory et 
al., 2006; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005) since few studies examine ToM abilities in 
the same test with imaging techniques. Secondly, this type of investigation would 
be especially insightful for inter-intra personal understanding of social norms, as 
there is little neuroimaging data on these social cognitive abilities. Moreover, to 
date, neuroimaging techniques have not been used on a measure that assess both 
ToM and social norms understanding within the same test.  
8.8. Conclusion 
There are many tests of social cognition in the literature, and while these have their 
advantages, they also have their limitations. The ESCoT was designed to address 
some of these limitations and has done so relatively successfully, improving on 
previous tests. The ESCoT represents a sensitive, concise and informative 
neuropsychological tool to offer new and useful insights in the abilities that 
individuals use to interact with others. It is hoped that the results from this series of 
studies have shown that the ESCoT is a valuable research and clinical tool to assess 
social cognition in healthy and clinical populations and will enable further 
understanding of social cognitive abilities.  
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 Appendix  
Appendix 1.1. Summary storyboards for each animation  
Scenario 1: Helping the elderly (social norm violation) 
 





Scenario 3: Being considerate on the bus (social norm violation) 
 







Scenario 5: Assisting a neighbour (non-social norm violation) 
 







Scenario 7: Talking in the cinema (non-social norm violation) 
 







Scenario 9: Skipping a bus queue (social rule violation) 
 







Appendix 1.2. Scoring 1 of the ESCoT 
Tell the participant: I’m going to show you a short animation that tells a story, and ask you a couple 
of questions about it. Let’s begin. 
Scenario 1: Helping the elderly (social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Anything else? 
 
Notes/Partial Responses/Misconstruction/Omissions 
1. Old lady with bag 
   
2. Shopping bag bursts 
   
3. Points to spilled shopping as man 
is present 
   
4. Man walks on 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the man think that the elderly woman wanted?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the elderly 
woman needs help with a specific activity and a 
contextual reason why she needs assistance. For 
example help with her shopping because she 
looks like she is unable to pick it up herself/she 





An answer that recognises that the elderly 
woman needs help with a specific activity. For 
example, help with her shopping/her shopping 
to be picked. No more than two points can be 
gained if the consequences of her age or 
situation is not explained  (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the elderly 
woman needs help. For example his 
assistance/help (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the 
elderly woman needs help. For example him to 
avoid stepping on her shopping OR don’t know 
0 







Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How did the elderly woman feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative 
emotion with a contextual reason. For example 
angry/disappointed/sad/frustrated because the 
man walked straight pass her without offering 
to help pick up her spilled shopping when it is 




An answer that gives a specific negative 




An answer that provides a generic negative 
emotion. For example not happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For 
example tired/unconcerned OR provides a 
positive emotion for example, happy OR don’t 
know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man acted in 
a socially unacceptable way and a contextual 
reason why she needed help. For example, no - 
should have helped the elderly woman pick up 
her shopping as she obviously needed help/is 




An answer that recognises that the man acted in 
a socially unacceptable manner. For example no 
- should have helped her (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the man 
acted in a socially unacceptable manner but 
provides a reasonable justification. For example 
yes - may have been in a rush and couldn't 
help/he didn't do anything wrong/he avoided 
her shopping as she requested/might not have 
noticed her pointing 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 









    
 






Scenario 2: Disobeying parking regulation (non-social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 





1. Woman arrives outside a shop in her car  
   
2. Woman goes into the shop leaving her car outside a 
no parking sign 
   
3. Parking attendant arrives and sees she is not 
allowed to park there 
   
4. Parking attendant gives the woman a ticket for 
parking in a no parking area 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the woman think that the parking attendant 
wanted?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the parking 
attendant performed a specific action and a 
contextual reason why he performed the action. 
For example, to give her a parking ticket for 
parking outside a shop that clearly shows that 
parking is not allowed/because the sign shows 




An answer that recognises that the parking 
attendant performed a specific action. For 
example, to give her a parking ticket. No more 
than two points can be gained if the reason for 
the action is not explained (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the parking 
attendant performed an action. For example to 
give her something (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the 
parking attendant performed an action. For 
example to say hello to her  OR don’t know 
0 









Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How did the woman feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example annoyed/angry/irritated/frustrated because she 








An answer that provides a generic negative emotion. For example not 
happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example 
unconcerned/fine OR provides a positive emotion for example, happy 
OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the parking attendant in the animation behave as 
other people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the parking attendant acted in a socially 
acceptable manner and contextual reason why he did. For example, yes 
- he did his job and gave the woman a parking ticket because she was 




An answer that recognises that the parking attendant acted in a socially 
acceptable manner. For example yes - he did his job (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the man acted in a socially 
acceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For example 
no - he did not need to give her a parking ticket, he could just have 
asked her to move her car  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
parking attendant in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 



















Scenario 3: Being considerate on the bus (social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 




1. Bus is full, seat next to man with bag 
on it 
   
2. Pregnant woman gets on bus carrying 
bags 
   
3. Pregnant woman points at seat 
   
4. Man does not move bags 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the man think that the woman wanted?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the pregnant woman would have liked 
the man to be considerate and perform a specific action, and a 
contextual reason why he should have been considerate. For example, to 
sit down in the seat his bags are on/him to move his bags so that she can 
sit down because she is heavily pregnant and would probably appreciate 




An answer that recognises that the pregnant woman would have liked 
the man to be considerate and perform a specific action. For example, to 
sit down in the seat his bags are on/him to move his bags so that she can 
sit down. No more than two points can be gained if the current 
condition of the woman is not considered (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the pregnant woman had a contextually 
specific desire. For example, to sit down/assistance (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that recognises that the pregnant woman had a request. For 
example to put her bags on the seat OR don’t know 
0 











Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example angry/disappointed/disgusted/surprised because 








An answer that provides a generic negative emotion. For example, not 
happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example unconcerned 
OR provides a positive emotion for example, happy OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
way and what he should have done. For example, no - he should have 




An answer that recognises that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. For example no - he should have helped her (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the man acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For 
example yes - he was sitting down first/needs a place to put his own 
bags/he thinks she is overweight and does not realise she is pregnant 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 




















Scenario 4: Cleaning up after your pet (social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 




1. Man walking dog near children's 
park/playground 
   
2. Dog defecates on ground near bin 
   
3. Woman and child approach, 
woman points at bin 
   
4. Man does not clean up after his 
dog 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What does the man think that the woman wants?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man should have performed a 
specific action, and a contextual reason why he should have done it. For 
example, him to clean up after his dog/him to put his dog's droppings 
into the bin because the dog droppings are a health hazard and it is near 
a children’s playground. It is illegal not to clean up after your dog, you 




An answer that recognises that the man should have  performed a 
specific action. For example, him to clean up after his dog/him to put 
his dog's droppings into the bin. No more than two points can be gained 
if there is no mention of why he should have done it (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the man should have performed an 
action. For example, him to use the bin (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the man should have performed 
a contextually specific action. For example, her child to use the bin OR 
don’t know 
0 











Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example disgusted/outraged/angry because it the man’s 
responsibility to clean up after this pet. They are near a children’s 








An answer that provides a generic negative emotion. For example, not 
happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example unconcerned 
OR provides a positive emotion for example, happy OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner and should have performed a specific action in regards to his 
dog. For example, no - he should have cleaned up after his dog/put the 




An answer that recognises that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner and should have performed a specific action. For example no - 
he should have used the bin/followed the woman's request (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the man acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For 
example yes - he had nothing to use to put the droppings in the bin so 
had to leave them/it's not his fault that his dog needed to defecate 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 



















Scenario 5: Assisting a neighbour (non-social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 




1. Woman in garden watering plants 
   
2. Neighbour next door in his own garden 
   
3. Woman points to cat in her tree 
   
4. Cat seems to be stuck as neighbour fetches 
ladder to get it down 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the man think that the woman wanted?   
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the woman needs help with a specific 
activity and a contextual reason why she needs assistance. For example, 
help getting the cat down from the tree/him to get the cat down from 




An answer that recognises that the woman needs help with a specific 
activity. For example, help getting the cat down from the tree/him to get 
the cat down from the tree. No more than two points can be gained if 




An answer that recognises that the woman needs help. For example his 
assistance/help (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the woman needs help. For 
example him to say hello OR don’t know 
0 












Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific positive emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example relieved/happy/grateful/thankful because the man 
was kind enough to get the cat down from the tree, she looked distressed 




An answer that gives a specific positive emotion. For example 
relieved/happy/grateful/thankful  (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that provides a generic positive emotion. For example, 
ok/fine (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example, unconcerned 
OR negative emotion. For example, annoyed/sad/angry OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man acted in a socially acceptable 
manner and offered his help to perform a contextually specific action. 





An answer that recognises that the man acted in a socially acceptable 
manner and offered his help. For example yes - he did what the lady 
wanted/he was helpful (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the man acted in a socially 
acceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For example 
no - he shouldn’t have gone up the ladder, it’s not safe. He shouldn’t 
have risked his life for a cat. The cat will not be as stuck as it seems  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 



















Scenario 6: Smoking in a prohibited area (social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 




1. Two women eating in restaurant 
   
2. Anti-smoking sign visible 
   
3. Woman in green lights up cigarette, woman in 
blue points to anti-smoking sign 
   
4. Woman in green blows smoke rings towards 
the woman in blue  
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What does the woman in green think that the woman in 
blue wants?    
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the woman in blue wants her to pay 
attention to the sign and perform a specific action, and a contextual 
reason why she needs to perform the action. For example, her to 
extinguish her cigarette/stop smoking because she is disobeying the sign 




An answer that recognises that the woman in blue wants her to pay 
attention to the sign and perform a specific action. For example, her to 
extinguish her cigarette/stop smoking. No more than two points can be 




An answer that recognises that the woman in blue wants her to pay 
attention to the sign. For example, her to pay attention to what the sign 
says (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the woman in blue wants the 
woman in green to pay attention to the sign or perform an action. For 
example wants her to share her cigarette OR don’t know 
0 










Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman in blue feel at the end of the 
animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example irritated/disgusted/angry/furious because the 
woman in green was rude, she not only ignored her request and the sign 








An answer that provides a generic negative emotion. For example, not 
happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example, unconcerned  
OR provides an irrelevant negative emotion, for example angry she 
didn’t share OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the woman in green in the animation behave as 
other people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the woman in green acted in a socially 
unacceptable way and a contextual reason why she shouldn’t be 
smoking. For example, no - the woman in green shouldn't be smoking in 




An answer that recognises that the woman in green acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. For example no - the woman should have 
followed the woman in blue’s request/shouldn't be smoking next to 
people who are trying to eat (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the woman in green acted in a 
socially unacceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For 
example yes - she can smoke wherever she wants because she has a 
right to do what she wants, it’s only a sign  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
woman in green? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 


















Scenario 7: Talking in the cinema (non-social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 




1. People in cinema watching film 
   
2. Two women start talking to one 
another 
   
3. One man says 'shh'/puts his finger to 
his mouth/tells them to be quiet 
   
4. Women cease talking and watch film 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the women think that the man wanted?   
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the man wants the women to perform a 
specific action and a contextual reason why they should. For example, 
them to be quiet/stop talking because they are disturbing him and other 




An answer that recognises that the man wants the women to perform a 
specific action. For example, them to be quiet/stop talking. No more 
than two points can be gained if there is no mention of why the women 
need to stop talking (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the man has a request. For example them 
to watch the film/pay attention to his action (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the man has a request. For 
example them to say hello OR don’t know 
0 












Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the man feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific positive emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example relieved/grateful/thankful that they stopped 









An answer that provides a generic positive emotion. For example, 
fine/ok (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example, unconcerned 
OR provides a negative emotion, for example annoyed/sad OR don’t 
know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the women in the animation behave as other 
people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the women acted in a social acceptable 
manner by obliging to the man’s request and performed a specific 




An answer that recognises that the women acted in a socially acceptable 
manner by accommodating the man’s request. For yes - they did what 
the man wanted (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the women acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner to begin with but provide a reasonable 
justification. For example no - they are entitled to talk during the cinema 
as long as they are whispering and should have told the man this 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
women in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 



















Scenario 8: Serving a customer (non-social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 





1. Man and child at hot-dog stand 
   
2. Child points to hot-dog sign/gestures towards 
employee at hot-dog stand 
   
3. Father hands man at hot-dog stand money 
   
4. Child gets hot-dog 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the man behind the stand think that the father 
wanted?   
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the father required a specific service 
from the hotdog vendor and a contextual reason why he would have 
required the service. For example, to buy his son a hotdog because his 




An answer that recognises that the father required a specific service 
from the hotdog vendor. For example, to buy his son a hotdog. No more 
than two points can be gained if there is no mention of why the man 
required the service (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the father required a service from the 
hotdog vendor. For example to buy his son something (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the father required a service. For 
example for his son to say hello to him OR don’t know 
0 












Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the father feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 
Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific positive emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example happy/thankful because his son got a hotdog/the 








An answer that provides a generic positive emotion. For example, fine/ok 
(prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example, unconcerned 
OR provides a negative emotion, for example annoyed/sad/angry OR 
don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man behind the stand in the animation behave 
as other people should behave?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the hotdog vendor acted in a social 
acceptable manner by obliging to the man’s request and performed a 
specific action. For example, yes - he gave the hot-dog to the 




An answer that recognises that the hotdog acted in a socially acceptable 




An answer that does not recognise that the hotdog vendor acted in a 
socially acceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For 
example no – he shouldn’t be selling hotdogs to children, because 
they’re not very healthy 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
behind the stand in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 
















Scenario 9: Skipping a bus queue (social rule violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 





1. People waiting in queue for bus 
   
2. Bus turns up, woman in purple approaches 
   
3. Woman in purple pushes past woman in orange at 
front of queue/skips queue 
   
4. Woman in purple is on bus first while others who 
were queuing are now paying 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What does the woman in purple think that the woman in 
orange wants? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the woman in orange wanted the woman 
in purple to let her/the people waiting go before her and a contextual 
reason why she should have. For example, to get on the bus before 
her/her to go to the back of the queue because people, including the 




An answer that recognises that the woman in orange wanted the woman 
in purple to let her/the people waiting go before her. For example, to get 
on the bus before her/her to go to the back of the queue. No more than 
two points can be gained if there is no mention of why the woman in 
purple should have joined the queue (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the woman in orange had a contextual 
desire. For example, to go somewhere (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the woman in orange wanted the 
woman in purple to let her/the people waiting go before her. For 
example thinks she's waiting for someone OR don’t know 
0 










Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman in orange feel at the end of the 
animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific negative emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example outraged/disgusted/angry/upset because the 









An answer that provides a generic negative emotion. For example not 
happy (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example unconcerned 
OR provides a positive emotion, for example happy OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did the woman in purple in the animation behave as 
other people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the woman in purple acted in a socially 
unacceptable way and a contextual suggest of what she should have 
done. For example, no - she should have waited her turn/gone to the 




An answer that recognises that the woman in purple acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. For example no - she was too impatient/didn't 
like the idea of having to wait (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that does not recognise that the woman in purple acted in a 
socially unacceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For 
example yes – she shouldn’t have to wait if she doesn’t want to or maybe 
she didn’t think they were getting on the same bus as her 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
woman in purple in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 


















Scenario 10: Assisting a stranger (non-social norm violation) 
General Question: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first picture and 
finishing with the last picture? 




1. Man and partner walking through park 
   
2. Man signals to other lady 
   
3. Man hands other lady his camera 
   
4. Other lady takes photo of man and his 
partner 
   
Other 
   
Question 1: Cognitive Theory of Mind: What did the woman think that the couple wanted? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the couple requires assistance with a 
specific activity and a contextual reason why they need help. For 
example, her to take a photograph of them because they want a photo of 




An answer that recognises that the couple requires assistance with a 
specific activity. For example, her to take a photograph of them. No more 
than two points can be gained if there is no mention of why the couple 
needs assistance (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that recognises that the couple needs help. For example her 
assistance/her to use their camera (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that does not recognise that the couple needs help. For 
example to give her a free camera OR don’t know 
0 












Question 2: Affective Theory of Mind: How does the couple feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that provides a specific positive emotion with a contextual 
reason. For example grateful/thankful/happy because the woman was 








An answer that provides a generic positive emotion. For example, 
fine/ok  (prompt) 
1 
    
An answer that provides a neutral emotion. For example unconcerned 
OR negative emotion. For example, annoyed OR don’t know 
0 
    
Question 3: Understanding of Social Norms: Did this woman (point to woman taking photo) in the 
animation behave as other people should behave?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that recognises that the woman acted in a socially acceptable 
manner and offered her help to perform a contextual specific action. For 




An answer that recognises that the woman acted in a socially acceptable 




An answer that does not recognise that the woman acted in a socially 
acceptable manner but provides a reasonable justification. For example 
no- she shouldn’t have said yes, she doesn’t know them. They are 
complete strangers  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant explanation  0     
Question 4: Understanding of Social Norms (Section 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
woman in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 


















Appendix 1.3. New practice scenario  















Appendix 1.4. Final scoring scheme for the ESCoT 
Tell the participant: I’m going to show you a short animation that tells a story, and ask you a couple 
of questions about it.  
The first animation is a practice, to get you used to the sort of questions I’m going to be asking. Let’s 
begin. 
Practice Scenario: Assisting a stranger  
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. A postman is empting a post box and filling 
up his bag  
   
2. Woman approaching with letter, looks to be 
in a rush  
   
3. Woman hands the postman the letter, and he 
takes the letter  
   
4. Postman puts the letter that the woman gave 
him his bag 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the woman with the letter thinking?   
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the woman wanted to perform a 
specific action and a contextual reason why she performed the action. 
For example, she is thinking that she wants him/the postman to post her 
letter/put the letter with the others because she was late and missed the 




A social answer that recognises that the woman wanted to perform a 
specific action. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual 
reason is not given. For example, she is thinking that she wants him/the 
postman to post her letter/put the letter with the others (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the woman wanted to perform 
a specific action. No more than 1 point can be gained if there is no 
mention of the other person from the interaction in the response, even 
with a contextual reason. For example, she wants to post the letter she 
has/she is thinking she wants to post her letter/put the letter in the bag 
(prompt) 
1 
    






Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman with the letter feel at the end of the animation?   
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 





An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels happy/ok/fine because 
she was able to post her letter (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she feels happy/ok/fine (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer  0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the postman in the animation behave as other 
people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the postman acted in a socially acceptable 
manner, and provides a contextual reason for his actions. For example, 
yes - he took the letter that she/the woman wanted to be posted/that the 
woman handed to him, it was the nice thing to do because she was late, 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the postman acted in a socially acceptable 
manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is 
not given. For example, yes - he took the letter that she/the woman 
wanted to be posted/that the woman handed to him, it was the nice 
thing to do (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the postman acted in a socially acceptable 
manner. For example, yes – he took the letter/he did his job/he was 
helpful (prompt) OR no - he should have made her put it in the box and 
wait for the next collection because she was late/it is illegal to take it  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 4 
Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
postman in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 





Scenario 1: Helping the elderly (social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. Old lady with bag 
   
2. Shopping bag bursts and all of her shopping is 
on the ground 
   
3. Points to spilled shopping as man is present 
   
4. Man walks on 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the elderly lady feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
abandoned/vulnerable/helpless because the man just ignored her and 
she is going to have to pick up her shopping on her own, which will be 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels angry/she is upset/not 
happy because the man just ignored her and she is going to have to pick 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she feels angry/she is upset/not happy (prompt) 
1 
    












Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the elderly lady thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the elderly lady required assistance, 
and provides a contextual reason of why she needed assistance. For 
example, she is thinking she wants him/the young man to help her pick 
up the shopping/she wants his help because her bag has split/she has a 





A social answer that recognises that the elderly lady required assistance. 
No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is not given. 
For example, she is thinking she wants him/the young man to help her 
pick up the shopping/she wants his help (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the elderly lady required 
assistance. No more than 1 point can be gained if there is no mention of 
the other person from the interaction in the response, even with a 
contextual reason. For example, she wants assistance/she is thinking she 
wants help/help to pick up her shopping (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner, and provides a contextual explanation of why she needed help. 
For example, no - he should have helped her/the elderly woman pick up 





A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual 
explanation is not given. For example, no - he should have helped 
her/the elderly woman pick up her shopping (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. For example, no - he should have helped/picked up the 
shopping (prompt) OR yes – he may have been in a rush and could not 
help/he did not do anything wrong/he avoided her shopping as she 
requested/might not have noticed her pointing 
1 
    









Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 2: Disobeying parking regulation (non-social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 





1. Woman arrives outside a shop in her car  
   
2. Woman goes into the shop leaving her car outside 
a no parking sign 
   
3. Parking attendant arrives and sees she is not 
allowed to park there 
   
4. Parking attendant gives the woman a ticket for 
parking in a no parking area 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the woman thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises the woman’s decision to park her car 
where she did had a consequence, and provides a contextual reason for 
this consequence. For example, she is thinking that she should not have 
parked there because he/the parking attendant is going to give her a 
ticket since she parked illegally/she is thinking that he/the parking 
attendant wants to give her a parking ticket/she is going to receive a 
fine from him/the parking attendant because the sign says it is a no 
parking zone/she parked illegally/broke the rules. Mention of affective 




A social answer that recognises the woman’s decision to park her car 
where she did had a consequence. No more than 2 points can be gained 
if a contextual reason is not given. For example, she is thinking that she 






to give her a ticket/he/the parking attendant wants to give her a 
parking ticket/she is going to receive a fine from him/the parking 
attendant (prompt) 
A non-social answer that recognises the woman’s decision to park her 
car where she did had a consequence. No more than 1 point can be 
gained if there is no mention of the other person from the interaction in 
the response, even with a contextual reason. For example, she is going to 
have to pay a fine/she is thinking that she is going to get a ticket/she is 
going to receive a fine (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 2 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
irritated/unlucky/annoyed because she received a parking ticket and 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels angry/she is upset/not 
happy because she received a parking ticket and probably feels like it 
was underserved (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she feels angry/she is upset/not happy (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer  0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the parking attendant in the animation behave as 
other people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the parking attendant acted in a socially 
acceptable manner, and provides a contextual reason for his actions. For 
example, yes - he did his job and gave her/the woman a parking ticket 
because she disobeyed the sign/was not allowed to parked where she 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the parking attendant acted in a socially 
acceptable manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual 
reason is not given. For example, yes - he did his job and gave her/the 
woman a parking ticket (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the parking attendant acted in a socially 
acceptable manner. For example, yes – he did his job/acted the way his 
job required him to (prompt) OR no - he did not need to give her a 
parking ticket, he could just have asked her to move her car 
1 
    








Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
parking attendant in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 3: Being considerate on the bus (social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Anything else? 
 
Notes/Partial Responses/Misconstruction/Omissions 
1. Bus is full, seat next to man with 
bag on it 
   
2. Pregnant woman gets on bus  
   
3. Pregnant woman points at seat 
   
4. Man does not move bags 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the pregnant woman feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
annoyed/infuriated/frustrated because he did not move his bag and she 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels angry/surprised/she is 
upset/not happy because he did not move his bag and she will have to 
stand on the bus (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she feels angry/surprised/she is upset/not happy (prompt) 
1 
    






Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the pregnant woman thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the pregnant woman had a 
contextual desire after getting on the bus, and provides a contextual 
reason for this desire. For example, she is thinking that she wants 
him/the man to move his bag so that she can sit down in the seat his bag 
is on/sit down next to him because she is heavily pregnant and would 
probably appreciate a seat/seats are reserved for people not bags. 




A social answer that recognises that the pregnant woman had a 
contextual desire after getting on the bus. No more than 2 points can be 
gained if a contextual reason is not given. For example, she is thinking 
that she wants him/the man to move his bag so that she can sit down in 
the seat his bag is on/sit down next to him (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the pregnant woman had a 
contextual desire after getting on the bus. No more than 1 point can be 
gained if there is no mention of the other person from the interaction in 
the response, even with a contextual reason. For example, she wants to 
sit down/she is thinking that she wants a seat/wants to sit down 
(prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner, and provides a contextual explanation of why she needed a 
seat. For example, no - he should have moved his bags so that she/the 
pregnant woman could sit down because she looks heavily pregnant and 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is 
not given. For example, no - he should have moved his bags so that 
she/the pregnant woman could sit down (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. For example, no - he should have moved his bag (prompt) OR 
yes - he was sitting down first/needs a place to put his own bags/he 
thinks she is overweight and does not realise she is pregnant 
1 
    








Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 4: Cleaning up after your pet (social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. Man walking dog near children's 
park/playground 
   
2. Dog defecates on ground near bin 
   
3. Woman and child approach, 
woman points at bin 
   
4. Man does not clean up after his 
dog 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the woman with the child thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the woman with the child wanted a 
specific action performed, and provides a contextual reason for this 
action to be performed. For example, she is thinking that she wants 
him/the man to clean up after his dog/put the dog’s droppings in the 
bin because it is the man’s responsibility to clean up after his pet/it is a 
health hazard and they are near a children’s playground/it is illegal not 





A social answer that recognises that the woman with the child wanted a 
specific action performed. No more than 2 points can be gained if a 
contextual reason is not given. For example, she is thinking that she 
wants him/the man to clean up after his dog/put the dog’s droppings in 
the bin (prompt) 
2 
  




wanted a specific action performed. No more than 1 point can be gained 
if there is no mention of the other person from the interaction in the 
response, even with a contextual reason. For example, she does not want 
dog droppings near her child/she is thinking that she wants the mess 
cleaned up/the dog’s droppings to be put into the bin (prompt) 
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 2 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman with the child feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
annoyed/revolted/appalled because the man did not clean up after his 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
angry/surprised/disgusted/ she is upset/not happy because the man did 
not clean up after his dog and just left the mess on the ground (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she is upset/not happy/she feels 
angry/surprised/disgusted (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer  0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner, and provides a contextual explanation of why the dog mess 
needed to be cleaned up. For example, no - he should have listened to 
her/the woman and cleaned up after his dog/put the dog's droppings in 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is 
not given. For example, no - he should have listened to her/the woman 




A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially unacceptable 
manner. For example, no - he should have cleaned up after his dog/put 
the dog's droppings in the bin (prompt) OR yes – it is not his fault that 
his dog needed to defecate 
1 
    










Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 5: Assisting a neighbour (non-social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. Woman in garden watering plants 
   
2. Neighbour next door in his own garden 
   
3. Woman points to cat in her tree 
   
4. Cat seems to be stuck as neighbour fetches 
ladder to get it down 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
thankful/relieved/appreciative because the man rescued the cat/went 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels happy/ok/fine because 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she feels happy/ok/fine (prompt) 
1 
    





Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the woman thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the woman had a contextual 
request, and provides a contextual reason for this request. For example, 
she is thinking that she wants him/the man to get the cat down from the 
tree/to help in getting the cat down from the tree because the cat looks 
stuck/the woman indicated that she wanted him to do something about 




A social answer that recognises that the woman had a contextual 
request. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is 
not given. For example, she is thinking that she wants him/the man to 




A non-social answer that recognises that the woman had a contextual 
request. No more than 1 point can be gained if there is no mention of 
the other person from the interaction in the response, even with a 
contextual reason. For example, she wants help/she is thinking that she 
wants the cat recused/help to get the cat down from the tree (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man in the animation behave as other people 
should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially acceptable manner, 
and provides a contextual explanation of the need for help. For example, 
yes - he got the cat down from the tree for her/the lady as she/the lady 
requested because it was evident that the cat needed assistance and it is 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially acceptable manner. 
No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is not given. 
For example, yes - he got the cat down from the tree for her/the lady as 
she/the lady requested (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the man acted in a socially acceptable 
manner. For example, yes - he was helpful (prompt) OR no - he should 
not have gone up the ladder, it is not safe. He should not have risked his 
life for a cat. The cat will not be as stuck as it seems 
1 
    









Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the man 
in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 6: Smoking in a prohibited area (social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. Two women eating in restaurant 
   
2. Anti-smoking sign visible 
   
3. Woman in green lights up cigarette, woman in 
blue points to anti-smoking sign 
   
4. Woman in green blows smoke rings towards 
the woman in blue  
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the woman in blue thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the woman in blue wanted a 
specific action performed, and provides a contextual reason for this 
action to be performed. For example, she is thinking that she wants 
her/the woman/the woman in green to extinguish her cigarette/stop 
smoking because she is disobeying the sign that is clearly 
visible/smoking is prohibited in the restaurant. Mention of affective 




A social answer that recognises that the woman in blue wanted a 
specific action performed. No more than 2 points can be gained if a 
contextual reason is not given. For example, she is thinking that she 
wants her/the woman/the woman in green to extinguish her 
cigarette/stop smoking (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the woman in blue wanted a 
specific action performed. No more than 1 point can be gained if there is 
1 




no mention of the other person from the interaction in the response, 
even with a contextual reason. For example, she does not want to be 
near smoke when she is eating/she is thinking that she does not want to 
be near smoke while she’s eating her meal (prompt) 
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 2 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman in blue feel at the end of the animation?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
irritated/disrespected/furious because the woman in green ignored her 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
angry/surprised/disgusted/she is upset/not happy because the woman 
in green ignored her request and the sign (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she is upset/not happy/she feels 
angry/surprised/disgusted (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer  0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the woman in green in the animation behave as 
other people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the woman in green acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner, and provides a contextual explanation of why she 
should have listened to the woman in blue. For example, no - she should 
have listened to her/the woman in blue and stopped smoking because 





A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the woman in green acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a 
contextual reason is not given. For example, no - she should have 
listened to her/the woman in blue and stopped smoking/paid attention 
to the sign (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the woman in green acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. For example, no - she should have stopped 
smoking/paid attention to the sign (prompt) OR yes - she can smoke 
wherever she wants because she has a right to do what she wants 
1 
    









Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
woman in green in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 7: Talking in the cinema (non-social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. People in cinema watching film 
   
2. Two women start talking to one 
another 
   
3. One man says 'shh'/puts his finger to 
his mouth/tells them to be quiet 
   
4. Women cease talking and watch film 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the man feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, he feels 
satisfied/relieved/pleased because they listened to him and stopped 





An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, he feels happy/ok/fine because 
they listened to him and stopped talking so he can go back to 
watching/enjoying the movie in peace and quiet (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, he feels happy/ok/fine (prompt) 
1 
    






Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the man thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the man had a contextual request, 
and provides a contextual reason for the request. For example, the man 
is thinking that he wants them/the women to be quiet/stop talking 
because they are being loud/distracting him from the movie/being 




A social answer that recognises that the man had a contextual request. 
No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is not given. 
For example, the man is thinking that he wants them/the women to be 
quiet/stop talking (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the man had a contextual 
request. No more than 1 point can be gained if there is no mention of 
the other person from the interaction in the response, even with a 
contextual reason. For example, he wants to watch the movie in 
silence/the man is thinking that he wants to watch the movie in 
silence/in peace and quiet (prompt)  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the women in the animation behave as other 
people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the women acted in a socially acceptable 
manner, and provides a contextual explanation of why they listened to 
the man. For example, yes - they did what he/the man wanted/they 
listened to him/the man and stopped talking when they were asked to 
because they were disrupting people trying to watch the movie/it is 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the women acted in a socially acceptable 
manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is 
not given. For example, yes - they listened to him/the man and stopped 
talking when they were asked to (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the women acted in a socially acceptable 
manner. For example, yes - they stopped talking (prompt) OR no - they 
are entitled to talk during the cinema as long as they are whispering and 
should have told the man this 
1 
    









Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
women in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 8: Serving a customer (non-social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 





1. Man and child at hot-dog stand 
   
2. Child points to hot-dog sign/gestures towards 
employee at hot-dog stand 
   
3. Father hands man at hot-dog stand money 
   
4. Child gets hot-dog 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the father thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the father required a service, and 
provides a contextual reason for this service to be performed. For 
example, he is thinking that he wants to buy a hotdog from him/the 
vendor for his son/to feed his son because his son indicated that he 
wanted a hotdog/his son is hungry. Mention of affective state limits 




A social answer that recognises that the father required a service. No 
more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual reason is not given. For 
example, he is thinking that he wants to buy a hotdog from him/the 
vendor for his son/to feed his son (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the father required a service. 
No more than 1 point can be gained if there is no mention of the other 
person from the interaction in the response, even with a contextual 
1 




reason.  For example, the father wants a hotdog/the father is thinking 
that he wants to buy a hotdog for his son/feed his son (prompt) 
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 2 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the father feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, he feels 
satisfied/pleased/content because the man gave him the hotdog/took 





An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, he feels happy/ok/fine because 
the man gave him the hotdog/took his money and now his son has a 
hotdog which is what he wanted (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, he feels happy/ok/fine (prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer  0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the man behind the stand in the animation 
behave as other people should behave?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man behind the stand acted in a socially 
acceptable manner, and provides a contextual explanation for his 
actions. For example, yes - he gave the hotdog to him/the father/gave 
them what they asked for because that is his job, to serve customers and 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the man behind the stand acted in a socially 
acceptable manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual 
reason is not given. For example, yes - he gave the hotdog to him/the 
father/gave them what they asked for (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant 
social norm highlighting that the man behind the stand acted in a 
socially acceptable manner. For example, yes - he did his job (prompt) 
OR no - he should not be selling hotdogs to children, because they are 
not very healthy 
1 
    










Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the man behind the 
stand in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          
/3 
aToM =       
/3 
UNS =         
/3 
UNS2 =       
/3 
Scenario 9: Skipping a bus queue (social rule violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 





1. People waiting in queue for bus 
   
2. Bus turns up, woman in purple approaches 
   
3. Woman in purple pushes past woman in orange at 
front of queue/skips queue 
   
4. Woman in purple is on bus first while others who 
were queuing are now paying 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the woman in orange feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
outraged/annoyed/shocked because the woman in purple pushed her 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding, 
with a contextual reason. For example, she feels 
angry/surprised/disgusted/she is upset/not happy because the woman 
in purple pushed her out of the way (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional understanding. 
For example, she is upset/not happy/she feels 
angry/surprised/disgusted (prompt) 
1 
    





Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the woman in orange thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the woman in orange had a 
contextual desire, and provides a contextual reason for this desire. For 
example, the woman in orange is thinking that she wants to get on the 
bus first/on the bus before her/the woman in purple because she is at the 




A social answer that recognises that the woman in orange had a 
contextual desire. No more than 2 points can be gained if a contextual 
reason is not given. For example, the woman in orange is thinking that 




A non-social answer that recognises that the woman in orange has a 
contextual desire. No more than 1 point can be gained if there is no 
mention of the other person from the interaction in the response, even 
with a contextual reason. For example, she wants to get on the bus/the 
woman in orange is thinking that she wants to get on the bus first/get on 
the bus (prompt)  
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the woman in purple in the animation behave as 
other people should behave? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the woman in purple acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner, and provides a contextual explanation of why her 
actions were inappropriate. For example,  no - she should have waited 
her turn and let her/the woman in orange go first/gone to the back of 
the queue and waited for everyone else to get on first because they were 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the woman in purple acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. No more than 2 points can be gained if a 
contextual reason is not given. For example, no - she should have waited 
her turn and let her/the woman in orange go first/gone to the back of 
the queue and waited for everyone else to get on first (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the relevant social 
norm highlighting that the woman in purple acted in a socially 
unacceptable manner. For example, no - she should have waited her 
turn/gone to the back of the queue (prompt) OR yes - she should not 
have to wait if she does not want to or maybe she did not think they were 
getting on the same bus as her 
1 
    







Question 4  
Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
woman in purple in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 






    
 
cToM =          /3 aToM =       /3 UNS =         /3 UNS2 =       /3 
Scenario 10: Assisting a stranger (non-social norm violation) 
General Comprehension: Can you tell me what's happening in this story, starting with the first 
picture and finishing with the last picture? 




1. Man and partner walking through park 
   
2. Man signals to other lady 
   
3. Man hands other lady his camera 
   
4. Other lady takes photo of man and his 
partner 
   
Other 
   
Question 1 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: What is the couple thinking? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that recognises that the couple had a 
contextual request, and provides a contextual reason for 
this request. For example, the couple are thinking that they 
want her/the woman to take a photo for them because they 
want a photo of them together to remember their walk/trip 
and they cannot take it themselves. Mention of affective 




A social answer that recognises that the couple had a 
contextual request. No more than 2 points can be gained if 
a contextual reason is not given. For example, the couple 
are thinking that they want her/the woman to take a photo 
for them (prompt) 
2 
  
A non-social answer that recognises that the couple had a 
contextual request. No more than 1 point can be gained if 
1 




there is no mention of the other person from the 
interaction in the response, even with a contextual reason. 
For example, they want a photo/the couple are thinking 
that they want a photo of themselves together (prompt) 
Don't know/irrelevant answer 0     
Question 2 
Affective Theory of Mind: How does the couple feel at the end of the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
An answer that demonstrates a higher order emotional 
understanding, with a contextual reason. For example, they 
feel pleased/grateful/thankful because the woman stopped 
and took the photograph for them and now they have 




An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional 
understanding, with a contextual reason. For example, they 
feel happy because the woman stopped and took the 
photograph for them and now they have something to 
remember their walk/trip (prompt) 
2 
  
An answer that demonstrates a lower order emotional 
understanding. For example, they feel happy/ok/fine 
(prompt) 
1 
    
Don't know/irrelevant answer  0     
Question 3 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: Did the woman taking the photo in the animation 
behave as other people should behave?  
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me more about what you mean by that? / Can you explain 
that in a little bit more detail? 
 Additional notes 
A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the 
relevant social norm highlighting that the woman acted in 
a socially acceptable manner, and provides a contextual 
explanation of why she did. For example, yes - she did as 
they/the man requested and took the photo because they 
could not do it themselves and it did not take much time 




A social answer that exhibits an understanding of the 
relevant social norm highlighting that the woman acted in 
a socially acceptable manner. No more than 2 points can 
be gained if a contextual reason is not given. For example, 




A non-social answer that exhibits an understanding of the 
relevant social norm highlighting that the woman acted in 
a socially acceptable manner. For example, yes - she was 
helpful/took the photo (prompt) OR no - she should not 
have said yes, she does not know them and they are 
complete strangers 
1 
    








Intrapersonal Understanding of Social Norms (Part 2): Would you have acted the same as the 
woman in the animation? 
Prompt ONCE if needed: Can you tell me why? 












    
 
















Appendix 1.5. Formula and calculations for age-adjusted scores for subtests of the 
ESCoT 
General formula:  
K = b1 (χ – mean (χ)) 
Cognitive Theory of Mind: 
1 = 0.037 (χ – 50) 
Affective Theory of Mind 
1 = 0.043 (χ – 50) 
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms: 
1 = 0.066 (χ – 50) 
To calculate the age adjustments for individuals younger than 20 years old and 81 
years old and older:  











Appendix 1.6. Supplementary information for Chapter 4 
Age adjusted scores 
Cognitive ToM. Raw cognitive ToM scores should be adjusted for age accordingly: 
18–22 years old= –1 point, 23–77 years old= no change in raw score and 78 years 
and older= +1 point.  
Affective ToM. Raw affective ToM scores should be adjusted for age:  18–26 years 
old= –1 point, 27–73 years old= no change in raw score and 74 years and older= 
+1 point.  
Interpersonal Understanding of Social Norms. Raw scores should be adjusted as 
follows: 18–19 years old= –2 points, 20–34 years old= –1 point, 35–65 years 













Appendix 1.7 Neuropsychological testing of patients 
The table below shows the mean scores of the patient group on the 
neuropsychological tests that patients completed with Professor Abrahams.  
Test Mean (SD) 
Memory  
BMIPB – story recall  
Immediate  11.88 (7.60) 
Delay  8.84 (8.15) 
% retained  63.48 (41.38) 
BMIPB – figure recall  
Copy 73.17 (10.31)a 
Immediate recall 36.80 (19.16) 
Delayed recall 32.37 (20.83)a 
% retained 77.92 (24.57)a 
BMIPB – FSCRT  
Free recall 13.33 (7.67)a 
Cued  38.42 (9.22)a 
Sensitivity to cuing (%) 77.22 (19.63)b 
Delay 4.05 (3.19)c 
Cued 12.91 (3.49)c 
Executive functions  
Trail Making Test (seconds)  
Part A 49.45 (22.35)a 
Part B 116.58 (64.43)d 
Letter fluency   




Animal fluency  13.78 (4.45)b 
D-KEFS card sorting (scaled score) 7.92 (2.81)a 
Language functions   
Graded naming test 16.12 (7.97) 
Warrington spelling test 20.28 (8.23)e 
TROG 36.73 (13.67)d 
Visuospatial   
Number location 9.87 (0.35)f 
Dot counting  7.13 (3.18)f 
Behaviour change  
FBI  
Negative behaviours 12.61 (9.52) 
Disinhibition  8.72 (7.71) 
Total  21.33 (16.61) 
an = 24; bn = 23; cn = 21; dn = 19; en = 18, fn = 15.  
 
 
 
